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ABSTRACT
The underlying theme of this study is to examine and 
compare the effectiveness and consequences of implementing 
two alternative stabilisation techniques in an open economy. 
The study incorporates an applied extension of recent 
theoretical stabilisation developments. In particular, the 
familiar optimisation or flexible target technique is compared 
with the new dynamic Tinbergen or fixed target technique. 
Essentially, the fixed target approach allows the policy-maker 
to exactly achieve a set of targets over a specified time 
horizon when he has more targets than instruments as long as 
he is prepared to anticipate the target path. On the other 
hand, the flexible target approach imposes the constraint of 
compromising all targets when the number of targets exceeds 
the number of instruments. In order to compare the two 
techniques, a simple open model of the Australian economy is 
constructed and estimated. The model assumes a fixed exchange 
rate and allows for an endogenous money supply and interaction 
and feedback between the income, monetary and open sectors.
The interrelationship between sectors complicates the use of 
policy and the carrying out of flexible and fixed target 
simulation experiments gives insight into this problem.
Uncertainty is stressed throughout the study and it 
is found that additive uncertainty can seriously affect the 
mix of policy required, given a specific set of objectives.
In particular, it is shown that a significant switch in the
Vemphasis on the use of instruments can occur when we move 
from a situation of certainty to uncertainty. The switching 
effects are especially important in an internal and external 
balance framework. In addition, problems of instrument 
instability in an open economy are examined and specific 
problems faced by the applied control theorist are identified 
along with suggested solutions.
The applied experiments mainly focus on the targets of 
internal and external balance coupled with monetary targets 
such as the rate of interest and the money supply. The optimal 
achievement of monetary targets is also examined in some detail 
with the general conclusion that the supply of money is the 
appropriate target to aim for. One general conclusion is clear 
from the internal and external balance experiments and the 
monetary experiments. The achievement of target configurations 
which include targets from different sectors and given a fixed 
exchange rate regime, requires a rigorous and strong use of 
both monetary and fiscal policy and indeed, the exact 
achievement of a target or targets under these conditions 
places considerable stress on the instruments. This feature 
results in the fixed target technique being vastly inferior to 
the flexible target technique given the model and the 
designated target paths set out in this study.
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS • . - •-• • • • • • • iii
ABSTRACT ... ... ... • • - iv
Chapter
I INTRODUCTION • • • - - - • ■ • 1
II THE STABILISATION FRAMEWORK ... ... 14
III A SMALL OPEN MODEL OF THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY ... 58
IV STATE SPACE REALISATION, TARGET SPECIFICATION,
COST FUNCTION BIAS AND INSTRUMENT INSTABILITY ... 96
V OPTIMAL AND FIXED TARGET PLANNING FOR INTERNAL
AND EXTERNAL BALANCE ... ... ... 157
VI OPTIMAL ACHIEVEMENT OF MONETARY TARGETS ... 221
VII THE FIXED TARGET APPROACH TO STABILISATION ... 273
VIII STABILISATION AND SPECULATIVE CAPITAL FLOWS ... 342
IX CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY ... ... ... 372
NOTES ... ... ... 379
BIBLIOGRAPHY ... ... ... 384
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The problem of macroeconomic stabilisation has been a topic on which 
a considerable degree of attention has been focussed for a considerable 
number of years. Recent developments in econometrics and control theory 
have enabled economists to approach the problem of stabilisation in a very 
sophisticated way, certainly at a level far above that conceived by Keynes 
(1935) in his classic "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money" 
which is regarded by many to be the precursor of modern macroeconomic 
stabilisation theory. Keynes of course did not offer any formal techniques 
for stabilising an economic system but his work did influence some 
important developments in that area. Unfortunately, the formal analysis of 
stabilisation techniques developed in two separate areas. The first major 
step in the development of formal dynamic stabilisation techniques (as opposed 
to purely judgemental procedures) was not the early work of Phillips as is 
supposed by many people, but the recognition by Tustin (1951),(1953) that 
the economy depicted as a simple Keynesian structure, could be formulated 
as a classical control system resembling a control engineer's view of a 
physical system. While the publication of Tustin's work was very close in 
time to that of Phillips', it is interesting to note that Tustin's view 
of the economy as a control system was formulated as early as 1946. While 
Tustin was successful in identifying the economy as a system in which 
controls (instruments) could be manipulated in a systematic way to affect 
particular responses in the outputs (targets), he failed to extend his 
analysis to modelling the economy within a particular structure and then 
analysing the nature of control policies to achieve particular output 
configurations. The seminal work of Phillips (1954), (1957) extended the
2frameworks of Keynes and Tustin to the application of classical control 
techniques to dynamic economic models which gave birth to a new literature 
in dynamic stabilisation. The proportional, derivative and integral 
policies of Phillips can be seen as a natural extension of Keynes' initial 
recognitiion of the need for governments to manipulate economic controls 
in order to achieve some desired state of the economy and when combined 
with the newly developing field of econometrics, presented a seemingly 
formidable tool for economic stabilisation.
While Phillips was essentially concerned with the dynamic evolution 
and stabilisation of systems, Tinbergen (1952) developed a set of 
propositions which, given a linear description of the model structure,would 
enable a policy-maker to exactly hit a set of specified targets so long as a 
static framework was employed. While Tinbergen's work made a considerable 
impact on economic thinking it was Phillips' approach which was regarded 
as the most amenable to practical implementations as most economists and 
policy makers view the world as a dynamic entity. As such, Tinbergen's 
static analysis was not seen to be able to cope with practical problems 
of macroeconomic stabilisation and the fruitful ideas put forward by 
Tinbergen were not built upon or extended into a formal dynamic framework 
until recently, as we shall see below. However, Hansen (1958, (1968), 
recognised the means by which extension of Tinbergen's static analysis 
could be carried but was unable to provide the necessary framework and 
his work remained largely unnoticed.
"If then we consider each target in each period as a single 
target (a balanced foreign trade for each year during the five 
year period is thus considered five single targets), and we 
consider each change of an instrument a measure, Rule No. 1, will 
be: The number of measures to be taken for the five years shall be
equal to the number of targets. But the number of instruments used
3may be smaller because a certain instrument may be varied 
each year. With respect to coordination certain 
modifications are also necessary. So too we remark that in 
principle all the measures necessary may be taken at the beginning 
of the five year period, or they may be spread out over the 
single years." (Hansen (1968), p.34).
Hansen's observation provides the basic foundation for a major portion of 
this study.
As attractive as Phillips' policy specifications were, there were 
a number of problems associated with them. Firstly, the early work was 
conceived within a single instrument single target framework and the theory 
was never adequately generalised to a multi-dimensional framework as was 
Tinbergen's static formulation and Hansen's observation on a dynamic type 
Tinbergen framework. Secondly, the nature of the classical design procedure 
is essentially ad hoc with little guide being given to the policy maker on 
how to select a particular policy rule over another or how to choose the 
speed of adjustment coefficients which form a fundamental component of 
Phillips' approach. Furthermore, Phillips (and later Baumöl (1970)) 
demonstrated how the incorrect implementation of policy could lead to 
severe oscillations and destabilising influences on income. With the 
development of modern optimisation techniques, particularly the work of 
Pontryagin (1962), the focus of attention in regard to dynamic 
stabilisation shifted to optimal control, particularly to the linear/ 
quadratic (flexible target) problem.which has become familiar in the 
economic literature. While Theil (1964) was one of the earliest exponents 
of the use of linear/quadratic techniques, it was not until the work of 
Pindyck (1973a) and Friedman (1972) that sufficient attention was focussed 
on numerically controlling economic systems to stimulate a wide body of 
research to be carried out in that area. Pindyck and Friedman certainly
4were not the first to introduce optimal control techniques into economics 
as it already had become a familiar technique in the growth theory 
literature (see Shell (1967)). Nonetheless, they demonstrated the 
considerable degree of knowledge that could be obtained from numerical 
analysis. Theoretical analysis is also important (for example see 
Turnovsky (1973) (1974) (1975)) but is only viable in terms of
mathematical tractability for small simple examples and hence the 
majority of applications of optimal techniques have been to numerical 
models. In a recent survey article Kendrick (1976) cites over fifty 
applications. The use of optimal techniques were seen as a distinct 
advantage over the Phillips type policies in that they were more general 
and allowed for the specification of specific targets to which the system 
is to be steered. Optimising techniques were also (and still are) seen as 
a significant improvement over the Tinbergen instrument/target equality 
condition in that policies could be found to exist when the number of 
targets exceeded the number of instruments and the framework was dynamic 
rather than static. (It was in fact recognised that if the number of 
targets equalled the number of instruments then it was possible to hit the 
desired targets in a dynamic framework. Little attention was paid to a 
formal analysis of the existence of policy however). In fact, optimisation 
techniques have in many cases been justified on the grounds that if the 
number of targets did exceed the number of instruments available then a 
Tinbergen type framework was inapplicable and the best the policy maker 
could do would be to trade off or compromise all of his targets. Indeed, 
with the exception of Hansen's unrecognised observation, it was and still 
largely is, the accepted view that Tinbergen's static framework could not be 
generalised to a dynamic framework,
5"The framework (Tinbergen's) does not appear to have any clear 
application to dynamic analysis in which each variable has not 
a one-dimensional fixed value but a time pattern of behaviour."
(Culbertson (1968, p.394).
Recently, Preston (1974) has, using modern control theory concepts 
of system controllability, successfully extended Tinbergen's static analysis 
into a dynamic framework thus resurrecting Tinbergen's analysis as a 
theoretically viable dynamic stabilisation technique and providing the 
formal criteria which eluded Hansen. The controllability conditions set 
out by Preston raise the interesting possibility that a multi-target system 
can be exactly stabilised over time with only one 'instrument varying. The 
practical implications of this are somewhat clouded in Preston's original 
paper as a continuous time formulation was employed. The basic result 
has been reformulated by Preston and Sieper (1977) in which a discrete time 
dynamic analogue to Tinbergen's famous counting rule has been derived, with 
the discrete time framework allowing for considerably more insight into the 
problem than the continuous time approach. It is shown that given policy 
existence (see ChapterTwo), a policy maker is able to exactly hit a sequence 
of targets over time when the number of targets exceeds the number of 
controls provided the policy-maker is willing to anticipate his target path. 
The notion of target anticipation refers to the requirement that a policy­
maker can begin to manipulate his instruments now in order to hit and stay
on target at some time period t. The analysis as we shall see depends
crucially on the number of targets selected, the length of the desired 
target path and the length of the anticipation period. By treating each 
instument at different points of time as a separate "instrument" (as was 
suggested by Hansen) a dynamic counterpart to Tinbergen's static counting 
rule can be obtained which states that the number of time indexed
instruments must equal the number of time indexed targets. This treatment
6of. instruments also accounts for the continuous time result whereby 
multiple targets could be achieved with a single instrument. The 
development of a dynamic Tinbergen framework should be viewed as the next 
stage of development after optimal stabilisation and finally draws together 
the early dynamic approach instigated by Phillips and the early static work 
of Tinbergen into a unified framework and in fact it poses a challenge 
to the continued use of optimising techniques. Optimising techniques 
by their very nature imply complete impatience by the policy-maker (more 
targets than instruments) in trying to achieve his targets, that is, he 
is not prepared to wait and tries to achieve them without any anticipation 
with the result that no targets are achieved. The dynamic Tinbergen 
framework (fixed targets) allows exact fine tuning when there are more 
targets than instruments, and indeed, raises the question of whether or not 
under these circumstances optimisation will become redundant. (If costs 
are placed on controls then of course the flexible target approach will 
still be relevant and the fixed target procedure will be inapplicable).
A major aim of this study will be to provide the first applied evidence 
concerning the use of a dynamic fixed target technique for macroeconomic 
stabilisation and in doing so comparing it with conventional linear/ 
quadratic results.
While the overall theme will be one of comparing two techniques, 
the study will follow several other main thrusts. Firstly, while it is 
common for studies which aim to illustrate various stabilisation techniques 
to largely ignore the economic implications involved, the economics of 
particular scenarios presented in the following chapters will be discussed 
in detail. In particular, the applied portions of the investigation will 
focus on specific issues associated with an open economy. The optimal 
stabilisation literature has in general tended to ignore problems of the
7open economy, although many of the studies which have been carried out 
have included open sectors of varying degree, for example Garbade (1957a) 
and Friedman (1975a). While open sectors have been included in the 
relevant econometric models, attention has usually been focussed on 
internal targets and stabilisation problems. The problems of open 
economies have not been ignored but have mainly been analysed in a 
comparative static theoretical framework. See for example Mundell (1962) 
and Helliwell (1969) to name just two. Recently, Turnovsky (forthcoming) 
(1977c) has analysed the behaviour of a small open economy in an optimising 
framework. This study seeks to extend the theoretical approach of 
Turnovsky to an applied framework and in doing so provide a further extension 
to the applied work that has been carried out in relation to closed 
economies. The particular aspects which are focussed upon are the linkages 
between the income, monetary and open sectors and the corresponding problems 
of achieving internal and external balance and/or monetary targets given the 
implications of these linkages. In addition, the choice of an optimising 
or non-optimising stabilisation technique may affect the choice of targets.
For example, compromising targets through the use of a flexible target 
technique may prevent exact fine tuning but may enable all target variables 
to lie close to their respective desired paths and be consistent with 
feasible levels of the controls. On the other hand, exact fine tuning 
through the dynamic Tinbergen framework may result in extreme adjustment 
by the instruments and unstable behaviour in the non-target endogenous 
variables. What is gained in target performance from the linear/quadratic 
solution may be offset by controls which are not feasible and erratic 
behaviour in the remainder of the system.
Uncertainty is a key issue in the implementation of policy, regardless 
of whether policy is formulated using econometric models and sophisticated
8quantitative techniques or pure judgement or a combination of both.
Brainard (1967) has shown how the presence of uncertainty in the form of 
random disturbances can lead to a situation where the policy planner 
can minimise the variance in his targets by using all linearly 
independent instruments at his disposal, even if he only has one target.
In a similar vein, Turnovsky (1975) has shown how the introduction of 
uncertainty can result in a switch in the choice of optimal monetary 
instrument. The results of both Brainard and Turnovsky clearly demonstrate 
the importance of uncertainty in selecting an appropriate mix of policy.
The work of the last two mentioned author's is in a purely theoretical 
framework but the implications for applied analysis are only too clear; if 
adequate account is not taken of uncertainty in the system then 
erroneous and possibly destabilising policy configurations could be 
implemented. The above statement appears to be a contradiction in terms 
for if it were possible to fully take account of uncertainty then 
uncertainty would no longer be a problem. However, the best policy-makers 
can do is to include uncertainty into econometric models in the form of 
random coefficients and additive disturbances and then make some policy 
assessment based on the distribution of those random variables. Techniques 
are available which enable the optimal control of an econometric model to 
be attempted within a stochastic framework although it should be recognised 
that for large models the treatment of coefficients as random variables 
would be largely prohibitive at the application level. No such techniques 
are as yet available for the fixed target framework and it will become 
clear in chapter two that it is unlikely that the fixed target approach, will 
be as amenable to stochastic analysis as the flexible target framework.
Applied studies have tended to focus on the variance of 
target variables when uncertainty is introduced and have paid little
9attention to the behaviour of the controls, particularly to the time 
paths of the controls. (See Abel (1975) and Chow (1972a)). Clearly it 
should be of prime concern to have some idea of the sensititivy of the 
controls to the presence of uncertainty and the ability of the controls to 
adjust to uncertainty in the system. An analysis of uncertainty is even 
more relevant in an open economy where one could expect external shocks to 
filter through the domestic economy - shocks which the domestic authorities 
will not be able to foresee. We know from the well-known nature of the 
feedback control laws derived in the linear/quadratic framework (Chow(1975a) 
for example) that to a large extent the optimal controls so derived will be 
self adjusting to past additive shocks. As we shall see in the following 
chapter, controls derived from the dynamic Tinbergen framework are unable, 
with one special exception, to adjust for past shocks. This implies that 
exact fine tuning will not take place. Will the presence of additive 
uncertainty result in the abandonment of the fixed target approach for a 
flexible target approach bearing in mind that optimisation techniques like 
the fixed target technique, are unable to adjust to present shocks? This 
is one of the questions which the study will address itself to. In 
addition, the effect of uncertainty on the behaviour of the controls will 
be examined in detail. Due to the computational complications of 
incorporating random coefficients into even a medium size model, only 
additive disturbances will be considered in this study. The necessity 
of such an approach will become apparent when the fixed target procedure 
is discussed in the next chapter. The use of random coefficients not only 
poses a formidable numerical problem but the requirement that coefficients 
can "bounce" around over time may result in a failure of policy existence 
in both the flexible and fixed targets frameworks.
The presence of an open sector in a system also poses another
10
problem of uncertainty for the policy planner and that is the problem 
of correctly forecasting future values of associated uncontrollable 
exogenous variables; variables which are assumed to be known with certainty 
in the solution of both the flexible and fixed target problems. In the 
case of Australia, the level of exports in any period can fluctuate 
considerably from any previous levels due to the seasonal nature of much 
of the exported produce, shifts in foreign demand and foreign exchange 
adjustments. Additional and related complications arise from unanticipated 
speculative capital flows flowing in or out of the country in anticipation 
of exchange rate adjustments. Difficulties could arise in trying to 
accurately forecast when speculation will be triggered. A failure to 
adequately forecast such occurrences correctly, could lead to a severely 
fluctuating or explosive balance of payments (level of reserves) which, 
if not compensated for by offsetting domestic monetary policy for example, 
could have severe consequences for the supply of money. Allowing for wealth 
effects in consumption it is clear that widely divergent movements in the 
money supply could have destabilising effects on income. The sensitivity 
of optimal controls to forecast errors in exogenous variables has largely 
been ignored in the applied optimal stabilisation literature and of 
course has not even been considered within the new fixed target framework. 
The present study will attempt to correct this deficiency in relation to 
forecast errors concerning unanticipated speculative capital flows, 
although it should be remembered that the results will be largely model 
dependent.
AN OVERVIEW
Chapter Two presents a theoretical framework for both the 
flexible and fixed target techniques with a special emphasis on a 
comparison between the two. Attention is also focussed on the question
11
of existence and uniqueness of policy, a question which has not received 
a sufficient degree of attention in the economic literature. The 
establishment of policy existence in an applied study is of crucial 
importance, especially if a fixed target technique is being utilised. 
Similarities between the existence and uniqueness criteria for both 
techniques of stabilisation are indicated where appropriate. Having 
developed a formal framework for stabilisation, Chapter Three contains a 
description and estimation of a small open model of the Australian economy 
under a fixed exchange rate regime, with particular emphasis on the linkages 
between the open, monetary and income sectors and which demonstrates the 
importance of considering the impact of fiscal policy on the monetary and 
open sectors, as well as the income sector, and similarly illustrates the 
importance of considering the effects of monetary policy on the income 
sector. It is also argued in Chapter Three that certain considerations 
need to be taken into account when constructing a model to be used for 
stabilisation purposes and indeed, some models and particular features of 
models will render those models unsuitable for stabilisation purposes. Such 
issues tend to be overlooked in the literature and should influence the 
type of model to be used.
Chapter Four presents a state space version of the model and 
clarifies the differences and similarities between the state space 
(one period lag) realisation familiar to economists and employed in the 
derivation of the linear/quadratic solution in Chapter Two and the state 
space realisation used in the fixed target approach which is more familiar 
to the non-economist control theorist. Desired target paths for all 
endogenous and control variables are presented along with a discussion 
concerning the appropriateness of using one set of weights in a quadratic 
cost function for all periods of a specified planning period. It is argued
12
that unless weights are adjusted each time period to take account of 
targets growing over time, cost function bias can influence a solution 
and perhaps even destroy the original desired trade-offs. The chapter is 
completed by a discussion and investigation of some aspects of instrument 
instability - a problem which warrants attention in an exact fine tuning 
framework and in an attempted fine tuning framework such as the linear/ 
quadratic approach.
Chapters Five and Six incorporate discussions of applied 
stabilisation exercises with the main emphasis being on the linear/quadratic 
approach. Chapter Five includes a discussion of the problems associated 
with achieving internal and external balance given a fixed exchange rate 
and compares the flexible and fixed target approaches under suitable 
conditions. Problems of hitting monetary targets such as the rate of 
interest and the supply of money are considered in Chapter Six. The 
complications resulting from the presence of an open sector in following 
such a course of action are discussed along with the effects of uncertainty 
a factor which is also stressed in Chapter Five. Both chapters extend the 
instrument instability analysis of Chapter Four and in particular it is 
shown that the presence of uncontrollable exogenous variables and desired 
target paths which grow over time can give a mistaken impression of 
instrument instability when in fact the underlying structure of the model 
does not contain such a property. The emphasis in Chapter Seven is 
switched from the linear/quadratic framework to the dynamic Tinbergen 
fixed target framework. The applied analysis is developed through the 
computation of the dynamic multipliers of the system using the state space 
realisation of Chapter Four. Controllability matrices for both target 
point and target path problems are analysed for a number of target 
configurations. Where appropriate, the results of Chapters Five and Six
13
are compared with fixed target solutions and the comparison is extended 
to incorporate internal and external balance targets with monetary and 
other income targets. The augmented target sets are then examined in both 
fixed and flexible target frameworks.
Foreign exchange speculation is a problem that can easily arise 
under a fixed exchange rate such as that which has operated in Australia 
in various degrees. The result of speculation is usually to force a 
substantial shift in the exchange rate with the direction of the shift 
depending on the direction in which reserves are moving. Speculation has 
played a significant role in Australia's external sector in recent years 
with a substantial revaluation in 1972 and a severe devaluation in 1976.
At the time of writing (1977), opinion was beginning to form in favour of 
a further major adjustment. The formation of such an opinion of course 
necessarily contributes to the speculation and the subsequent exchange 
rate adjustment. Chapter Eight examines the effect of speculation within 
the context of the model and more importantly, examines the sensitivity 
of stabilisation techniques to speculation. It will be seen in the next 
chapter that in the linear/quadratic framework the optimal controls will 
be able to adjust to past disturbances in the system which raises the 
question of whether or not the automatic control laws will be able to 
adequately compensate for unanticipated capital flows (speculation). In 
contrast, the dynamic Tinbergen approach does not allow for self­
adjustment in the controls which suggests that if the speculation is 
particularly severe then planning and fine tuning would need to be 
abandoned in favour of short run discretionary policy. The applied analysis 
will yield some insight into these issues. Chapter Nine summarises the 
main results and contains the conclusions of the study in addition to 
highlighting some areas of future research suggested by the present study.
CHAPTER II
THE STABILISATION FRAMEWORK
In this chapter the control framework for the experiments that 
follow, is set out with particular emphasis on a comparison between the 
flexible target approach (linear/quadratic) and fixed target approach 
(dynamic Tinbergen). Both techniques have received attention elsewhere, 
particularly the linear/quadratic approach, while the fixed target approach 
is a relatively new technique. The linear/quadratic technique is of the 
following form. We seek to minimise a cost function given by
J = E i W ' W V  + ‘v V ' W V 1t=l (2.1)
subject to the system dynamics
x = A x n + C u + D z + a + e  (2.2)t t-1 t t o t
with given initial condition
x = iJj (2.3)o
with (2.2) being a first order or state space realisation of the 
conventional reduced form of an econometric model. A further discussion of 
state space systems follows in chapter four but for the present it suffices 
to say that the state vector, x^ _, consists of the output vector, y^ _, or 
vector of endogenous variables contained within the system of interest, plus 
newly defined variables to take account of endogenous variables with lags 
greater than one period and lagged controls and exogenous variables. The 
notion of states and outputs will be crucial in the development of both the
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optimal and non-optimal fixed target approaches to stabilisation. The
matrices A, C and D are constant matrices of coefficients of lagged state,
control and exogenous variables respectively while u^ and z^_ are vectors
of control and exogenous variables. a is a vector of constant termso
and e _^ is a vector of random additive disturbances with zero mean and
satisfying a specified covariance matrix. In relation to the cost
function (2.1), x^_ and u^_ are vectors of desired or target values of the
state variables (specifically the output component of the current state)
and desired values of the control variables. E is the expectationo
conditional on the initial conditions and Q and R are cost matricest t
which penalise deviations of the state variables and control variables 
from their respective target paths. Usually, Q is specified to be 
positive semi-definite while in many cases it is convenient to specify 
R^_ as a positive definite matrix. This restriction on R^_ implies that 
there is some positive cost (however small) associated with deviations of 
all control variables from their desired paths. The imposition of this 
restriction on R^_ is not necessary to obtain a mathematical solution 
without resorting to the complications of using a generalised inverse 
but, as we shall see below, it is when combined with other conditions, 
sufficient to ensure that a policy exists and is unique. Before proceeding 
to a discussion of the solution technique it is convenient to introduce 
the following notational simplification. In order to apply control theory 
of the fixed or flexible target variety in the absence of any learning 
procedure, it is necessary to assume that the values of the uncontrollable 
exogenous variables are known, or are believed to be known, for each 
time period 7 a highly restrictive assumption, which will be relaxed in 
Chapter Eight, in relation to correctly forecasting the "trigger" level 
of foreign reserves which will set off speculative capital flows. Thus,
16
Dz^ _ and a can be added together and treated as given over the planning 
period. To achieve this a new vector, b , can be defined such that
b = Dz + a . (2.4)t t o
(2.2) can now be written as
x, = Ax _ + Cu + b + e (2.5)t t-1 t t t
The reduction of (2.2) to (2.5) will greatly facilitate the derivation
of the optimal control laws. Letting n equal the number of state and k
equal the number of control variables yields the following system
dimensions. A and C are (nxn) and (nxk) matrices respectively while
x , x , b and e are all (nxl) vectors, u, \s (K'kV).t t-1 t t v j
The specification of the optimal control problem as it is 
presented above is certainly the most basic specification and the 
literature, both economic and non-economic/has progressed significantly 
from the formulation. However, in terms of the aims of this study the 
formulation is quite acceptable. The use of a quadratic cost function 
can be criticised on many grounds (see Theil (1964)) particularly from 
the point of view of the restrictive way in which penalties are allocated. 
It is argued, with some justification, that pol.icy-planners are in many 
instances only concerned with particular target variables lying between 
certain specified upper and lower bounds or above or below particular 
limited, in addition of course to normal quadratic treatment. This type 
of problem can be adequately handled by a piece-wise quadratic approach 
(Friedman (1975), Fitzgerald, Johnston and Bayes (1973)). The piece-wise 
quadratic approach has not been adopted here as has been stated in the 
previous chapter, the underlying theme of this study is to consider system 
performance under exact fine tuning or attempted fine tuning. The fixed
17
target approach yields exact fine tuning after an appropriate policy 
lead while the linear/quadratic approach attempts in the absence of an 
exact fine tuning capability, to come as close as possible to a fine 
tuning solution given the constraints of the system and possible trade­
offs between targets. The adoption of a piece-wise quadratic approach 
implicitly assumes that policy-planners are not concerned with getting 
as close as possible to levels of specified targets. Indeed, if policy- 
planners were not concerned with trying to exactly achieve targets then 
the fixed target approach would be redundant. Because of the underlying 
philosophy of the quadratic cost function approach to optimal control, 
it is logical that this should be the optimal technique to be used as a 
comparison with the fixed target approach - at least at this stage of our 
knowledge of the performance of a system under dynamic fixed target 
control which up until this study was nil. There is ample scope for future 
research into comparative techniques.
A second objection to the optimal control formulation outlined 
above is that it is linear and stochastic only in relation to the 
inclusion of the additive disturbances. The linearity restriction is 
probably the restriction which has caused the greatest degree of objection 
to optimal control techniques, especially in the initial stages of the 
development of macro economic applications, resulting in accusations of 
"fixing" the models and research problems to fit the technique. In 
response to such a criticism a researcher has available a wide variety of 
techniques to solve non-linear optimisation problems, for example,
Chow (1976a), (1976c), Livesey (1971), Garbade (1975a) and Gupta et al
(1975) to name just a few. While attempts to find non-linear techniques 
are commendable in themselves, it must be pointed out that such techniques
involve approximations. The question that has not been investigated is
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whether or not keeping a model in its non-linear form and approximately 
optimally controlling it (which usually involves a linearisation during 
the procedure) or proceeding directly to a linear estimation and exactly 
controlling the model will give widely divergent solutions. That is, is 
there anything to be gained from trying to approximately control a non­
linear model which could not be similarly achieved by using a linear 
version of the system.-'- On a more practical level, as the fixed target 
framework has only been developed for linear systems it would appear to be 
most sensible, at least initially, to use a linear optimal control 
technique as a comparison. As we shall see below, the fixed target 
solution makes use of the dynamic final form multipliers of the system 
and while the use of a non-linear model may be reasonably adequate in the 
flexible target solution, the linearisation of the model for solution 
in the fixed target framework may result in unacceptable solutions being 
obtained due to the linearised estimates of the final form multipliers 
behaving in a way which is contrary to the underlying non-linear structure. 
Such a result was obtained by Friedman (1975) in his linearisation of the 
Wharton Model.
The solution to the linear/quadratic problem has received 
adequate attention elsewhere, see for example Chow (1970), (1972a),
(1973b),(1975a), Pindyck (1973a) and Turnovsky (1974), (1977b) and as
such will not receive an excessively detailed exposition here. The solution
to the problem is obtained by the application of Bellman's (1957)
Principle of optimality which states that in a multi-dimension decision 
process an optimal solution for the entire process can be obtained by 
computing an optimal solution for each stage of the process. The set of 
all optimal decisions then consistute an optimal solution for the entire 
multi-decision problem. To employ this principle it suffices to find a
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general solution which is optimal for each stage (time period) of the 
policy decision process. It must be pointed out that the problem can be 
solved in a number of ways; for example by the use of Lagrange multipliers 
or by Pontryagins (1962) Maximum Principle. In either case the solution 
will be of the same general form as that obtained by dynamic programming.2 
The problem as specified by (2.1) - (2.3) differs slightly to the (
conventional formulation of the problem in the economic literature. For 
example, the instruments and instrument costs are included as a separate 
component of the cost function which differs from the approach adopted by 
Chow in any of his papers cited above. Chow includes u^_ in x^_ and hence 
u^_ and R^_ disappear from the solution and are incorporated in x^_ and Q^ _.
The inclusion of the controls in the cost function as a separate component 
follows the usual practice of the non-economic control literature and has 
several distinct advantages. Firstly, for very large systems it can greatly 
reduce the size of the state space system to be controlled and will alleviate 
the "curse of dimensionality" which is associated with dynamic programming 
techniques. This will become apparent in Chapter Four where the state space 
realisation is discussed in more detail. Secondly, it enhances our 
intuition and insight into how the optimal solutions will respond to the 
relative adjustments in state and control costs and the impact, for 
example, of uncontrollable exogenous variables on the optimal control vector 
given various state and instrument weightings. The second observation 
leads into a third related advantage in that our insight into existence 
and uniqueness criteria associated with linear/quadratic optimal control, 
is considerably enhanced, particularly for those wo do not profess any 
great expertise in this area. A summary of existence and uniqueness 
conditions given below illustrates this point quite adequately. Optimal 
control applications and theory in economics has not been solely confined
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to the Chow specification, for example, Pindyck (1973a), who treated 
controls as a separate component of the cost function but derived his 
control laws from the Maximum Principle. The theoretical work of 
Turnovsky (1977a) also employs a dynamic programming procedure along with 
a cost function of the (2.1) type but includes the exogenous variables in 
the vector of additive disturbances and thus a unified treatement of the 
linear/quadratic problem given (2.1) and uncontrollable exogenous variables 
has not gained any predominance in the economic literature although it 
should be noted that the changes required to the equations specifying the 
computation of the relevant feedback matrices in both Chow and Turnovsky 
are minimal. (2.1) is of course an equivalent expression for Chow's cost 
function which is of the form
J
T
Eo Z [(x -x ) t tt=l
K (x -x )] t t t (2.6)
and while the resulting computational procedure differs slightly, the two 
procedures are in fact equivalent and will yield precisely the same 
numerical answers.
The solution procedure proceeds as follows. The appropriate 
control laws are found by substituting (2.5) into (2.1) and obtaining an 
expression for the optimal expected cost at time T (terminal time). This 
procedure is repeated for the remaining time periods although it will 
become apparent that a generalised expression can be obtained after a 
minimal amount of manipulation through time periods. The equations at any 
time t, are a function of all present and future targets (specified by the 
weighting pattern in and R^_) and future forecasts of the exogenous 
variables while the optimal control vector itself, is a function of the 
same variables through the influence of the relevant feedback matrices
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and the immediate past state of the system. The random additive 
disturbances are handled by appealing to the principle of certainty 
equivalence (Theil (1957) , Simon (1956) ) and can thus be eliminated 
from the derivation of the control laws. The certainty equivalence 
assumption leads to the application of the same and f^ for all t for 
both deterministic and additive stochastic frameworks. The general form of 
the solution is given by the linear feedback relationship
u*t F x t t-1 + ft (2.7)
where u* is the vector of optimal controls, F^ _ is a feedback matrix which 
relates the optimal controls to the past state and can be regarded as a 
type of automatic response rule which adjusts controls to deviations of the 
state away from its desired values while f is an additive vector or 
intercept term which in addition to being a function of control costs and 
instrument impacts and state costs and dynamics, summarizes the influence 
of the uncontrollable exogenous variables on the optimal control vector.
The cost function for the final period, T, can be rewritten as
where
E [x ' H x T-1 T T T - 2x' h T T + e + u ' R u T T T T - 2u'n + d ] T T T (2.8)
H = Qrp *-rp
H = k = Q x T T T T
e = x 1Q x T T T T
d = u ' R u T T T T
n = R u T T T
(2.9)
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
(2.13)
and (2.9) and (2.10) have been defined as above in order to facilitate a
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multi-period generalisation at a later stage. Substituting (2.5) into 
(2.8) gives
JT = (AXT-1 + CUT + V 'HT (AXT-1 + CUT + V
- 2 (Axt_^ + Cu^ + b ) 'hT + e^ + U^RTUT
- 2 u ' n + d +■ E e ' H s T T T T-l T T T (2.14)
To minimise costs at time period T, (2.14) is differentiated with respect
to u^ and equated to zero.
3 J
— = 2C'H (Ax + Cu + b ) - 2C'h + 2R u - 2n = 0  (2.15) 3u T T-l T T T T T T
Solving for the optimal control u* yields
- (C1H C + R ) 1 C'H Ax , - (C'H C + R ) 1 C'H b T T T T “ 1 T T T T
+ (C'HC + R ) 1 n T T T (2.16)
which, upon rearranging and grouping terms, can be rewritten as
F x _ + f T T-l T (2.17)
where
(* denotes optimal)
F = - (C'H C + R ) 1C'H A t T T T (2.18)
f = -(C'H C + R ) 1 (C'H b - C'h - n ). rp T T T T  T T (2.19)
It can be seen that with the exception of the time subscripts (2.17) is in 
precisely the same form as that specified by (2.7). The optimal expected
cost for period T, condition on x^  ^ can be derived by substituting (2.17)
into (2.14) giving
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J* = (AXt-1 + CV t-1 + CfT + bT ) 'HT (AXT-1 + CFTXT-1
+ Cf + b ) - 2 (Ax + CF x + CF + b ) 'h T T T-l T T-l T T T
+ eT + (FTXT-1 + fT^ RT (FTXT-1 + f 2 ( F TXT-1+ fT^  RT
+ d + Ee 1H £T T T T (2.20)
Grouping and rearranging terms gives
J* = x' , (A+CF ) 'H (A+CF )x , + 2x' ■ (A+CF ) 'H b -h ) T T-l T T T T-l T-l T T T T
+ (Cf + b )'H (Cf + b ) - 2 (Cf + b )'h + e T T T T T  T T T T
+ (FTXT-1 + fT) RT (FTXT-1+ fT^  2 F^TXT-1 + fT^  UT + dT
+ Ee'H e T T T (2.21)
Having determined the optimal control for period T along with the 
corresponding optimal expected cost, we are now in a position to consider 
period T-l. The total welfare cost for period T-l will include the costs 
incurred in period T-l plus the optimal expected cost from period T. The 
total welfare cost in period T-l is therefore given by
T-l ET-2^Xt-1^T-1XT-1 2XT-1 + XT-1XT-1 + UT-1RT-1UT-
2UT-1 nT-l + UT-1RT-1UT-1 + JT^
where
"T-l Q . x T-l T-
and
T-l R uT-l T-l
(2.22)
(2.23)
(2.24)
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Substituting (2.21) for J* in (2.22) and grouping and rearranging terms 
yields the following expression.
J = E Tx' (Q , + F'R F + (A + CF )'H (A + CF ))x ,T—1 T-2 T-l ~T-1 T T F T T T T-l
- 2XT-l(V l  + FTnT + (A + CFT> ' (hT - V t))
+ x' 0 _ x u ' R  , u , - 2u' nT-l -T-l T-l + T-l T-l T-l T-l T-l
+ u' R , u + (Cf + b )'H (Cf + b ) T-l T-l T-l T T T T T
- 2(CfT + bT ) ,hT + eT + ^ R TfT 2f1n + d T T T
+ Ee'H e *\. T T T •* (2.25)
The apparent formidable nature of (2.25) is somewhat deceiving as an 
appropriate grouping in terms will convert (2.25) into a function of the 
same general form as (2.8). Thus,
J . = E _[x' _H x n - 2x nh _ + u' nR nu T-l T-2 T-l T T-l T-l T-l T-l T-l T-l
- 2u' n _ + e _ + d _] T-l T-l T-l T-l (2.26)
where
H = Q + F 1R F + ( A + C F ) ' H ( A + C F )  T~1 x»p-l T T T T T T (2.27)
h — h . t F ' n + (A + CFm ) ' (hm - H b )  T-l T-l T T T T T T (2.28)
GT-1 XT-1^T-1XT-1 + (CFT + bT^  I!T^CfT+bT^
- 2 (Cf + b ) 'h + e + Ee'H e T T T T T T T (2.29)
dT-l UT-1RT-1UT-1 + fTRTfT 2fTnT + dT (2.30)
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Taking the differential p^Su^  ^ and solving for u*  ^ will yield an
optimal solution for the control vector identical to that given by (2.16) 
and (2.17). Of course, in this case the time subscripts will be lagged one 
period. The process outlined above is repeated for each time period 
from t = T to t= 1. It should be clear from the preceding analysis that 
for each time period after t = T, the same general solution will be obtained 
for the optimal control vector u* . To illustrate the general nature of the 
solution (2.26) is differentiaiedwith respect to u^  ^ with the adjustment that 
the time subscript is replaced by a more general case, t. Solving for the 
optimal control after differntiating (2.26) yields the following. The 
optimal control is given by
where
u*t F x , t t-1 + ft
Ft
Ht-1
(C'H C + R ) 1C'H A
(C’HtC + Rt)"1(C,Htbt - C'ht - nt)
V i + F; v t + <A + cv v a + cFt)
(2.31)
(2.32)
(2.33)
(2.34)
t-1 k , + F'n + (A + CF )'(h t-1 t t t t H b ) t t (2.35)
t-1 9 x vt-l t-1 (2.36)
nt-l Rt-lUt-l
with boundary conditions
H = 0  T '~rp
h = k = O xrp rp '- rp  rp
(2.37)
(2.38)
(2.39)
26
n = R u T T T (2.40) t
If the cost matrices £> and R are held constant at Q and R for allt t
time periods of the planning period, that is for t=l to t=T, the 
matrices F^ _ and H^__ will converge to steady state solutions of the form
- (C1 HC + R) 1 C'HA (2.41)
H = Q + F'RF + (A + CF)'H(A + CF) (2.42)
provided that the characteristic roots of the matrix (A + CF), are less 
than unity in absolute terms. Very briefly, this result follows from the 
fact that (2.32) can be written as an infinite series of the form
H = Q + (A+CF)'Q(A+CF) + (A+CF)'2 Q(A+CF)2
i o 3+ (A+CF) J Q(A+CF) + ..........  (2.43)
and that the steady state will not exist unless the series of (2.43)
qconverges. For most applied optimal stabilisation studies carried out so 
far, it has been the practice to use only one set of weights for each 
experiment thus creating favourable conditions for a steady state solution 
(see Chow (1972a) where it is claimed that F^ converges very rapidly). 
However, the use of one set of weights when targets are growing over time 
may result in the original intended trade-off being disrupted. To 
maintain exact trade-offs it may be necessary to adjust weights in each 
time period thus ensuring that a steady state solution will not be 
obtained. The issues associated with this type of procedure are discussed 
in detail in Chapter Four. The addition of time variant system matrices 
in place of the constant matrices A, C and D does not affect the solution 
procedure or resulting control laws in the finite time horizon case 
although it is essential to have time invariant matrices in the infinite
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horizon case in order to ensure the appropriate convergence to a steady 
state solution. The imposition of time subscripts on the system matrices 
does provide some conceptual difficulties. In particular, if the 
procedure outlined above is to be used then the addition of time 
subscripts implies an exact knowledge about future structural shifts as 
the solution must be computed backwards in time. A more appropriate and 
realistic procedure would be to develop the optimisation problem within an 
adoptive or learning framework so that the optimal solution could be updated 
as better information about the present and future structures becomes 
available. (See Abel (1975)). For the purposes of this study, the system 
matrices will be held constant over all time periods of a particular 
planning horizon. The recursive nature of the optimal solution and the 
treatment of control costs, R , as an explicit component of the cost 
function gives rise to, and illustrates, a further interesting property.
If control costs are increased relative to state costs, then the feedback 
coefficients of the control(s) of concern will diminish in importance 
with respect to the determinination of the appropriate component(s) of 
the control vector, u* . The additive vector, f , will then become more 
important in relation to setting the level of the relevant controls in any 
particular time period. As control costs become exceptionally large, the 
weighted control will gradually become an open loop control with little 
or no feedback from x^_  ^with complete dominance of the additive vector 
f . In the limit, an open loop control will exist. If all controls are 
weighted heavily to produce this situation then optimisation will become 
unnecessary as the appropriate solution could be obtained by simulating 
the system with the desired fixed open loop control levels. The 
occurrence of the above can be very easily verified by considering a 
simple one control, one time period and one target problem or from a
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close inspection of the control laws. In particular, it should be observed
that the term n in (2.33) will dominate the solution as R is increased t t
relative to 0 ."t
The format of the solution requires some comment in relation to the
Chow solution and the Turnovsky solution. First of all, assuming that all
costs on controls are zero, R^_ = 0, then by deleting R^ and n^_ from the
above control equations we can recover Chow's solution. Of course we
would then need to assume that u has been included in the state vectort
and can be weighted through the cost matrix Q^. Similarly, by explicitly 
deleting the uncontrollable exogenous variables from the system and 
including them in the vector e and looking at state and control deviations 
rather than levels, we can recover the Turnovsky solution. The solution 
presented above is therefore quite general in its applicability and a 
computer program designed to solve it would also solve control problems 
in either the Chow or Turnovsky formulations without the need for adjustments 
to either the program or the control problem specification.
The solution to the optimal control problem designated by (2.31) 
to (2.40) can be succinctly summarised as follows. Firstly, F^ and H^_ 
are solved backwards in time from t = T to t =1. The boundary conditions 
(2.38) - (2.40) are initially used to compute Ft and H^. H  ^can then be 
computed by substituting F^ and into (2.32) and (2.34). This recursive 
procedure continues until all time periods in the planning period have been 
accounted for. The resulting (Tk x n) and (Tn x k) matrices are then 
stored. Secondly, h^_ and f^_ are recursively computed backwards in time in 
the same manner as F^_ and and the resulting (Tn x 1) and (Tk x 1) 
vectors are stored. When the first two steps have been completed the 
optimal control (2.31) can be computed from t = 1 to t = T. At each stage 
of the computation the previous period's optimal state variables are fed
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back into (2.31) to obtain the current optimal control. The oply 
exception is the first period when the initial condition  ^ is used.
Finally, after all iterations have taken place, the optimal expected cost 
for the entire planning period can be calculated using (2.1). A number of 
observations on the solution procedure are relevant. Firstly, it can be 
seen immediately from (2.32) that the matrix to be inverted, (C'H^C + R^_) 
is of order k, that is, of order equal to the number of control variables. 
This makes the solution procedure very efficient as in general only small 
matrices will be required for inversion. The advantage of this is best 
seen in light of the fact that a twenty period problem would require twenty 
separate matrix inversions. The efficiency in terms of computer time and 
computer time and computation tractability is best seen in light of a fixed 
target problem which for a modest problem of four targets and two controls 
would require a (40x40) matrix inversion (see below). Another point of 
some importance is the amount of computer storage required to overcome any 
potential problems of the "curse of dimensionality" from which the dynamic 
programming procedure is apt to suffer. F^ and H^_ will be of size (k x n) 
and (n x n) respectively. Solving for these matrices backwards in time 
would result in the need to store 2T matrices. Even for relatively small 
problems the storage requirements may be extremely large. Consider a 
problem which includes five control variables and thirty state variables.
It will be of size (5 x 30) and twenty matrices of size (30 x 30). These 
forty matrices are equivalent to storing two matrices of size (100 x 30) 
and (600 x 30) respectively. The vectors f^_ and h^_ must also be stored 
during computation along with the system matrices A and C and the vector 
b^_ which would presumably be computed by the program and thus would entail 
a further data input consisting of the matrix D and the values of all 
exogenous variables for each time period. One simple method for reducing
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the size of the data to be stored would be to slightly modify the 
recursive solution procedure set out above such that at each time 
period f^_ is calculated immediately from H^ _ thus eliminating the cumulative 
storage of over the entire planning period. It can be seen from (2.34) 
that H^ _ is required to compute H^ _ ^. therefore at any time period of the 
planning horizon, only two matrices specified by (2.34) will need to be 
stored on the computer. This will considerably reduce the overall storage 
requirements and will allow problems of large state dimensions to be 
efficiently computed on modest computing facilities. The problem of state 
dimensions is of considerable important as a large model with a considerable 
number of high order lagged variables could result in a state system as 
large as (1000 x 1000) say. In this type of circumstance, the inclusion 
of the controls as a separate component of the current controls from the 
state vecotr will substantially reduce the state dimensions as opposed to 
the Chow formulation. Indeed, the need to convert a model to an 
equivalent state space realisation (see Chapter Four) may make the solution 
so prohibitive in terms of size that it may be necessary to turn to the 
Theil-Tinbergen framework used by Friedman (1975a) which we have seen 
is in fact equivalent to the linear/quadratic solution, but is subject to 
its own problem of implementation.
Another issue, related both to the theory of optimal control and 
the computation of optimal controls, is the question of the existence and 
uniqueness of optimal economic policies given a particular model. The 
applied stabilisation literature has almost invariably ignored such 
questions as has the theoretical economic literature with a few notable 
exceptions. For example, Turnovsky (1974),(1977b) briefly addresses such 
issues while a rigorous analysis has recently appeared in the work of 
Garbade (1976) and Preston (1977). As we shall see below, the question
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of existence and uniqueness is of prime concern in the fixed target
framework for stabilisation and there exists similar parallels between the
existence and uniqueness criteria for the linear/quadratic and dynamic fixed
targets approaches. In many instances it would be difficult to ascertain
the existence and uniqueness of an optimal policy before computation is
attempted, especially if the model is particularly large and complex.
Unfortunately, the problem of existence and uniqueness failures may not be
directly transmitted to the applied researcher in the process of computation.
For example, in the linear/quadratic framework outlined above, the problem
resolves around the existence of the inverse (C'H^C + R ) . The computer
programs which utilise conventional Gauss-Newton inverse sub-routines which
do not contain any option for examining the rank of the matrix of concern
can in fact produce solutions even when the matrix does not have the
desired rank. The results are of course nonsensical but in the absence
of any knowledge about the appropriate inverse it is difficult to ascertain
whether the result originates from a programming error or a data input
error or a failure of existence or uniqueness. It would be highly desirable
then to have certain criteria available by which the existence of the
inverse (C'H^C + R^_) could be established before beginning the computation.
A set of existence and uniqueness conditions can be summarised as follows.^
First of all consider the case where there are zero control costs,
R =0. In this case the matrix of concern reduces to (C'H C) ^. t t
Obviously, a sufficient condition for the inverse to exist is that (C'H^C)
has full rank before computation. A set of necessary conditions can be
obtained as follows. The Sylvester rank inequality theorem states that
for two matrices B* and B, the following will hold, p [B*B] < Min{p[B*],
P [B]}. Applying this to (C'H C) it is clear that for C'H C to have fullt t
rank it is necessary for p[C] = k and p[H] > k. This condition does not 
ensure sufficiency however, but it does have the convenient structure of
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requiring the number of targets to be at least equal to the number of 
instruments. The existence of the inverse will depend on how the 
instruments affect the particular targets of concern. Note that if at least 
one lag occurs in all instruments then the necessary conditions are 
satisfied trivially. Recall that C is a matrix of size (n x k). The rank 
condition outlined above merely ensures that each instrument has an 
independent impact on the state vector and does not imply any conditions in 
relation to particular targets which are a subset of the state vector. For 
example, we could choose targets (assume less instruments) which do not 
constitute a set of independent targets,that is, in the reduced form of the 
structural model the instrument multipliers for the targets will be linear 
combinations. Under these conditions the necessary conditions could still 
hold as it could be possible to find a submatrix of C, depending on the 
size of the state (we would require n > m) which has rank equal to two 
but the inverse would not exist due to the choice of targets. Consider 
further the special case where k = m, that is, the number of targets equals 
the number of instruments. Provided the targets are strictly independent 
then the inverse (C'H^ _C) will exist and the resulting policy will be 
unique and in addition it is a simple matter to detect the existence and 
uniqueness before computation provided the reduced form is available.
Now consider a situation in which R^_ = 0 and m < k. It is argued that this 
type of cost function specification is restrictive as the policy-maker has 
more instruments than is necessary and greater system control can easily 
be obtained by adding additional independent targets until k < m. However, 
the case remains of some interest as it is likely that the policy planner 
will in some circumstances, direct an apparent surfeit of instruments 
towards a particular target or targets. For example, directing the S.R.D. 
ratio and open market operations twoards a money supply target. First of
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all, observe that if k > m then from the Sylvester rank equality, (C'H^ _C) 
will not have full rank but policy will still exist but will no longer be 
unique due to the inverse failure. This problem can be overcome by 
resorting to the use of a generalised inverse. Alternatively, the 
assumption of zero control costs can be dropped and by specifying R^_ to be 
strictly positive definite (denoted by > 0), policy uniqueness can be 
established. Indeed, the appropriate specification of R^ > 0 will lead to 
policy uniqueness even when k < m and C'H^C is singular. This last condition 
leads to the interesting situation where solutions can be obtained when some 
targets are not independent. In general, we can obtain sufficient conditions 
for policy uniqueness by specifying R^_ > 0 (usually only positive elements 
along the diagonal) or H^_ positive definite with p(C)=k and R^_ > 0. The 
proposition follows directly from the recursive nature of the solution for 
and u*, and like the sufficient condition R > 0, allows for policy 
existence and uniqueness when m > k (more targets than instruments). It 
is clear that if we wish to obtain sufficiency without R^_ > 0 then the 
structure of the model, the framework and hence the feedback matrices must 
be conducive to establishing H^_ > 0. It should be noted that the strong 
conditions on H^_ or R^_ are not necessary for policy uniqueness except 
when k > m (see above). Indeed, (CrH G + k )  ^can exist as we have seen 
when > 0 and C'H^C is singular and even given H^_ > 0, C'H^C may be 
singular if p[C] ^ k.5 While various criteria can be established for 
policy uniqueness, it should be noted that the structure of the model will 
play an important role in this question at the computation level as it 
does in the dynamic fixed target problem. However, as we shall see below, 
the existence and uniqueness criteria for the latter framework are of a 
more simple nature than the conditions for the linear/quadratic solution.
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OPTIMAL STABILISATION POLICY: SOME PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS '
Before proceeding any further with developing the framework of this 
study, it is convenient to briefly discuss some of the practical 
considerations associated with implementing optimal stabilisation policies. 
A discussion of this aspect is warranted in light of the attitude of many 
economists working in the optimal stabilisation field. In particular, 
many researchers fail to discuss the feasibility of actually using optimal 
control as a tool for stabilisation. Leaving aside the traditional 
criticisms of the technique on the grounds of misspecified models, 
uncertainty about the structural parameters and lags, and our ability to 
adequately forecast uncontrollable exogenous variables (more of this later) 
I will focus on the implementation of policy.
Consider the equation relation to the optimal control to the lagged
state, u* = Fx + f . Given that some components of the lagged statet t-1 t
vector are true first order lagged variables then it is almost certain that 
the type of dynamic policy response described by the feedback relationship 
above will not be applicable in practice. Firstly, even if the true exact 
value of x^_  ^were known at the beginning of the current unit time period 
(period t as opposed to the entire planning period), the policy decision 
and transmission process of governments and the bureaucracy would prevent 
the desired value of u* from being achieved in that period. The feedback 
relationship implies that as data about the past state does not become 
available until the end of the current time period, which of course is the 
beginning of the next time period, the implementation of policy is 
instantaneous! If the assumption about some components of the past state 
consists of say lags greater than two or three periods (converted of 
course to equivalent one period lag structures - see chapter Four) then it 
is possible that policy may be formulated before the required time period
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with sufficient time to implement it. However, even the presence of long
lags does pose some difficulties as the new variables defined to replace
those with lags greater than one period will also play an important role
in the feedback matrix F and contribute to the formulation of u* . Thist t
will become apparent in the ensuing applied discussion in later chapters.
One possible solution to the problem would be to make the planning period 
less than say the longest lag to prevent some auxiliary variables from 
taking on values in the feedback matrix. Once again, the reader is 
referred to future chapters where feedback matrices for the applied experi­
ments are presented and where it can be seen how auxiliary variables drop 
out of the feedback matrices as the planning period approaches its terminal 
time. The important point to be made here is that policy planners would 
need to plan some time in advance in order to ensure that their desired 
policies do in fact become realised at time t. The need for forward planning 
refers mainly to government spending as instruments such as tax rates and 
open market operations can be carried out almost instantaneously in terms 
of say a quarterly model. A further need for forward planning in relation 
to government spending arises from a need to calculate the government's 
budget position for the entire year. In a quarterly model this would entail 
planning optimally at least four quarters in advance. The compilation 
of the budget and the allocation of funds to various factors also requires 
time resulting in a need for perhaps a total of six quarters advance time 
before the optimal policy can be implemented. At first sight it could be 
argued that all policy lags of the system (not just impact lags) could be 
explicitly modelled. While this is feasible in theoretical optimal 
stabilisation work, for example Preston (1975) and Turnovsky (1977a) its 
extension to an applied framework is highly dubious due to the great 
variability from time period to time period in the lags involved which can
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occur through bureaucratic, institutional and political reasons.^
The need for forward planning also necessitates using forecasts
of the state vector x , to obtain u* and thus the optimal control will nott-1 t *
be able to adjust for additive disturbances with the result that the 
implemented u^_ will be sub-optimal. Even if the shocks are extremely 
small, the model may not be able to adequately forecast the future and 
the policy-maker will be severely limited in his ability to take account 
of uncertainty. Whether or not ignorance of future shocks and poor fore­
casts will pose serious problems, especially when fine tuning is desired, 
depends on the degree of sub-optimality. Even if instantaneous policy 
adjustment can be carried out there still remains the problem of gaining 
good information about the immediate past state. It may be necessary to 
derive the optimal control before the final figures for say income, 
have been formulated for a particular quarter. Initial estimates can 
contain "noise" elements which may obscure the "true" value considerably. 
The problem of uncertainty about the immediate past state whether generated 
by a need for forward planning or by an inability to correctly observe the 
state at the appropriate time could severely limit the application of 
optimal techniques as a knowledge of x^  ^is required in each time period. 
As we shall see below, the computation of fixed target solutions only 
relies on a single estimate of the initial condtions and hence will suffer 
less from errors in the state. Nonetheless for real world applications it 
would most likely be necessary to plan in advance even within the fixed 
target framework. While adaptive learning techniques may be useful 
when policy implementation is instantaneous, they will be extremely 
limited if policy decisions need to be made well in advance of the time 
they are to be implemented. In any case, the experimental use of 
learning procedures has not, in many cases, significantly improved the
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performance of optimal stabilisation, for example the work by Abel 
(1975), Macrae (1972) and Walsh and Cruz (1976).
THE DYNAMIC FIXED TARGET FRAMEWORK
In this section the dynamic fixed target framework for 
stabilisation will be developed and discussed with the discussion drawing 
heavily on the recent work of Preston and Sieper (1977). The development 
of a fixed target framework relies heavily on the control theory concept 
of controllability, a concept which has, along with existence and 
uniqueness, been largely ignored in the economic literature - particularly 
in the applied literature. The concept of controllability forms a 
fundamental component of control theory as applied in the sciences and 
stems from the work of Kalman (1960a) (1960b). The notion of
controllability along with the concept of observability provides necessary 
conditions and in specific cases, sufficient conditions, for a control 
problem to possess a solution. Observability need not concern us here.
A useful reference which employs the concept of observability in the 
development of existence criteria is the work by Preston (1977) mentioned 
above. When talking about controllability it is necessary to distinguish 
between two basic types - state controllability and output controllability. 
Basically, state controllability is a property of a given system which 
ensures that any given initial state can be transferred to any previously 
specified terminal state in a finite time span. Conversely, output 
controllability refers to the achievement of any desired or target 
terminal target vector in finite time starting from some arbitrary initial 
state. The development of the linear/quadratic solution outlined above 
was in terms of the state vector as opposed to an output vector (in 
economic terms outputs refer to the endogenous variables of a system).
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The framework developed here will be in terms of outputs and the 
subsequent controllability criteria developed will refer to the achievement 
of specific outputs/targets which form a subset of the state space vector 
of the system.
Tinbergen analysis of economic policy and then extending this to a dynamic 
framework. A general static model can be represented by
which is in the notation set out at the beginning of this chapter with the 
addition that y replaces x and refers to the targets outputs of the system. 
That is, it is assumed that all non-target variables have been explicitly 
ignored. y is an (m x 1) vector, C is an (m x k) matrix, u is a (k x 1) 
vector, D is an (m x j) matrix and z is a (j x 1) vector where m equals 
the number of outputs/targets, k equals the number of instruments and j 
equals the number of exogenous variables. From (2.46) we can obtain a 
number of basic propositions concerning the static achievement of targets. 
Firstly, if p[C] = k = m then it follows that there exists a policy set 
which is unique and allows the exact achievement of the target vector y 
and is given by
Furthermore, if p [C] = m < k then policy will exist but will not be
We begin the discussion by looking briefly at the static
7
Cu + Dz (2.44)
which can be rewritten in reduced form as
y = A ^Cu + A ^Dz (2.45)
or y = Cu + Dz (2.46)
(2.47)
unique and if p [C] = k < m then policy will not exist. The above
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conditions simply state the familiar Tinbergen static counting rules 
along with a sufficient rank condition. That is, a necessary condition 
for policy existence is that the number of instruments must equal or be 
greater than the number of targets. A sufficient condition for existence 
and uniqueness is given by the matrix of instrument multipliers having 
full rank equal to both the number of instruments and targets. If the 
number of targets is less than the number of instruments then policy will 
still exist but will no longer be unique. The observations are standard 
but it is interesting to compare them with the existence and uniqueness 
criteria for the dynamic linear/quadratic problem. Recall that in the 
linear/quadratic framework it was possible to obtain a set of policies 
even if the number of targets exceeded the number of instruments and as 
such is a more flexible approach than the static Tinbergen approach. The 
solution (2.47) implies free adjustment of all instruments while it was 
recognised that to obtain uniqueness in the linear/quadratic (static and 
dynamic) case it may be necessary to weight the controls. The weighting 
of controls need not be a hindrance as the weights can be specified to be 
very small in relation to the state weights and thus approximate zero.
It may not seem appropriate to compare the static and dynamic cases but 
it is an easy matter to establish similar conditions for the static 
linear/quadratic case which again is more flexible in its application 
in relation to obtaining policies when the number of targets exceeds 
the number of instruments or even if an instrument rank failure exists. 
The disadvantage of a flexible target approach may be that if m > k 
then targets will be traded-off unless all targets are perfectly 
consistent. As we shall see below, the introduction of dynamics into 
the system will enable the fixed target approach to take on a similar 
degree of flexibility to the linear/quadratic approach although the
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basic solution techniques retain the same simple general form as the 
static case given by (2.47).
Assuming, time invariant coefficient matrices and perfect fore­
casting of the uncontrollable exogenous variables, the dynamic fixed 
target framework can be developed as follows. (2.44) can be expressed in 
dynamic form as
Ä(L)yfc = C(L)u + D(L)z (2.48)
where L refers to the delay operator of the form LVx^ _ = x^ _ and 
consequently Z(L), C(L) and D(L) are polynomial matrix coefficients 
which are defined as
e
A(L) = Z Ä.L. (2.49a)
and
C (L)
f _ .
Z C.L1_ l
D (L)
g
Z D.L~ l
(2.49b)
(2.49c)
where e,f and g represent the longest lag of the targets, controls and 
exogenous variables respectively. Note that imbedded in the dynamic 
structure of (2.48) there is a static steady state model given by
A (1) y = C (1)u + D (1)z (2.50)
which of course is identical to (2.44). Even if the steady state can 
be achieved in a fairly rapid time period, it will in most cases not be 
instantaneous and thus the policy-maker will need to anticipate his 
target if he wishes to achieve a stationary target, y. Following the 
notation of Preston and Sieper we shall denote a dynamic policy model 
(2.48) with matrix C(l) which satisfies the condition that p [C (1)] = m
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as weakly-Tinbergen. Conversely, if we consider the reduced form (2.48) 
for simplicity, a situation in which the impact multiplier matrix of 
control coefficients has rank equal to m, shall be denoted strongly — 
Tinbergen. In a dynamic strongly-Tinbergen world we simply treat all 
lagged controls, targets and exogenous variables as given predetermined 
variables and solve the policy problem as we would for the static case. 
That is, given the same number of instruments and targets in a dynamic 
world and provided the targets constitute independent targets so the 
matrix of reduced form instrument multipliers has sufficient rank, it is 
possible for the policy planner to hit all his targets without 
anticipation through the concurrent manipulation of available instruments. 
We shall also examine the controllability of systems designated as 
non-Tinbergen where k < m but for which existence criteria can be 
formulated in contrast to the static case.
important concepts must be considered. The first is the final form of 
an econometric model and the second is the state space form of a model. 
The final form of (2.48) can be written as (provided the targets are 
naturally stable)
and is important in terms of the dynamic multipliers associated with it. 
Secondly, the state space realisation of a structural economic model 
such as (2.48) can be written as
To develop a dynamic fixed target framework for stabilisation two
y. = (L) C (L) u + A-1D (L) zt t t (2.51)
(2.52a)
y = Px + Su + Mz t t t (2.52b)t
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where F and G are written with a hat to avoid confusion with the 
notation used in the derivation of the control laws and where xt+1
represents the state vector as before. The state space realisation 
given by (2.52) is the usual formulation found in the non-economic 
control literature and differs from the simple reduced form state space 
used at the beginning of the chapter. To maintain consistency with the 
literature (2.52) will be used to derive controllability conditions for 
the fixed target approach although it should be pointed out that (2.52) 
is equivalent to the first order realisation employed in the linear/ 
quadratic solution. A comparison and discussion of the two techniques 
is given in Chapter Four. There are two important reasons for using a 
state space realisation in this context. Firstly, analytically, it is 
easier to investigate the dynamics of the problem within the context 
of a first order system such as (2.52) and secondly, related to the 
first issue is that a potentially large number of structural form poly­
nomial structural coefficients matrices, A(L), C(L) and D(L) can be 
replaced by constant coefficient matrices F, G, E, P, S and M. However, 
the use of (2.52) also reduces our economic insight into any analysis 
which is pursued. This is contrary to the form used at the beginning 
of the chapter where the original reduced form structure is maintained 
throughout. The problem of insight and interpretation can be overcome 
in the specific case of the dynamic fixed target framework analysed 
here as the problem essentially reduces to the manipulation of dynamic 
multipliers - a concept familiar to economists.
To establish the solution of the problem in terms of the dynamic 
multipliers of (2.48), the final form and state space form can be 
utilised.8 Using the delay operator in the state dynamics of the
system (2.52a) gives
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-1x = [I - LF] (GLut + ELzt  ^ (2.53)
Substituting (2.53) into the target mapping (2.52b) gives
yfc = [S + P(I - LF)_1GL]ut + [M + P(I - LF)_1zt (2.54)
Using (2.54) and the expression for the final form (2.51) we have the
following identities
A-1 (L) C (L) E TT(L) E S + P[I - LF]_1GL (2.55a)
A-1(L)D(L) E r(L) E M + P[I - LF]_1EL (2.55b)
Power series expansions for the last two identities in (2.55a) yields
CO
z
i=0
TT . L 1
(
S + P Z Fi-1Li 
i=l
(2.56)
which immediately gives us a relationship between the dynamic instrument 
multipliers of the system in terms of the state space constant matrices. 
In particular we have that
710 E s ' = PG, 2 = PFG , . .
~T-1~. . 7T E PF G .T (2.57)
where 'ip represents the dynamic instrument multipliers and the subscript 
refers to the period impact of the multiplier.
Having developed the appropriate concepts we are now able to derive 
solutions for two types of fixed target policy. The first type of problem 
to be considered is the achievement of a target point objective which is, as 
we shall see below, a pre-requisite for target path achievement which is a 
discrete time extension of the continuous time Tinbergen framework 
developed in Preston (1974). The achievement of a target point objective 
incorporates the concept of a policy lead,denoted by s,the rationale for which 
will become much clearer as the analysis proceeds. The problem then,is to find
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a policy sequence (assuming existence) beginning at time t = 0 which
consists of the set u , u ,,...u which is able to steer a set of0 1 s
outputs from some arbitrary initial position, yQ , such that desired
targets for the outputs, y , are achieved at some period in the future,s
s, where s also denotes the length of the policy lead or degree of 
anticipation required or desired. Basically we are asking if it is 
possible to adjust our instruments over time in order to achieve a 
desired set of target values. Note that as yet nothing has been said 
about the number of targets or the number of instruments.
The solution to the problem is obtained by initially performing 
s iterations of the state dynamics (2.52a) to produce the following 
equations:
x, = Fx + Gu + Ez 1 0  0 0
- 2x„ = F x + FGu + Gu, + FEz + Ez, 2 0 0 1 0 1
x = FSx + [GFG...FS Xg 3 s 0 U s-1 + [EFE...FS 1E] Zs-1
Us-2 Zs-2
1 
c 0 1
 
__
__
__
_fo (2.58)
Similarly, the sth iteration of (2.52a) yields an expression for the
target point y given by s
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y = PFSx^ + [SPG PFG...PFS 1G] s 0
s-1
s-2
A A -l
+ [MPE PFE...PF El
s-1
s-2
(2.59)
which can be written compactly as
y = PF x + B u + Bz s 0 s s s (2.60)
where y is an (mxl) vector, B is an(mx[s+l]k) matrix, u is an
( [s+1]jxl) vector. The target point objective depends on the initial 
conditions x^, the uncontrollable exogenous variables which are assumed 
to be known exactly in advance and the discretionary policy sequence given 
by the vector u . Assuming that we know x and z , then it only remains to 
determine u^ and provided the existence of a discretionary policy sequence 
can be established, the appropriate u^ can be obtained from solving the 
linear system (2.60). It is clear from (2.60) that a sufficient condition 
for the existence of a solution to the target point problem is that the 
matrix B has rank equal to m . If p[B] = m then the target point problem 
has a solution
U = B ~*~y - B ^ p F SX - B "^"Bz ^s s s 0 s
where y designates some desired target level. The controllability 
condition can be expressed more formally as
A A A A /S ^  ^p [B ] = p[S PG PFG . •. PF G] = ms
(2.61)
(2.62)
Note also that the relationship between the state space realisation and 
the dynamic multipliers of the system yields an equivalent controllability
condition
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p [B ] = p [7T 7r ir . . .If ] = m.s 0 1 2 ' " ' s (2.63)
Also note that the solution to the dynamic target point objective problem 
given by (2.61) is of an identical procedure to the solution of the static 
Tinbergen problem given by (2.47). The relationship between tt and
l
the state space matrices makes the solution given by (2.61) very simple. 
The dynamic instrument and exogenous variable multipliers are substituted 
into (2.61) and the problem is solved by carrying out a simple matrix 
inversion and matrix multiplication. Note that the dimensions of the 
system require that the matrix to be inverted is of order m, the number of 
targets. For large target configurations obtaining the inverse could lead 
to numerical problems. This is in contrast to the linear/quadratic 
solution where the matrix to be inverted is always of order k. Therefore 
even if there are 100 targets and twenty instruments the matrix to be 
inverted will only be of order 20 while in the fixed target point control 
problem the matrix would be of order 100. The target point problem also 
allows the policy planner to hit his desired targets when k < m (provided 
the existence criterion is fulfilled). By redefining the notion of 
instruments within a dynamic context as considering the same instrument 
at different points in time as a distinct instrument or time indexed 
instrument we have a dynamic counterpart of the static Tinbergen counting 
rule, that is, the number of time indexed instruments must be greater 
than or equal to the number of targets. The counting rule is given by
sense controllability conditions for the static and dynamic cases are
(2.64a)
or "k" = k(s+l)> m (2.64b)
where "k" indicates the number of time indexed instruments.*® In this
basically the same. Also, a dynamic formulation of policy allows the
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policy-maker to hit more targets than he has "true" or non-time indexed 
instruments which is similar to the linear/quadratic situation where it 
is possible to have policy existence but of course targets will be traded- 
off rather than exactly hit unless the targets are specified to be 
perfectly consistent. The problem of more instruments than targets, 
whether true instruments or time indexed instruments, still poses problems 
of non-uniqueness. This problem can be overcome by simply setting any 
slack instruments to any pre-designated levels just leaving enough 
instruments to satisfy the controllability conditions. The pre-set slack 
instruments can then be treated as exogenous variables. In many cases 
the impact instrument multiplier S = 7Tq will have sufficient rank to 
satisfy the controllability condition. Under these conditions the 
policy-maker can hit his targets instantaneously without resorting to the 
need for a policy lead. Alternatively, the policy-maker can do as he 
pleases for the periods leading up to the time period to achieve his 
desired objective. The example of sufficient rank in of course 
corresponds to the strongly-Tinbergen condition outlined above.
Just as there is a lower bound to the policy leads, there is 
also an upper bound. That is, there is some point where the future can 
no longer be affected by adding additional time indexed instruments.
This result follows from the Cayley-Hamilton theorem which when applied
A sto the problem presented here tells us that F is a linear combination 
of the first n powers of the n x n matrix F, for all s > n. Hence 
the extension of the policy lead s beyond the state dimension n will 
not add any additional linearly independent columns to (see 2.60).
It follows that the policy lead has an upper bound
s < n (2.65)
and must lie between the bounds
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< s < n (2.66)k-1
Having developed criteria for the exact achievement of a target point 
objective and briefly noted the similarities with a corresponding static 
analysis, we now turn to the more interesting case of an exact target path 
within a dynamic context. Once again we shall derive a dynamic counterpart 
to the static Tinbergen counting rule. As with the target point problem 
the policy lead s will be of prime importance. To make the analysis 
clearer the concept of a planning period in relation to a fixed target 
problem will be made more explicit. The planning period consists of two 
basic components the familiar policy lead s and difference between the 
policy lead or anticipation period and the total planning period. The 
target path problem then, is to choose a discretionary policy sequence 
over the entire planning period which will enable the policy planner to 
realise his target objectives over a subset of the planning period. The 
concept is best illustrated diagrammatically by utilising the diagram in 
Preston and Sieper (1977 p.221).
Policy
origin
Policy Lead
Target
Path
^Origin Target Path
Target Path and 
Policy horizon
-S
------- S+T+l------------------
Periods
Policy Anticipation Framework 
Figure 1.
It can be seen from Fig. 1 that the target point objective discussed 
above is a special case of the target path problem with the target point 
being achieved at period 0 with lead s, a total policy interval of
49
s + 1 periods. The introduction of a target path implies that policy­
makers wish to hit and maintain pre-selected levels of their targets 
for some specific length of time. The target path objective can be viewed 
as a series of point objectives and it is clear that if our target path 
origin is to begin at 0 in Fig.l then quite clearly the policy model, 
given the desired targets and respective instrument multipliers, must 
be point controllable at the target path origin. Thus we wish to 
ascertain the existence of a policy sequence
U S,T H <U- S ..... V  - - - V  <2-67>
given arbitrary initial conditions and arbitrary values of the exogenous 
variables which can anticipate our target path objective such that the 
target path objective
YT E (V  ' * ' 'V (2.68)
can be achieved. Note that the components of y* ; y , y^ etc. are in 
fact vectors consisting of the number of targets to be achieved in each 
time period. Thus if the policy planner wishes to achieve m targets 
in each time period of the target path, then the total number of targets 
to be aimed for will be m(T+l).
Firstly, consider the situation in which the instrument impact 
multiplier is of full rank
p [S] = p [tt ] = m < k (2.69)
In this case we have a strongly-Tinbergen situation and a special 
extension of the target point problem. (2.69) ensures that the policy 
model with structural coefficients Ä(L), C(L) and D(L) will be both 
target point controllable and target path controllable with zero policy 
lead. This is of course equivalent to the static Tinbergen situation
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in which the number of targets must equal the number of instruments.
The dynamic case can be extended however, to include situations in which 
the impact instrument multipliers have zero rank and p [tt^ ] = m < k.
This condition applies where the instruments have no effect on the targets 
until the next period. Given this situation the policy-maker will need to 
anticipate his targets by one period but given full rank in tt^  he is still 
able to keep the system on target for every period as long as the policy 
is decided upon the period before the target is achieved. A similar 
argument holds for tt^  etc. For most policy purposes situations will exist 
in which the number of targets exceeds the number of instruments and 
7T or it, will not have sufficient rank to enable the policy-maker to exactly
0  l '
achieve his targets instantaneously by the manipulation of his instruments 
within the current time period. In this case the policy-maker will need 
to adjust his instruments over time to anticipate his targets. An expression 
for the achievement of the target path objective for lead s can be obtained 
by applying (2.64) for t = 0, 1....T, that is for each element of the 
target path vector y* = (yg,y^...y^), and considering a general situation 
where the origin becomes -s and a time span of T+s is considered, giving
(excluding the exogenous variables for simplicity)
- - at+s-1aS PG...PF G PF G...PF G
S PG 
0 S
PFG PF G 
PG ~ s—1Ä PF G
-1
'T+S
PF"
PF
1+s
-s
(2.70)
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By dropping the time indices from (2.70) and reintroducing the exogenous 
variables, the stacked matrices and vectors can be written compactly as
y = Ru + Dz + Px-s
where the 'U" on y, R, u, D and P has been introduced to avoid the
repetition of scarce notation. Note that the subscript, -s, on the state
vector x refers to the initial conditions at the beginning of the policy
lead. (2.71) is, excluding the initial conditions, in the same general
form as the static policy model (2.46) and the point controllable framework
of (2.60). The dimensions of (2.71) are as follows, y is an (m(T+l)
vector, R is an (m(T+l) x k(T+s+1)) matrix,u is a (k(T+s+l)xl) vector,
D is an (m(T+l)xj(T+s+1)) matrix, z is a (j(T+sxl)xl) vector, P is an
(m(T+l)xn) matrix and x is of course an n x 1 vector. The system 
dimensions and (2.71) immediately gives as a sufficient condition for the
existence of u which will allow the achievement of the target path y
from 0 to T with lead s . The linear dynamic model with coefficient
matrices A(L), C(L) and D(L) with equivalent state space structure given
by the matrices F, G, E, P, S and M is target path controllable with policy
lead or anticipation, s,se(0,l...) and target interval T+l for any
arbitrary initial conditions x and any arbitrary values of the exogenous-s
variables, if and only if, the (m(T+l)xk(T+s+1)) controllability matrix,
R, satisfies
p[R] = m(T+l) (2.72)
where R is of course equal to the matrix of (2.70). Furthermore, from 
(2.57) and (2.70) we have an equivalent controllability condition
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II0 1 T+l T+S
P = p[R] = m(T+l) (2.73)
0 TTS
The fulfilment of the sufficient condition for dynamic policy existence 
allows a solution to the problem (2.71) to be obtained. The solution can 
be found by using the dynamic instrument multipliers in the controllability 
matrix and using the dynamic multipliers for the exogenous variables which 
are related to the state space realisation in the same general way as the 
instruments, to give an expression for the dynamic values of the instrument
(2.74) is conceptually a very simple problem to solve, certainly more 
simple than the linear/quadratic approach to dynamic stabilisation.
However, there are some very real problems associated with solution of 
(2.76) in an applied framework as we shall see below and in a later chapter. 
The sufficient condition if satisfied, enables the policy-maker to 
exactly achieve his targets over the period T+l even in a non strongly- 
Tinbergen world where k < m so long as the policy-maker is willing to 
anticipate his target by s periods. The dimensions of the controllability 
matrix R and the rank criterion for sufficiency lead to a dynamic 
counterpart of Tinbergen's counting rule. Thus, a necessary condition 
for dynamic target path achievement is that the number of time indexed 
instruments must be greater than or equal to the total number of targets 
over the target path. That is,
In many instances the column dimension of R, k(T+s+1)f will be greater than
.-1. .-1.. ,-l~u = R  y - R  D z - R  Px
-S
(2.74)
"k" = k(T+s+l) > "m" E m(T+l). (2.75)
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the row dimension m(T+l) and the matrix will not be square hence 
precluding the existence of the regular inverse. That is, if the matrix 
has full rank then we will have more instruments than are necessary to 
achieve the desired target configuration. To overcome this problem, time 
indexed instruments can be dropped from R until R has dimension 
(m(T+l)xm(T+l)). The excluded "instruments" can then be assigned pre­
determined values and treated as exogenous variables although in practice 
it would be difficult to ascertain at which level to fix the instruments. 
The numerical values chosen for the "slack" instruments will of course 
affect the values obtained for u in the solution. While there may be 
some justifiable reasons for government spending at a pre-determined level, 
for example social and political reasons, there would appear to be little 
justification for setting monetary instruments at a particular level for 
say one period. This would be especially so when the time indexed monetary 
instrument was dropped from the anticipation period. The sensitivity of 
fixed target solutions to the dropping of slack instruments and the values 
assigned to those instruments would be of prime concern in an applied 
framework and will be a matter for investigation in this study. As with 
the target point problem, an upper bound on the amount of target path 
anticipation can be derived from the Cayley-Hamilton theorem. The upper 
bound for the target path problem is s = n, that is, once the level of 
anticipation equals the number of state variables no further linearly 
independent time indexed instruments can be found.
Tentative comparisons between the fixed target framework and the 
linear/quadratic framework have already been made. The most striking 
difference between the two techniques which has already been alluded to in 
Chapter One is that in many cases the policy-maker will not be able to 
achieve all his targets over a planning horizon with a limited amount of
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instruments. Implicit in the linear/quadratic case is a zero policy lead 
implying that the policy-maker expresses excessive impatience in trying 
to achieve his targets. The end result is that his targets will be 
compromised. On the other hand, the fixed target approach allows a policy­
maker to exactly hit his target within the bounds of the planning horizon 
as long as he is prepared to wait. Which technique to choose? The linear/ 
quadratic solution for a particular problem may result in all targets 
being compromised but the degree of compromise may be small in all periods.
The fixed target solution for an identical problem may entail being 
considerably off target for two thirds of the planning period and only 
exactly on target for the remaining third of the planning period. The great 
divergence from targets in the initial stages of the planning period may 
result in structural shifts as the expectations of the private sector change. 
The maintenance of a constant structure is crucial for a fixed target 
approach and while a constant structure has been assumed for the linear/ 
quadratic case, recent developments in that area have allowed for learning 
techniques to be incorporated in the stabilisation procedure. In this 
respect the fixed target approach is more restrictive.
There are also some similarities in the existence criteria of 
both techniques. Specifically, if the targets chosen are independent 
and the number of instruments equals the number of targets then the 
existence of policy in both frameworks is guaranteed. However, in such 
a strongly-Tinbergen world the linear/quadratic solution becomes redundant 
and the problem can be solved by the computationally simpler fixed target 
technique. Both stabilisation techniques allow for policy existence 
when the number of natural targets exceeds the number of natural
5 j
instruments- However, the dynamic Tinbergen solution still requires 
equality betweeen "targets" and "instruments" in a time indexed sense 
and hence the policy planner is constrained in relation to the number of 
targets he can choose given his available instruments and the length 
■of the planning period. In this respect, the optimisation approach is 
more flexible as the number of time indexed instruments and targets has 
no part in establishing the existence of policy and the policy planner is 
free to choose any number of targets relative to instruments and will 
not be constrained by the length of the planning period. While the 
optimising policy planner is free to choose many more targets than 
instruments than may be possible in a fixed target framework, the choice 
of targets still must be consistent with the computation of (C*H^_C + R^ _)
While it may not be possible to ascertain if the sufficient conditions for 
policy existence are satisfied in the linear/quadratic case prior to 
computation, it is possible in the target point situation when we only 
need to establish the existence of the inverse of a matrix of order m.
If the number of targets is about four then this is a relatively easy 
exercise - not so however, for the target path problem. Indeed, the 
size of the matrix to be inverted in the target path situation is one 
of the drawbacks of the technique. Consider a planning horizon of 
twenty periods with four targets and two instruments. Assuming existence, 
the linear/quadratic solution would require twenty (2x2) matrix inversions, 
the target point solution would require one (4x4) inversion while the 
target path solution would require one (40x40) matrix inversion and 
in addition, the controllability matrix will contain a large number of 
zero elements, from (2.74). Typically, the non-zero elements will be 
very small which could make inversion difficult with the possibility 
occurring of computer rounding and rounding of the data input creating
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rank deficiencies and linear dependence between instruments when in fact 
none exist. Further insight into this problem can be gained from 
Chapter Seven.
The relative adjustment of both techniques to uncertainty is also 
important. As presented here, neither technique is able to adjust to 
parameter uncertainty although it must be recognised that the optimisation 
literature has begun to advance techniques to handle fully stochastic 
systems for example Chow (1975b) and Kendrick and Majors (1974) to name 
just two of an ever expanding literature. The inclusion of parameter 
uncertainty in the fixed target framework presents some problems. The 
nature of the solution procedure makes learning techniques questionable 
in effectiveness. One technique would be to replace the coefficients by 
expected values and run monte carlo simulations to gain a knowledge of 
the variance in policy and target performance. The problem here would 
be that existence of policy could not be obtained in many cases whereas 
existence could be obtained in a purely deterministic framework. 
Optimisation techniques are clearly ahead of the fixed target approach in 
terms of parameter uncertainty but as this study constitutes the first 
attempt to employ fixed targets techniques, it will not be concerned 
with parameter uncertainty.Nonetheless it does suggest a very interesting 
area for future research. Of more interest is the reaction of the 
alternative solutions to additive uncertainty. The feedback nature of 
optimisation allows the controls to adjust past shocks and in this 
sense the technique is more flexible than the fixed target technique 
which in general cannot adjust to additive uncertainty as the past 
state of the system only enters into the solution once in the form of 
initial conditions prevailing at the beginning of the planning period. 
However, if strongly-Tinbergen conditions exist then the fixed target
5/
approach is able to adjust to past shocks as policies are computed 
for each time period without anticipation and it is only under these 
conditions that such adjustment can take place- The removal of past 
state behaviour from the computation of controls for target path 
achievement removes the problem of obtaining accurate information 
about the past State vector - a difficult problem for any real world 
application of optimisation techniques and one which has not been 
adequately explored in the literature. Both techniques suffer from 
the perhaps unpalatible assumption of perfect foresight about the future 
behaviour of the exogenous variables although filtering and adaptive 
techniques can be employed in optimisation solutions. The advantage of 
optimisation is that because it reflects a situation of zero 
anticipation and considerable compromise, it would, in the event of new 
information becoming available about future exogenous variables, be 
feasible to abandon the current plan and re-compute the optimal controls 
for the remaining of the planning period. This procedure would not be 
feasible in a fixed target framework unless the policy-maker was dealing 
with a strongly-Tinbergen situation as the need to re-plan would 
constitute hitting the targets outside of the current planning period 
due to the need to adequately anticipate the exact achievements of the 
targets. The answer to the question of which technique to use cannot be 
answered from theory or armchair speculation. Each stabilisation problem 
has its own characteristics which perhaps may favour one or the other 
technique. The applied results which are presented in the remainder of 
this study will hopefully shed some valuable light on this issue.
CHAPTER III
A SMALL OPEN MODEL OF THE AUSTRALIAN ECONOMY
In this chapter a small open model of the Australian economy will 
be developed and estimated. The philosophy behind the construction of 
the model is that only the "minimal" size model required to illustrate the 
important linkages between the open, monetary and income sectors will be 
discussed. As is the practice with most econometric studies, a wide variety 
of differing structures were tested but because of the limited space 
available the alternative specifications will not in general be discussed.
As we have indicated in the previous chapter, non-linear techniques are 
available for the approximate optimal control of non-linear models. However, 
as the dynamic Tinbergen approach requires a strictly linear model, we 
shall proceed directly to the construction of a linear model and disregard 
non-linear versions which may be linearised. The need to employ a linear 
model does place some restriction on the structure of the model and can cause 
difficulties through the mixture of real and nominal values of variables in 
equations. If the inherent non-linearities are not too severe however, 
then it could be expected that the choice of a linear version will not 
result in excessive information loss. The term "minimal" model needs some 
clarification at this point. The aim of the applied investigation is to 
observe the behaviour of the major broad aggregates rather than a multitude 
of subsectors. This can be effectively carried out by aggregating the 
system into a smaller system which captures all desired structural 
characteristics. Secondly, the use of very large models does not guarantee 
any additional information so the model presented here was originally 
formulated as a much larger version of the final structure presented and 
gradually reduced. Equations which did not contribute any significant
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influence on the general results were either simplified or deleted with 
the requirement that the remaining structure gave similar results to any 
preceding larger versions. On a more practical level, a large model would 
be very difficult to handle in the dynamic Tinbergen fixed target framework 
and as this study is the first to contain any applied analysis of dynamic 
fixed target problems, it is of some benefit to keep the analysis as 
simple as possible. Even with a small simple model, the solution of the 
fixed target problem presents a formidable computational problem as will 
be seen in Chapter Seven. The requirements of linearity, simplicity and 
smallness leave stabilisation studies of the kind presented here open to 
charges of "bending the problem to fit the technique" but the use of a 
small simple model does not necessarily imply any significant information 
loss at an aggregated level and as we have already pointed out a linearity 
requirement need not be too restrictive in all cases.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the model, a number of issues 
need to be considered. Firstly, the proliferation of optimal stabilisation 
studies has given rise to a debate concerning the endogeneity of 
government controls in estimated models. Clearly, if governments do have 
some kind of cost function in mind and controls are continually being 
adjusted to offset current stocks in order to minimise accumulated welfare 
costs^then controls are endogenous and should be treated as such in the 
estimation of models to avoid serious specification errors. Recent work 
by Crotty (1973) (1976), Boddy and Crotty (1975) and Blinder and Goldfeld
(1972) has focussed on a theoretical assessment of this problem. The 
possibility of such a feature raises some interesting econometric problems 
in regard to the degree of coefficient bias that may be present if the 
controls are not treated as endogenous. However, the adjustment of current 
controls to current deviations in the desired targets implies that the
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decision period for policy is shorter than the observation period for the 
data and that policy authorities are able to react to current shocks and 
observations. Clearly the authorities would not know the size and 
direction of shocks until after the data for the current period becomes 
available. In this case, it could be reasonably argued, depending on the 
time unit chosen, that policy must be formulated on the basis of past 
performance and as such controls become a function of predetermined 
variables and can legitimately be treated as exogenous. The use of feed­
back control laws also reinforces this as controls are always adjusted 
in response to past target deviations. The choice of unit time period is 
important in this case as there could be an argument for treating the 
controls as endogenous if annual data were used when the correct model 
is quarterly, as controls would most likely have been adjusted within 
the current time period. To avoid this specification problem, the time 
interval chosen was quarterly although as we shall see below this can 
also lead to problems in a stabilisation framework. The fixed target 
approach presents some conceptual problems with respect to endogenous 
instruments as the current controls are a function of current desired 
target levels. It is not clear whether or not controls should be treated 
as endogenous for estimation purposes in this situation. However, as 
fixed target techniques have not yet been employed for stabilisation 
purposes, especially by present or past Australian governments, no 
specification errors are likely to occur in the estimated model from this 
source. With the level of knowledge of stabilisation techniques now 
making control of national economies more feasible, it is of some 
importance to consider the possibility of specification error when
choosing a stabilisation model.
61
The linear/quadratic controls laws set out in Chapter Two 
utilised the reduced from of an economic system. Similarly, the fixed 
target solution can be derived directly from the reduced form. If the 
stabilisation techniques are amenable to the direct use of reduced forms 
then why bother carrying out a structural form estimation when the reduced 
form can be estimated directly? Monetarists argue that it is exceptionally 
difficult to model the transmission of policy, particularly monetary policy, 
and even a complicated model of considerable size will not be able to capture 
the underlying structure. As such, reduced forms should be estimated.
Blinder and Goldfeld (1972) have shown that the direct estimation of 
reduced forms can seriously bias the estimated impacts of monetary and 
fiscal policy. Extending this to a stabilisation framework it is clear that 
given an incorrect assessment of the effectiveness of policy, an 
inappropriate mix of policy can result. Even when a structural form is 
specifically outlined, the direct estimation of a reduced form can be 
inconsistent with the underlying structure. The work of Blinder and 
Goldfeld places serious doubt on the acceptability of using reduced form 
models and in particular questions the findings of perhaps the most 
widely known monetarist model - the St Louis model (Andersen and Jordan 
(1970)). To avoid problems of reduced form estimation, the model will be 
estimated in its structural form and then the "true" reduced form will 
be obtained from the structure. While criticism of the structure can be 
made, the reduced form will be at least consistent with the structure and 
provided the structural form can adequately capture the general relative 
importance of monetary and fiscal policy, the reduced form instrument 
multipliers will display a similar tendency.
The model itself is essentially Keynesian in nature and assumes a 
fixed exchange rate, and is divided into three sections which feed back
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into and interrelate with each other. The monetary sector is closely 
related to the open sector through the concept of a money base and 
endogenous money supply. The inclusion of an endogenous money supply 
raises the interesting proposition that the planning authorities are 
unable to directly control the supply of money and hence it cannot be 
directly treated as an instrument as is the case in many econometric and 
theoretical studies. The monetary variable that the authorities can control 
directly is taken to be the domestic component of the total monetary base. 
The open sector is based on the portfolio approach to capital inflow 
developed by Porter (1974) for the Australian economy. Porter's work is 
used as the basis for building up the relationship between capital flows, 
foreign reserves, the money base and hence the money supply. The link 
between the income, monetary and open sectors is provided firstly through 
the effect of the rate of interest on investment and secondly, through a 
financial wealth effect on consumption. In keeping with the philosophy 
of simplicity, the controls have been restricted to two, a basic fiscal 
instrument (government spending) and a basic monetary instrument (domestic 
component of the monetary base). As it turned out, after considerable 
experimentation with larger sets of instruments, the choice of the two 
finally included was something of a necessary condition for feasible 
policy solutions to exist, given the model. The exclusion of other "minor" 
instruments stems from the fact that in both the optimising (no adjustment 
costs on controls) and fixed target frameworks, the achievement or 
attempted achievement of specific target sets required that all 
instruments be used in a rigorous manner. For example, the Statutory 
Reserve Deposit ratio (SRD) was required to be used vigorously each time 
period (quarterly) with shifts of up to 100% per quarter and occasionally 
negative values being required. This behaviour was not confined to the
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S.R.D. ratio but was evident in other controls which typically are not 
used continuously by the authorities. The net result was that in the 
linear/quadratic solutions controls such as the S.R.D. ratio were 
weighted heavily to avoid adjustment. As these controls were not able to 
contribute substantially to the results without unrealistic policies 
resulting, they were abstracted from in the final form of the model.
Such instrument behaviour has been found to occur in other stabilisation 
studies, for example, in the work of Pindyck (1973a), where it was found 
that the time path of the tax surcharge behaved in an unacceptable manner 
when it was allowed to adjust freely to complement the other controls 
in the system. Clearly, large quarterly shifts in tax rates or surcharges 
would not be tolerated in a real world situation. The behaviour of 
particular controls in either a flexible or fixed target framework 
indicates that the use of such techniques are reasonably restrictive and 
that what is required is a combination of formal techniques and short run 
discretion whereby instruments such as the S.R.D. ratio and tax rates 
can be adjusted in an appropriate manner. The control theorist would 
need to bear these considerations in mind when constructing a suitable 
"control" model. The abstraction from the S.R.D. ratio does not 
necessarily imply a weakness in the model as over recent years the 
Reserve Bank has shifted away from the use of direct controls such as the 
S.R.D. ratio with the main emphasis being on market oriented controls 
such as open market operations. This is not to say that the S.R.D. ratio 
is no longer used but its role has been substantially limited. In many 
cases it has been implemented solely for the purpose of mopping up 
seasonal variations in the supply of money. The tendency of trading banks 
to effectively circumvent direct controls, largely through market 
manipulations, has been the key force behind the move towards market
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controls. The incorporation in the model of the domestic component of 
the monetary base as the monetary control of concern effectively captures 
this feature.
The foundation of the income sector is the national income 
identity. This is given by
Y = C + I + X - I M + G  (3.1)
where Y equals income, C equals consumption, I equals investment, G 
equals government spending, X equals exports and IM equals imports.
G is the fiscal instrument and exports are taken to be exogenous and 
uncontrollable. That is, it is assumed that the volume of exports 
largely depends on external factors and internal seasonal variations - a 
reasonable assumption in the case of Australia. The treatment of X as 
exogenous also recognises the fact that model builders have experienced 
considerable difficulty in constructing acceptable export functions.
The remaining components of the income identity, C, I and IM are explained 
by behavioural relationships.
Previous macro models of Australia have tended to disaggregate 
consumption spending into two or more components. For example Higgins 
and Fitzgerald (1973), Kmenta (1966), Nevile (1970), Norton and 
Henderson (1972) and Zerby (1969) . While this approach undoubtedly has 
its merits, it was found that doing so in this case did not substantially 
affect the overall general results and as such/a single aggregate function 
has been included . Modern macro theory has firmly established the
importance of wealth in the role of consumption. A simple model which 
captures the earlier Keynesian concept of consumption and which incorporates 
wealth is given by
a + a 0 1 YD + a W t 2 t (3.2)
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where YD equals disposable income and W represents private sector wealth.
A more sophisticated version of (3.2) is that presented by Ando and 
Modigliani (1963) which incorporates the effects of expected future 
income. The aggregated version of the Ando-Modigliani consumption 
function is given by
Ct = a0 + ai YDt + a2 Wt + a3 Yt <3-3)
0where y equals expected future income. Attempts were made to estimate
0(3.3) but the presence of y^_ presented some difficulties. Various
proxies were tested such as the use of a time trend of actual income
(used by RBAl, Norton and Henderson (1972)) which were not completely 
0satisfactory. y^ can be removed from (3.3) by introducing a simplifying 
assumption that expected future income is a constant multiple of current 
household disposable income. Thus
y® = B YD , B > 0 . (3.4)
(3.4) asserts that if disposable income increases then people will adjust 
their expectations of the level of expected future income by a factor B.
By incorporating (3.4) into (3.3) we have
C = a' + a' YD + a ’ W + ao(ßYD ) (3.5)t U l t 2 t 3 t
which can be written as
C = a' + a" YD + a'W (3.6a)t 0 I t  2 t
where
a^ = (a^  + a3B) , 0 < a^ < 1 (3.6b)
which of course is in precisely the same form as (3.2) but allows for the 
general separation of future income effects from disposable income and 
provides a more acceptable basis for the estimation of a (3.2) type
function. As it stands (3.5) can be estimated directly provided that
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appropriate wealth data can be found. Unfortunately, in the past good 
wealth data for Australia has not been available which makes estimation 
slightly more difficult. Theoretical work usually breaks wealth up into 
financial and physical wealth with physical wealth being represented by 
the capital stock. Without venturing into the well-known debate on 
whether or not physical capital can in fact be measured, it was decided to 
incorporate only financial wealth in the consumption function - a 
simplification successfully employed in RBAl. The exact definition of 
financial wealth provided some difficulty and a discussion of the 
definition is left until later. The inclusion of financial wealth 
allows for a direct monetary policy linkage with the income sector as a 
definition of financial wealth will necessarily include the supply of 
money in either of its various forms.
Like consumption, investment will be treated as a single 
aggregated variable. It has long been recognised that the estimation 
of an appropriate investment function is one of the most difficult 
aspects of macro model building as,unlike consumption theory in which 
a broad area of agreement has been reached, no settled form of the 
investment function has been settled upon. For example, should a neo­
classical type function be incorporated or should an accelerator type 
function be used? Neo-classical functions have found considerable 
favour with a broad spectrum of economists but are notoriously difficult 
to estimate with considerable concessions to the theory being necessary 
in many cases to obtain an acceptable estimated function. The empirical 
work on investment has been limited in Australia but recent work by 
Higgins et al (1976) has thrown some doubt on the total effectiveness 
of neo-classical functions. Higgins et al concluded that the much 
maligned accelerator version of the investment function provides an
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explanation and prediction of investment as good as, and in some cases 
superior to, alternative specifications in relation investment behaviour 
in Australia over recent years. As such, and due to the difficulties of 
quantifying some of the neo-classical conepts, an accelerator type function 
was estimated. The structural form of the function was derived by initially 
distinguishing between investment expenditure and investment expenditure 
decisions. Investment expenditure refers to the actual expenditure 
that occurs at time t while expenditure decisions refers to decisions to 
undertake specific projects, those decisions to be made from time t. If 
a firm wishes to expand its fixed capital it is reasonable to assume that 
it is unable to carry out all projects relevant to that expansion in the 
unit time period. Specifically, it is assumed that actual investment 
expenditure is carried out over a number of time periods with some 
fraction carried out in the first time period, some fraction in the second 
and so on. Putting this another way we can say that current investment 
is related to investment decisions made prior to the current time period. 
Using this concept and expressing investment as a distributed lag 
function and using the familiar accelerator assumption relating the 
desired capital stock to income in the following way
K* = aY , (3.8)t t
we can derive a generalised accelerator function of the form
I == k + k (Y - Y . ) + E c .1 .t 0 1 t-n t-n-1 , j t-j
j
t=l
(3.9)
where n reflects the lag on the actual income accelerator and j 
represents the lag on the stock adjustment variables. Specific lags 
can be established a pr'iov'L from specific assumptions about the lag 
structure of the decision process and the way in which terms are grouped 
together. However, in general the actual length of the lags involved
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will be an empirical question and it is possible that some components 
in the stock adjustment summation will not be statistically significant.
In general, (3.9) represents an accelerator stock adjustment model in 
which it has been assumed that it is not possible to fully adjust 
capital stock to changes in output in one period. In its present form 
(3.9) provides a linear relationship which can be easily estimated but 
omits the important financial link with the monetary sector. The 
accelerator coefficient can be regarded as also reflecting the cost of 
finance, the tax structure and other restrictions on the ability of 
firms to undertake investment. Accordingly, financial effects in the 
form of the rate of interest can be separated and explicitly included 
in the function, presumably with a long lag. Thus the term
br , b < 0 (3.10)t-s
can be incorporated into (3.9) with s being the length of the interest 
rate lag on investment which once again is an empirical proposition.
The company tax structure has not been explicitly included for the 
reasons outlined above - specifically because the solution techniques 
require adjustment every time period when it is only usual to adjust 
tax rates once every four quarters at the most.
Exports,as we have argued, can be legitimately treated as 
exogenous in Australia. In contrast, imports are a leakage from the 
system which depends very much on internal factors but like exports, 
adequate import functions are difficult to estimate. While there is 
no general formal body of theory in the same vein as consumption or 
investment, it is possible to build an acceptable import function 
although in many cases variables are introduced in an ad hoc manner and 
tested in an empirical framework. As imports represent that portion
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of income not spent on domestic goods or saved, it is reasonable to 
assume that imports will depend largely on the level of domestic 
income which provides a basis for building up the remainder of the 
function. Imports are often viewed as a "safety valve" in that any 
excess demand which cannot be met by domestic production will spill 
over on to imports, thus relieving pressure on the system. It seems 
desirable then to include some measure of domestic capacity into our 
import function. Initially^experiments were carried out using a variable 
that measured capacity utilisation. Capacity utilisation is defined as 
the difference between registered vacancies and the total of unemployed 
persons divided by registered vacancies. The inclusion of such a variable 
failed to contribute significantly to the overall performance of the 
model in either its non-linear or linearised versions. The result can 
be partially explained by the fact that excess demand was not significant 
over the estimation period - a conclusion which is supported by the 
stability of prices over the same period. A further influence on the 
level of imports is the degree of government control over imports. It 
is very difficult to capture the complexity of government import controls 
in a simple function and as such it is convenient to introduce a 
proxy variable for the governments external policy actions (excluding 
monetary policy). This approach is supported by the fact that historically, 
import controls in various forms have not been a major instrument of 
short run stabilisation in Australia and their explicit inclusion in 
the model would result in the type of unsatisfactory behaviour outlined 
above. Kmenta (1966) has suggested using lagged exports as an indicator 
of government's policy actions. The suggestion is based upon considerable 
experimentation with the data and reflects the notion of the role of 
exports as an indicator of the economic health of system and the assumption
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that government policy relating to imports is based on the behaviour of 
export income. Implicit in this approach is the notion that the government 
has some balance of trade (and possibly a balance of payments) objective 
and attempts some modest adjustment in imports in response to the behaviour 
of exports. An additional hypothesis can also be associated with the use 
of exports and that is that the past level of exports provides income and 
foreign exchange to the export sector which is then available for the 
purchase of imports.11 To complete the import function, relative prices 
are introduced although in a linearised version and a stock adjustment 
hypothesis is included which asserts that current imports are a function 
of past demand. The final version of the import function is given by
IMt f (Y. t-P IMt-1 RP ) t-m (3.11)
where IM equals imports, X equals exports and RP represents relative 
prices which were linearised in the estimated version. P represents the 
lag associated with the effect of exports and M is the lag associated 
with relative prices.
As well as forming an important integral part of the income 
identity, exports and imports constitute a significant portion of a major 
external relationship, the current account balance. The identity for 
the current account balance (CB) is given by
CB = X - IM + NT + GF (3.12)
where NT equals net transfers overseas and GF equals government capital 
flows. GF is included to keep (3.12) in line with the definitional 
requirements of Porter's capital flow equation discussed below. The 
inclusion of GF in CB does not affect the overall balance of payments 
results as its inclusion simply means that the balance of payments
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position can be obtained by adding CB to private capital inflow.
To complete the income sector of the model we require a 
relationship to explain personal disposable income, YD. By seeking to 
explain YD we also introduce supporting relationships for total personal 
income, TPY, and personal income tax payments, T. YD is defined by 
the following identity,
YD = TPY - T - OT - IP. (3.13)
OT equals other direct taxes (as distinct from T), fees, fines and other 
payments to government while IP equals interest payments on consumer debt. 
OT and IP are treated as exogenous variables. The treatment of the largest 
component of the identity, TPY, requires some consideration. As defined 
in the Quarterly Estimates of National Income and Expenditure published 
by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, TPY is equal to the sum of wages, 
salaries and supplements, income of farm unincorporated enterprises, 
income of other unincorporated enterprises and from dwellings and interest 
dividends, transfers from overseas and cash benefits from general 
government. TPY would usually be incorporated into a model defined as 
above and treated as an identity with a wage/price sector explaining the 
evolution of wages, salaries and supplements. While the theoretical 
treatment of wage/price sectors has reached a level of considerable 
sophistication, for example, Turnovsky and Pitchford (forthcoming), 
the empirical formulation of such functions has not progressed to the 
same level, especially in Australia where researchers have in the past 
found it extremely difficult to adequately model wage/price sectors 
due to the nature of minimum wage fixation, the high level of unionism and 
the arbitration system. For example, Higgins and Fitzgerald (1973) 
treated money award wages covered by Arbitration Commission decisions as
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exogenous. This would include the majority of wages and salaries 
included in the definition of TPY. Due to the difficulties of 
constructing an adequate wage/price sector for Australia (since the 
introduction of wage indexation the modelling of the wage structure would 
become considerably easier) and as wages and prices were extremely stable 
of the estimation period, it was decided to exclude a sophisticated wage/ 
price sector in the model in favour of a more simplified treatment.
Indeed, any attempt to estimate a detailed wage/price sector would 
constitute a major study in itself. A simple function relating TPY to 
national income has been included in the model which is sufficient to 
capture the essential movement in total personal income in a period of 
wage and price stability.
To complete the identity for personal disposable income and 
the income sector as a whole, we require a relationship for personal 
income tax payments, T. The main influences on the level of personal 
income taxes are obviously the level of total personal income which is 
subject to taxation and of course the statutory tax rates which apply to 
such income. Other important closely related factors include the 
distribution of total personal income which is taxable and in the case 
of Australia, the degree of progressiveness of the tax structure. The 
notion of a progressive tax structure suggests that a non-linear relation­
ship would be the most appropriate but this possibility is of course 
eliminated due to the linearity requirements of the model and it is of 
course very difficult to capture all the above factors without 
incorporating a large disaggregated tax subsector in the model similar to 
that constructed by Mackrell (1970) for RBA1. In fact, the use of a 
linear structure prevents the explicit inclusion of tax rates in the 
model in a form in which they can be treated as controls. This highlights
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a significant drawback of the linear approach but is counter-balanced by 
the earlier observation that as tax rates are not usually constantly 
manipulated, the inclusion of them in a fixed or flexible target 
stabilisation framework could lead to infeasible policies being specified. 
Empirical evidence of this type of behaviour can be found in Wells (1977). 
The only alternative to treating total tax payments as an instrument which 
is clearly incorrect, would be to incorporate a tax surcharge instrument 
in a similar way to that employed by Pindyck (1973) . This can be achieved 
by fitting a simple linear relationship between tax payments and total 
personal income but forcing the function through the origin and hence 
excluding an estimated constant term. The surcharge can then be added to 
the function as a constant term which can be directly manipulated bv the 
government. Considerable experimentation was carried out with this type 
of function but was excluded from the final structural form due to the 
fact that most solutions required unrealistic shifts in the surcharge and 
to avoid this problem the surcharge had to be weighted heavily in the 
linear/quadratic framework and fixed a priori in the fixed target 
framework and treated as an exogenous variable. The final form of the 
tax function was a simple linear function relating tax payments to total 
personal income
T = t + t1TPYt (3.14)
with t^ representing an average tax rate for the entire economy which of 
course remains fixed. This is not an unreasonable approach in light of 
past experience in Australia where governments have displayed considerable 
reluctance to change tax rates and use tax rates as an instrument of short 
run stabilisation. (3.14) adequately approximates the progressive tax 
structure, over the estimation period as the "explosion" in incomes
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relevant to recent Australian history did not occur until after the 
estimation period (pre 1972). It should be recognised that in a time of 
rapidly increasing incomes, (3.14) would most likely be considerably less 
than adequate.
In the past it has been customary to treat the supply of money as 
a control variable subject to direct manipulation by the monetary 
authorities. If this assumption is dropped we are left with a more 
realistic and interesting proposition that the supply of money is a 
variable which is endogenously determined within the system. The 
implications of this for economic policy are very important. Specifically, 
if the authorities require a particular target rate of growth of the 
money supply then it cannot be guaranteed that this target will be 
automatically achieved. The money supply function incorporated in the 
model presented here is based on the work of Teigen (1964), although some 
slight modifications to Teigen's work have been included. The significant 
departure from Teigen concerns the introduction of a foreign component 
of the money base which allows for the important interaction between the 
money supply and the open sector. The total monetary base is given by
MB = DM + FR (3.15)
where DM constitutes the domestic component of the base and FR is the 
foreign component with FR defined as the level of foreign reserves. The 
government can inject or withdraw money into or out of the banking system 
by manipulating DM through open market operations. By building up the 
relationship between the required reserve ratio and deposits, the excess 
reserves of the banking system and the foreign component of the base a 
money supply function of the following form can be obtained.
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MS ^(DM + FR - R ) e (3.16)
with
ip = 1S(l-d) + d (3.17)
and where R equals excess reserves, S equals the required reserve e
ratio and d equals the proportion of the money supply held as notes and 
coins. In Australia, the required reserve ratio can be considered to be 
the Statutory Deposit Ratio. The supply of money is now 
expressed as a simple multiple of the money base less excess or free 
reserves with \p > 1 reflecting the multiple expansion effect of the 
banking system. A further extension to (3.16) can be introduced through 
the profit maximising behaviour of banks which is reflected in the supply 
of money having a positive interest elasticity. The positive response 
of the money supply to the rate of interest reflects the willingness 
of banks to try and issue more loans as the interest rate increases. In 
terms of (3.16) this is equivalent to expressing excess reserves as a 
function of the rate of interest giving
MS = \p(DM + FR - f (r) ) . (3.18)
Two estimation choices are open. Firstly, ip can be considered in a broken 
down version (3.17) in which it is desired to explicitly include S in the 
estimation and would allow for S to be treated as a control. The 
requirement of linearity negates this first approach. To overcome the 
problem of incorporating S, a linear approximation can be used whereby 
S appears as an explanatory variable in a linear fashion. Secondly,
(3.18) can be estimated directly leaving S as function of ip. ip can be 
found by hand by fitting a straight line through the origin although 
after considerable experimentation it was found that a least squares
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estimation was more efficient. A further extension to the basic function 
was employed in which the rate of interest was removed from the brackets 
in (3.18) and treated as a separate explanatory variable - this procedure 
of course requires a least squares estimate. The final form selected 
for inclusion in the model consisted of the following specification,
The S.R.D. ratio was excluded on similar grounds to some forms of tax 
rates, that is, the ratio is not generally subject to large shifts for 
short run purposes and the stabilisation techniques require this to occur 
unless it is fixed. When it is fixed it fails to contribute to the 
overall controllability of the system and can be effectively excluded.
The explicit exclusion of S does not significantly affect the overall 
explanatory behaviour of (3.19) and of course S is implicitly included 
in the function as the money multiplier, m , is a function of S.
The specification of a money demand function is much more straight- 
forward with money demand, M , being a function of income and the rate 
of interest and following Goldfeld (1973) and other researchers, M 
is specified to be a function of wealth. Thus
Various lag structures and specifications were tested within the basic 
framework of (3.20). The specification of a suitable wealth variable 
presented some difficulties, remembering of course that a similar problem 
was encountered with the consumption function. The solution of the problem 
is discussed below. The sub-system of the model consisting of the demand
r m , m > 1 
1 1 2
(3.19)
dM = L (Y, r, W) (3.20)
L1 > 0, l2 < 0, 0 < L3 < 1.
for and supply of money can be closed by introducing the identity
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S d ...M = M = M. (3.21)
The relationship between the rate of interest and the supply of
and demand for money is crucial with the rate of interest being
S cldetermined by, and at the same time determining, M and M in a 
simultaneous manner. If we invoke (3.21) and insert M into (3.20), the 
function for the rate of interest can be derived directly from the money 
demand function. Hence
r = L* (Y,M,W)
•k
L* > 0, L2 < 0 ,  0 < L* < 1 .
(3.22)
Up to this point in the discussion "the" rate of interest has been referred 
to. The question is, which rate of interest should be incorporated in the 
equations (3.19), (3.20) and (3.22) and should it be the same as the rate
of interest included in the investment function? Clearly, the rate of 
interest included in the investment function should be a long rate. At 
first sight, the choice of interest rate for the money supply and demand 
functions and hence (3.22), is not as straightforward. The best we can do 
is appeal to the available body of empirical research which exists on this 
subject as a detailed exhaustive examination of the issues and problems 
involved is beyond the scope of this study. Following other researchers 
such as Heller (1965), Laidler (1966), Zerby (1969) and Adams and Porter 
(1976), a short rate will be included in the money supply and demand 
functions as short rates tend to reflect the opportunity cost of holding 
money instead of close substitutes. The choice of a short rate as the 
appropriate rate to include presents some further difficulties as there 
are a multiplicity of rates to choose from and any rate which is chosen 
will only serve as an indicator or proxy for movements in the short term
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market. The rate chosen was the yield on two-year government bonds as 
this rate is influenced by changes in the Liquid Assets and Government 
Securities (L.G.S.) assets of the commercial banking system and is also 
influenced by shifts in the liquidity preference of the non-bank public. 
The inclusion of a long rate and a short rate requires a behavioural 
equation explaining the long rate. This is most effectively carried out 
by specifying a simple term structure relating the long rate to the short 
rate. To some extent the long and short rates have in the past exhibited 
a tendency to move broadly in line with each other with the long rate 
generally lying above the short rate. This proposition can also be 
established theoretically, see Lutz (1968), for example. The ten-year 
government bond rate was used as a proxy variable for "the" long rate of 
interest.
Before discussing the remaining equations of the model it is 
convenient to return to the question of an appropriate definition of 
wealth and the related area of an appropriate definition of the supply of 
money. Most definitions of wealth include the supply of money and the 
holding of other financial assets such as government bonds. Considerable 
experimentation was carried out using various definitions of wealth with 
the limited amount of data that was available at the time of estimation.
It was found that a broad definition of money was adeauate as a definition 
of financial wealth with the addition of other variables not adding 
significantly to the overall estimation or the results of various control 
experiments. As such, only money was included. The money demand and 
interest rate equations were adjusted accordingly. This procedure also 
had the advantage of decreasing the size of the system as the inclusion 
of other components of wealth required corresponding behavioural 
relationships. There appeared to be little gained from specifying
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additional relationships for variables which did not contribute 
significantly to the analysis. Unlike other variables such as C and I 
where the choice of data is relatively straightforward, there is no 
settled body of opinion on what constitutes the "correct" definition of 
money. As financial wealth has to some extent been abstracted from,the 
definition of money employed here is broader than is usually considered.
In addition to currency and demand deposits with trading banks, fixed 
term deposits (including certificates of deposit with all trading banks) 
plus deposits with all savings banks have been included. Thus the 
definition includes assets with perfect liquidity and assets with a less 
degree of liquidity, depending on the withdrawal restrictions imposed 
by the trading banks and if only currency and term deposits are taken to 
be the usual constituents of "money" then the remaining assets can be 
regarded as "near money". As we have already indicated however, the broad 
definition proved to be the most acceptable in terms of the overall 
philosophy of the model.
The basic idea behind the capital flow equation (Porter (1974)) 
is the notion that capital flows provide the means by which the private 
sector is able to remove any deficiency in the amount of.liquidity 
(in this case money) it requires. Thus, a positive change in national 
income will generate an increase in the demand for liquidity which can 
be partially satisfied through capital flows. Similarly, a negative 
current account balance will induce a currency drain in the private 
sector. The resulting outflow of foreign reserves will cause a fall in 
the stock of money through its influence on the total monetary base. The 
net result of this movement will be a balancing effect from an inflow of 
capital. The reverse situation is also true. If the current account 
balance is positive then the resulting flow of foreign reserves into the
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system will result in capital inflow not being required to help satisfy 
liquidity in the private sector. The capital inflow function also 
incorporates the change in the Euro-dollar rate which serves as a proxy 
for foreign alternatives for the allocation of funds by overseas investors 
We would therefore expect a positive change in overseas rates to have a 
negative impact on capital inflow in Australia as funds are diverted 
elsewhere. Porter's equation also includes a variable representing 
speculative inflow - a variable which has been of considerable importance 
in recent Australian history. The inclusion of a speculation variable 
implies "that any expected change in the exchange rate is a function of 
the level of foreign exchange reserves at the beginning of the period; 
once reserves reach a certain initial "trigger" value."(Porter (1974,p.7)) 
By specifying a particular "trigger" value we could expect some 
simultaneous feedback from the level of foreign reserves to capital inflow 
which would then feedback into foreign reserves and so on. Porter's 
original investigation was within the confines of a single equation 
analysis. The extension to a multi-equation system allows for the 
situation in which a blow-up in foreign reserves induced by speculation 
will result in a significant impact on the supply of money and income 
through the wealth effect in consumption. Finally, the effect of 
government generated liquidity is included in the function through the 
introduction of the domestic component of the monetary base, DM. An 
increase in base money will have a direct increase on MB and M by 
definition. However, a positive change in domestic base money will also 
have a negative impact on capital flows (CF) which, depending on the 
movement of the current account balance, could cause a downward shift 
in the level of foreign reserves. Thus we have a potentially self- 
defeating monetary policy situation in which the authorities may try to
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expand the money supply by a domestic monetary expansion which could be 
offset to some degree by a corresponding drain on foreign reserves.
It is this relationship between the sectors which provides some of the 
most important and novel interactions of the model and it is this aspect 
of the model which appears to be unique to Australian models which have not 
adequately modelled the interactions between the open and monetary sectors. 
Of course, the degree to which monetary policy is compromised depends on 
the offset coefficient associated with DM in the capital flow eauation.
The general form of the capital flow equation is given by 12
CF = f + f CB + f ADM + f AY + f SC + f ERO (3.23)t 0 I t  2 t 3 t  4 t  5 t
f < 0, f < 0, f > 0,f > 0, f < 0.1 Z o 4 D
where SC^ equals the speculative proxy and ERO^ _ equals the change in the 
Euro-dollar rate. The open sector and the linkage with the monetary sector 
is completed by the addition of the identity
AFR = CB + CF • (3.24)
For simulation purposes and to provide for the feedback of FR into the 
total monetary base, (3.24) can be written as
FR = CB + CF + FR • (3.25)t t t t-1
A major difficulty associated with the model was the choice of 
deflated or nominal data to be used in the estimation of the structural 
equations. On the income side, real national income, real investment 
and real consumption are more important than the corresponding nominal 
values. However, if we estimate the model in real terms and then carry 
out policy experiments we are implicitly assuming that the authorities 
are able to exercise direct control over real government spending and 
real domestic base money. To some extent this is an invalid assumption
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as governments are only able to directly control nominal values of
instruments. In the monetary and external sectors it is usually nominal
values which are important, at least in Australia. It is generally the
nominal values of foreign reserves, capital flows and money supply which
are of interest. The treatment of some variables as real and using
linear approximations of others to give nominal values (for example 
Ma— - a^M + a^p) gives an unsatisfactory mix of real and nominal variables 
in the model. The final version of the model was estimated in nominal 
terms and then reguired variables were deflated by a simple price eguation. 
This procedure was effective due to the low rates of price inflation over 
the estimation period. Initially, a simple supply curve function was 
estimated
P = a + a y  (3.26)t 0 I t
where y equals real national income. The inclusion of (3.26) presented 
the problem of incorporating real income when income was treated as 
nominal in the remainder of the system. Recognising that (3.26) can 
rewritten as
P = t + a (-) 1 P t
(3.27)
a linear approximation can be taken where (— ) can be expressed as
aY + aP. This gives a form of the function
P = a ' +  a' Y (3.28)t 0 I t
(3.28) is admittedly a crude relationship but its inclusion does not 
affect the evolution of the remainder of the system. Australia has had 
a long tradition of imported inflation (see Pitchford (1968)) and it 
was desirable to include some imported component of the price level to 
enable some sensitivity analysis to be carried out, if required. Thus 
the function for the price level becomes
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= a' + a'Y + OP (3.29)
t 0 1 t t
where OP^ _ represents a proxy variable for the imported component of 
inflation. It is stressed that (3.29) is only meant to provide a deflating 
or scaling procedure for the remainder of the system and does not affect 
system performance or the trade-offs between the variables. Indeed, if 
all variables are treated as real variables then the resulting estimated 
structure would give the same general policy results and implications as 
the nominal version. However, if we were still interested in nominal 
values of particular variables then some procedure for inflating the data 
would be required and a function of the form of (3.29) would be appropriate 
in that case as well. The recent burst in inflation would probably 
invalidate (3.29) and a comprehensive wage/price sector would need to be 
incorporated into the model.13 However, the stability of wages and prices 
over the selected estimation period results in (3.29) being an adequate 
proxy for a price generator.
It was indicated above that the unit time period selected for the 
model was quarterly which is the usual time period chosen for short run 
stabilisation and also it reduces the change of the specification error 
outlined above. There is one difficulty/however, associated with the use 
of a quarterly model when open and monetary sectors are incorporated 
along with an income sector. The problem is that while income data is 
typically only available in annual or quarterly form, monetary variable 
information is available on a monthly and sometimes weekly basis. Thus, 
in reality, the monetary authorities could be adjusting their instruments 
on a monthly basis giving very close short run stabilisation with respect 
to those variables. The fiscal authorities on the other hand may be 
forced to operate stabilisation policy within at least a quarterly unit 
time period.1  ^ Clearly, an annual model would be totally unacceptable
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for stabilisation purposes when an open and monetary sector is included. 
Hiebest that can be done is to use a quarterly model while at the same 
time recognising that there could be some information and controllability 
loss in the open and monetary sectors in practice. Ideally, if the true 
monetary model is say monthly and the appropriate fiscal model is quarterly, 
we would like to have an interaction between sectors in which each sector 
is modelled within the appropriate unit time period. This would be very 
difficult except under very stringent and restrictive conditions.
Further analysis related to this issue can be found in later chapters.
MODEL ESTIMATION
The complete estimated version of the model is listed below. It
should be noted that a great number of structures were tested within the
basic framework outlined above. The final version of the model is that
which satisfies the basic philosophy and the minimality condition in the
most appropriate fashion. Even within a basic Keynesian framework there
are a number of alternative specifications which could be regarded as
acceptable. Stabilisation experiments were conducted with a variety of
specifications with the outcome that the results presented in the following
chapters appear to be quite robust in relation to alternative structures
similar to the overall philosophy of the model. The data sources were
the Australian Bureau of Statistics Quarterly Estimates of National
Income and Expenditure and the Reserve Bank's Statistical Bulletin. The
structural equations were estimated by two stage least squares using
quarterly seasonally unadjusted nominal data. The estimation period
ranged from the second quarter 1965 to the fourth quarter 1972. Seasonal
dummies were included in each structural equation. The bracketed figures
2under the coefficients are t statistics. D.W., S.E.R. and R refer to 
the Durbin-Watson statistic, the standard error of the residual and the
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coefficient of determination respectively.
National Income
Y = C + I + X - I M + G (3
Total Monetary Base
MB = DM + FR (3
Change in Foreign Reserves
AFR = CF + CB (3
Current Account Balance + Government Capital Flows
CB = X - IM + GF + NT (3
Personal Disposable Income
YD = TPY - T - OT - IP (3
Total Personal Income
TPYfc = -317.073 - 395.21S1 - 141.69S2 + 126.37S3 + .846Y (3
(-3.324) (-6.861) (-2.470) (2.142) (63.857)
2R = .99 DW = 2.262 SER = 110.516
Personal Consumption Expenditure
C fc = 166.565 + 106.34S1 + 94.013S2+ . 60lYDt + .053Mt+ . 1 2 0 2 ^ ^ ( 3
(1.638) (2.673) (2.674) (11.122) (2.000) (1.240)
2R = .99 DW = 2.19 SER = 76.169
Private Investment
Ifc = 124.761 + 90.329S2 + .1489(Y fc - Yfc_1)-24.903RLt_4+ .521 (3
(1.705) (3.376) (7.027) (-1.886) (4.349)
+ .4731 0t-2
(3.483)
2R = .98 DW = 1.942 SER = 37.06
.30)
.31)
.32)
.33)
.34)
.35)
36)
.37)
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Imports of Goods and Services
IM = 1127.559 + 33.252S2 t
(3.913) (2.007)
48.165S3 + . 0622 Y + .212Xt t-3
(-2.311) (3.396) (1.503)
- 12.2170P t
(-3.435)
2R = . 95
+ .561Mt-1
(4.978)
DW 1.711 SER = 37.38
Supply of Money
M = 1168.311 - 569.317S1 + 2.743MB + 722.51RSt t t
(1.087) (-2.263) (21.132) (3.640)
2R = .94 DW = 2.262 SER = 610.883
Short Rate of Interest
RS = 5.512 - .675S1 - .474S2 - 1.189S3 + .00122Yt t
(10.139) (-3.131) (-3.089) (-5.384) (5.271)
-.00059M + .848(RS -RS )t t-1 t-4
(-4.202) (11.028)
2R = .85 DW = 2.452 SER = .218
Long Rate of Interest
RL = .159 + .091S1 + .054S2 + .394RS + .599RL ,t t t-1
(1.239) (1.975) (1.228) (7.275) (10.685)
2R = .96 DW = 2.344 SER = .1003
Private Capital Flows
CF = 152.125 - 118.478S2 - 69.442S3 - .597CB - .259(DM -DM _)t t t t-1
(4.018) (-4.217) (-2.514) (-3.910) (-2.943)
+ .048(Y -Y ) + .089SC - 27.49EROt t-1 t t
(2.283) (7.184) (-1.973)
. 38)
(3.39)
(3.40)
(3.41)
(3.42)
.86 DW = 2.544 SER = 32.626
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Personal Income Tax Payments
T = -191.336 t
(-12.441)
2R = . 99
14.366S1 - 13.062S3 + .154TPY t
(-1.693) (-1.442) (55.483)
DW = 2.242 SER = 19.653
(3.43)
Price Equation
Pt 51.278 - 4.331S1 - .546S2 - 
(6.718) (-7.148) (1.682)
2R = .99 DW = 2.136
5.176S3 + .0068Y + .13370Pt t
(-7.808) (16.596) (1.736)
SER = 1.109
(3.44)
Endogenous Variables
C = Total personal consumption expenditure.
CB = Current account balance plus government capital flows.
CF = Net private capital inflow.
FR = Foreign reserves.
I = Private gross fixed capital expenditure.
IM = Imports of goods and services.
M = Volume of money (currency plus current deposits with all trading 
banks plus fixed term deposits, including certificates of deposit 
with all trading banks, plus deposits with all savings banks).
MB = Total monetary base.
P = Price level (implicit GNP deflator).
RL = Long rate of interest (10-year government bond rate used as a 
proxy variable).
RS = Short rate of interest (2 year government bond rate used as a proxy 
variable).
T = Personal income tax payments.
TPY = Total personal income.
Y = National income.
YD = Personal disposable income.
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Exogenous Variables
ERO = Change in the Euro dollar rate.
GF = Government capital flows.
IP = Consumer interest payments.
NT = Net transfers overseas.
OP = Imported component of P (import price index used as a proxy variable).
OT = Other payments to government plus transfers overseas.
= Seasonal dummy, i = 1, 2 or 3.
SC = Speculative proxy (Lagged Foreign Reserves).
X = Exports of goods and services.
Controls
DM = Domestic component of the monetary base defined as domestic assets 
of the Reserve Bank.
G = Government expenditure (consumption plus fixed capital expenditure).
Despite the overall size and simplicity of the model, the 
estimated results are guite satisfactory. The signs of all coefficients 
correspond to those specified by economic theory. Note that the money 
demand function has been deleted from the listing of the structural 
eguations. This is because its presence did not significantly contribute 
to the overall performance of the model as the money demand and short rate 
of interest eguations are essentially the same. To include both would be 
unnecessarily repetitive. As a check, both equations were estimated and 
compared. It was found that when the money demand function was rearranged 
to yield an interest rate function, the coefficients were very close to 
the estimated coefficients for the interest rate equation. One other 
aspect of interest was the failure of significance of domestic prices 
in the import function. Recall that a linear approximation of relative 
prices was incorporated in the import function. The failure of significance
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may not be solely due to the linearisation as previous studies, for 
example, Gregory and Martin (1976),have indicated that relative prices 
in a non-linear form have not performed particularly well in estimates of 
import functions.
To gain some insight into the dynamic performance of the model,
a dynamic simulation was carried out using historical data for the
initial conditions, exogenous and control variables. The results are
summarised in figures two to five. Y has been chosen to summarise the
behaviour of the income sector and FR indicates the dynamic performance
of the open sector. The money supply and long rate of interest are also
graphed. It is clear that the model performs exceptionally well in
relation to the income sector and effectively captures the general
behaviour of the open sector. The model is especially effective in
capturing the sharp upturn in foreign reserves experienced towards the end
of the estimation period. The performance of the open sector is
particularly encouraging in light of the fact that the coefficient of
2determination for the capital flow equation is only .86. While the R of 
an equation should not be the sole criterion for judging the acceptability 
of an equation it is desirable to obtain a good fit to the data as one 
"bad" equation which has a substantial effect on other sectors can 
seriously affect the performance of the model with respect to replicating 
the system which it purports to present. The performance of the open 
sector is further enhanced by the simulated level of the current account 
balance which tracks very close to its historical time path. Similarly, 
the short rate of interest equation does appear to be potentially of some 
concern. As in the case of the capital flow equation, however, the 
simulated levels of RS reflect the general underlying behaviour of the 
historical data and therefore help to keep the long rate largely on track
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although some reasonably large deviations do occur. (See figure five).
The failure of the interest rates and to a lesser extent the failure of the 
open sector to perform in a manner comparable to income, results in the 
money supply exhibiting some comparatively large deviations from the 
historical time series. The impact of this upon the remainder of the 
system is minimised due to the fact that the money supply coefficients in 
other equations are very small. As the simulated level of M captures 
the general behaviour of the historical situation in an adequate manner 
for most time periods, the overall performance of M is quite acceptable.
Various experiments were carried out to test the response of the 
system to changes in the controls. As the coefficients of the model all 
have the correct sign, the direction of the target responses were 
predictable. The important point to come out of the policy simulation 
exercises was the fact that an impulse in government spending had a 
significant effect on income - a not too surprising result which follows 
directly from conventional multiplier analysis - and at the same time had 
a substantial effect on the monetary sector and a noticeable effect on 
the open sector as well. On the other hand monetary policy was 
considerably less effective in shifting the income variables and required 
a considerable degree of adjustment to affect any significant response 
in the open sector due to the manner in which the monetary instrument 
enters the capital flow equation. These results can be obtained from a 
close inspection of the structural equations and in fact the simulation 
exercises convey little additional information than that which can be 
obtained from such an inspection or by examining the reduced form (see 
Chapter Five). As a result the full details of the experiments are not 
presented. The preceding analysis concerning policy responses of the 
system has important implications for stabilisation as we shall see in
the following chapters.
CHAPTER IV
STATE SPACE REALISATION, TARGET SPECIFICATION, COST FUNCTION 
BIAS AND INSTRUMENT INSTABILITY
The model and stabilisation frameworks set out in the previous 
two chapters will be implemented to analyse specific policy and target 
configurations. Before turning to applications, however, some additional 
framework needs to be developed and discussed. The model as it stands in 
chapter three is in an unsuitable form for the direct application of the 
linear/quadratic control laws and the fixed target approaches to 
stabilisation. To overcome this the model will be converted from the 
structural form to the reduced form and then placed in its equivalent 
state space formulation, at the same time clarifying the distinction 
between the commonly used economic state space form and the engineering 
state space realisation which is beginning to appear in the economic 
literature.
The conversion of the structural form to the "true" reduced form 
is a straightforward procedure and requires no elaboration here. The 
qualification, "true", refers to the fact that the reduced form obtained 
is the unique form found from the structure and entirely dependent upon 
the structure. Any structural change, whether it consists of changing 
variables within the structure or changing coefficients of variables, will 
have an effect on the composition of the reduced form. This distinction 
serves to separate the procedure used here from the Andersen and Carlson 
(1970) and Andersen and Jordan (1968) concept of an estimated reduced form 
which ignores the underlying structure and is as we have argued in the 
previous chapter, an entirely unsuitable method for pursuing macroeconomic 
stabilisation. The reduced form coefficients for the fifteen endogenous
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variables are set out in Table 1. The simple simulation experiments 
carried out in chapter three yielded some insight into possible policy 
responses of the system. An examination of the reduced form coefficients 
can achieve the same results but with less precision as the size of the 
coefficients will depend on how the data was scaled for the estimation 
of the model. Note that both instruments have a contemporaneous impact on 
all endogenous variables. In terms of the fixed target approach this 
implies that as long as the number of targets equals the number of 
instruments (in this case two) policy planners can hit any configuration 
of independent targets without any anticipation. The contemporaneous 
impact is derived from the fact that within the underlying structure, 
income, Y, has a contemporaneous influence on every endogenous variable 
and as government spending constitutes an important component of the 
national income identity, it too has an impact on all endogenous 
variables. The effect of monetary policy is less direct as it only 
operates directly on two equations, money supply and capital flows, 
which in turn feed back into additional equations. An indirect effect 
operates through the long rate of interest which does not have any effect 
on the income, monetary and open sectors until a four-period lag has 
transpired. This indirect effect of monetary policy is reflected in the 
fact that the variable RL  ^only has an impact on the long rate of 
interest in the very short run. The fact that the reduced form exhibits 
contemporaneous impacts from all instruments has an important consequence 
for the formulation of optimal stabilisation policies. Pindyck (1973a) 
(1973b) found that when a particular policy variable only operated with 
an n period lag on most endogenous variables, with the end of a particular 
planning period only n periods away or some number less than n, the 
optimal solution for both targets and instruments would behave in a
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peculiar fashion. If the end of the pieinning period was n periods 
away and if monetary policy had an impact lag of n periods then it is 
clear that monetary policy will equal its target level (provided some 
positive weight is applied to deviations of the instrument from its 
desired level) over those n periods as it cannot contribute to the 
solution. In effect then problems could arise in the next planning period 
due to the passive nature of monetary policy. The reason why Pindyck 
obtained this solution is that he failed to specify any financial wealth 
effects on consumption as have been incorporated into the model presented 
here. The impact effect of all instruments ensures that an instrument 
will not become passive (specifically not directed towards any 
contemporaneous targets) over the final periods of the planning period 
which gives the strange behaviour obtained by Pindyck. The removal of 
this problem ensures that one complicating factor in the choice of the 
length of the planning period has been removed. That is, it will not be 
necessary to extend a desired planning period by n periods to ensure 
that all instruments are active over the desired time-span.
While the reduced form and simulations are useful in gaining 
insight into policy responses, it is usually impossible to ascertain 
a priori what effect the choice of a particular target configuration 
will have on the remainder of the endogenous variables and the instruments. 
It is clear from Table 1 that the degree of effectiveness of both monetary 
and fiscal policy is limited but this in itself is not sufficient to 
indicate whether or not a particular instrument should be aimed at a 
particular target. Consider the reduced form instrument coefficients for 
Y. G has an impact of 2.2 while DM only has an impact of 0.165. If 
it was desired to direct monetary policy towards the income target, and 
purely on the basis of the reduced form there is no reason why this should
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not bo the case, then it would be reasonable to expect that monetary 
policy would need to be used in a more extensive manner than the use of 
fiscal policy in a similar situation (given that a similar scaling 
procedure for G and DM was used). It is not immediately clear what 
would happen to the remainder of the system. A similar case could be 
stated if fiscal policy was directed towards say the foreign reserves 
target where clearly fiscal policy is limited in effectiveness compared 
with monetary policy. A situation such as that outlined above could 
result under an ad hoc type approach to stabilisation and result in 
destabilising the rest of the system as well as resorting to severe and 
undesirable movements in the time paths of the instruments. The fact that 
some endogenous variables are influenced in various degrees of effective­
ness, directly or indirectly through other endogenous variables, indicates 
the difficulties that could arise in obtaining the appropriate policy mix 
to achieve a given set of targets. A large number of simulations may 
produce the desired mix but the cost in money terms and time would be 
prohibitive. Should fiscal policy be employed solely to adjust 
expenditure variables, thus leaving monetary policy to offset the impact 
of fiscal policy on other sectors and at the same time to try and move 
the monetary and open sectors towards specified targets? Or should both 
instruments be used to complement each other? These questions are 
difficult to answer by studying the reduced form coefficients. As we 
shall see, by incorporating policy goals into a formal optimisation 
framework direct information can be obtained as to the overall 
effectiveness and the appropriate mix of monetary and fiscal policies.
In particular, it will become clear that the linear quadratic solution 
will produce a complementary mix of policy which takes into account the 
relative effectiveness of each policy on each particular target variable.
1C2
The information contained within the reduced form will be utilised to 
its fullest extent in obtaining the appropriate mix and once the mix is 
obtained it is constructive to return to the reduced form to gain some 
further insight into why a particular policy has been designated.
The above section has argued that while the reduced form may 
contain all the information required to successfully pursue 
stabilisation policies, it is not an easy matter to effectively use that 
information as so many policy effects and dynamic effects are 
continuously feeding through the system. The reduced form is then viewed 
as a tool for obtaining more precise information about possible policy 
options which can be carried out in a linear/quadratic or dynamic fixed 
targets framework. Before any analysis can be carried out however, the 
reduced form must be converted to its equivalent state space (one period 
lag) form. In converting the system to its state space form we shall 
make several appropriate observations on the alternative procedures that 
can be adopted. The economic literature has diverted from the control 
engineering literature in respect to state-space formulations of systems 
of difference equations. The economic literature has focussed on what 
shall be called the Chow-Tumovsky formulation (see Chow (1973) , (1975a) 
and Turnovsky (1974)). This is not to say that these writers have been 
credited with the formulation of the procedure but the techniques set 
out in the abovementioned papers have come to be accepted by economists 
as the standard type of procedure to be used. The discussion of the 
dynamic fixed targets approach to stabilisation set out in Chapter Two 
utilises the control engineering approach to state space formulation with 
which economists have less familiarity (a recent high level text book 
contribution to the economic literature by Aoki (1976) mentions the 
engineering approach but does not explain its derivation). The Chow-
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Turnovsky state space realisation is derived from the reduced form in the 
following manner. The reduced form of an economic system may be written 
as
Y = Any^ + A.y^ _ + . ...+A y + C u + C u  _ + . . . .  t lTt-» 2J t-2 irrt-m o t 1 t-1
+ C u + D z, + D_ z + .... + D. z + a + e n t-n o t 1 t-1 k t-k o t (4.1)
where the A^,Ch ,D_^  are equivalent to constant matrices of coefficients 
of lagged endogenous variables and constant matrices of lagged and 
current control and exogenous variables respectively. As in Chapter two, 
and Y^ __ . are vectors of current and lagged endogenous variables while 
u^ _  ^ and Zt_-L are vePtors of current and lagged control and exogenous 
variables (for contemporaneous effects i = 0) . Gq and maintain
the definitions of Chapter two. Note that the reduced form of the model 
could be left in the form of (4.1) but this would invalidate the general 
applicability of the controls already derived and would unnecessarily 
complicate the derivation of suitable control laws and the subsequent 
numerical computation of optimal control and target paths. For example, 
if there are lags greater than one period in the endogenous variables of 
the reduced form of an econometric model the appropriate linear feedback 
control equation may be given by
FltYt-l + F2tYt-2 + F3tYt-3 + f. (4.2)
thus precluding the efficient recursive approach to the solution set out 
in Chapter two. The use of a state space realisation is not necessary to 
compute optimal stabilisation policies but it does substantially 
facilitate computation.
The reduction of (4.1) to a first order system is carried out 
by defining new variables to replace endogenous, control and exogenous
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variables which have lags greater than one period. That is, these 
variables are mapped into a vector of current states which will consist 
not only of the current endogenous variables of the system but also of 
the newly defined, or auxiliary, variables. In terms of (4.1) the 
following new variables can be defined:
ylt = yt-l' y2t = ylt-l = yt2.... .y(m-1)t = Y(m-2)t_i = yt.m+1 (4.3)
ul = u . . u2 . = ul, n = u _ , . . ..u(n-1) = u(n-2). . = u. ,, (4.4)t r+ 1 h- r+ t-1 t-2 t t-1 t-n+1
zlt = zt - i ' z2t = zlt-l Zt-2' .z(k-l) = z(k-2)t = zt_k+1 (4.5)
Using (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5), (4.1) can be rewritten as
y . A, . . .A C, . . .C D- . . . D. Y. -> C*t 1 m l  n 1 k o
y H O O o o o y_,_ 0yt-m+1 J t-m
u oooooo u, n It t-1
x = X +t
u o o o H o o o u^ 0t-n+1 t-n
zt
oooooo
Zt-1 0
•
o o o o o H o •7 . i 0i■—i +i zt-k _ ...
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D a eo o t
0 0 0
0 0 0
• z + t • + -
0 0 0
I 0 0
_ 0 _ 0 __ 0
where x^ _ is designated to be the new vector of state variables. (4.6) 
represents a mapping of the original reduced form,(1.4),into a system of 
the following form
x = Ax + Cu + b, + e. t t-1 t t t
where b, = Dz + at t 0
(4.7)
(4.8)
which of course is identical to the system (2.5) which was used to 
derive the relevant optimal control laws. Before commenting on the 
desirable and undesirable features of (4.6) it is convenient to 
reintroduce the control engineering state space realisation used to 
derive the approach to the solution of the fixed target anticipation 
problem. Recall that the policy model of Chapter two could be written as
= Fxt-i + GVi t-i+ Ez (4.9)
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t-1 Px + Su + Mz t - 1  t - 1  t - 1 (4 .1 0 )
w h e re  F an d  G a r e  w r i t t e n  w i t h  a h a t  t o  a v o i d  c o n f u s i o n  w i t h  t h e  
n o t a t i o n  em p lo y ed  i n  t h e  o p t i m a l  c o n t r o l  l a w s .  The u s e  o f  ( 4 .9 )  and  
( 4 .1 0 )  a s  a s t a t e  s p a c e  r e p r e s e n t a t i o n  n e c e s s i t a t e s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  
m a p p in g  p r o c e d u r e  t o  t h a t  fo u n d  i n  t h e  d e r i v a t i o n  o f  ( 4 .6 )  . C o n s i d e r  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s i m p le  ex a m p le  w h e re  t h e  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  h a v e  b e e n  
e l i m i n a t e d  f o r  e a s e  o f  e x p o s i t i o n .  The r e d u c e d  fo rm  f o r  t h e  e x a m p le  
i s  g i v e n  by
V t - l  + V t-2  + V t -3  + C0Ut + Cl V l
+ V t-2  + V t -3 ( 4 .1 1 )
S u b t r a c t i n g  C^u^ fro m  b o t h  s i d e s  g i v e s
Yt - V t  = V t - l  + V t-2  + V t-3  + Cl Ut-l
+ C_u _ + C u 2 t - 2  3 t - 3 ( 4 .1 2 )
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  r i g h t  h a n d  s i d e  o f  ( 4 .1 2 )  h a s  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  Ai Co u t - l  
a d d e d  an d  s u b t r a c t e d  t o  m a i n t a i n  e q u a l i t y .  N o te  t h a t  t h e  e x p r e s s i o n  
CQu t  ^ r e f e r s  t o  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l s  on y ^  ^ one  p e r i o d  b e f o r e  
an d  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  c o n f u s e d  w i t h  C^u^ w h ic h  r e f e r s  t o  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  
l a s t  p e r i o d s  c o n t r o l s  on t h e  c u r r e n t  v e c t o r  o f  e n d o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s .  The 
new s y s t e m  can  be  w r i t t e n  as
yt - C0Ut “ V yt-1 - V t - i  + V t-2  + V t-3
+ <C1 + V o ' V l  + C2Ut- 2  + C3\-3 (4.13)
To p u t  ( 4 .1 3 )  i n t o  t h e  same fo rm  a s  (4 .9 )  an d  ( 4 .1 0 )  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e  
v a r i a b l e s  can  be  d e f i n e d
107
ZI (4.14a)
(4.14b)
(4.14c)
(4.14d)
(4.14e)
Having derived two different state space realisations the question needs 
to be asked of which one should be chosen to formulate the model of 
Chapter Three in? First of all note that in the engineering procedure 
only five state variables would be required whereas the economic 
realisation of (4.6) would require six state variables for the same 
reduced form. For very large systems the reduction in the size of the 
system may be important in terms of computer storage. On the debit side, 
the engineering approach requires an alternative composition of the state 
vector in that the variable of prime concern, y^ _, does not explicitly 
appear by itself but only as a composite term, y - C^u^. This 
formulation would be clumsy in computing optimal policies in the linear/ 
quadratic framework and some modifications to the control procedure would 
be necessary as well as the fact that by obscuring y , some of the 
intuitive insight into the behaviour of linear feedback control laws and 
the corresponding Ricatti equations may be lost, especially to the 
non expert. The situation is as follows. The optimal control laws have 
been derived using the conventional Chow-Turnovsky state space 
realisation which, while being a system of greater dimension than the 
corresponding engineering realisation, gives a clear insight into the 
behaviour of systems under optimal control as the underlying reduced form 
is maintained throughout. On the other hand, following the recent
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literature of Preston-Sieper (1977) the dynamic fixed target approach is 
formulated in control engineering terms. Can the two be reconciled?
The answer is obviously yes when it is realised that the two 
alternative methods are interchargeable, that is, they are alternative 
ways of expressing the same model with one being more efficient in terms 
of system size requirements than the other. In fact, system (4.6) can 
be written in the same form as (4.9) and (4.10) as (ignoring the 
exogenous variables)
xt Fxt-1 + Gufc
yt-1 Pxt-1 .
(4.15)
(4.16)
The only difference in the general form from (4.9) and (4.10) being that 
the controls appear with the same time subscript as the state vector x^ 
and x^ explicitly includes y^ as the first component. Also note that 
as the solution to the fixed target problem is co-ordinate free, then any 
method of calculating the dynamic multipliers is admissible so long as 
the solution is consistent with the specification of the state space. 
Furthermore, if the Chow-Turnovsky realisation is expressed in the form of 
(4.15) and (4.16) then using the procedure outlined in Chapter two, the 
dynamic instrument multipliers for that system can be written as
ttv = PE^G (4.17)
The above discussion has shown that the two approaches to the 
state space realisation are conceptually different in the basic approach 
of each but are just different ways of expressing the dynamic structure 
of an economic model. The choice of which representation to use is 
dependent upon the preferences of the researcher and the uses to which it 
is to be put. The state space technique employed in this study is a 
slight variant on the Chow-Tumovsky framework. This method was chosen
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to enable an effective computer package (which was one of the secondary 
aims of this study) to be developed which would solve both optimal 
flexible target problems and fixed target problems. The choice of the 
Chow-Turnovsky framework enables any linear model to be fed into the 
computer, which is in the appropriate form, by economists not generally 
familiar with the engineering literature. The co-ordinate free nature 
of the fixed target approach and the relationship between the Chow- 
Turnovsky specification and the dynamic multipliers given by (4.17) 
means that the same specification can be used to efficiently solve both 
problems. Even though the engineering approach has been rejected, it is 
nonetheless very useful to know how it is formulated (equations (4.11) 
to (4.14)) as exposition of this has not readily filtered into accepted 
economic usage which makes reading of some of the latest literature 
(for example Preston and Sieper (1977) and Preston (1977)) extremely 
difficult for the non-specialist, and even difficult for the economic 
control theorist who has only acquired familiarity with the Chow- 
Turnovsky framework.
The state space representation of the model contained within 
Chapter Three and which appears in the pages that follow is a slight 
variant on that given by (4.6). If the mapping of (4.6) is followed 
literally then all controls and exogenous variables would be mapped into 
the state vector. The framework for optimal stabilisation presented by 
Chow in various papers requires that the controls must be included in the 
state vector. This approach is avoided here and is one reason why the 
controls are explicitly included in the cost function separately from the 
states. The mapping of the controls into the state vector needlessly 
expands the dimensions of the system and for very large systems could 
create severe computer storage problems. The modification to (4.6) will
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be that only those variables with lags greater than one period will be 
incorporated into the state vector, with the exception of the lagged 
monetary instrument, DM , which will also be mapped into the state 
vector. The new variables and their definitional equations are given 
below.
RL1 — RL ,t t-1
RL2 _ RLl , _ RLt t-1 t-2
RL3^ _ RL2 . _ RL „t rt i H t-3
RSI _ RS ,t t-1
RS2, = RSI , _ RS „t t-1 t-2
RS 3, RS2 , = RS _t t-1 t-3
11 = I ,t t-1
SM, _ DM,t t
SX^ x,_t t
SX1 SX ,t t-1
SX2 , _ SXl , _ sx „t t-1 t-2
(4.18a)
(4.18b)
(4.18c)
(4.18d)
(4.18e)
(4.18f)
(4.18g)
(4.18 h ) 
(4.18i)
(4.18j)
(4.18k)
The variable SM^ is defined to be equal to DM^ to avoid confusion and 
takes account of the lagged value of the domestic monetary base in the 
capital flow equation. SM^ _ will appear in the state vector, x^, but 
will be treated as an auxiliary variable and hence will not be assigned 
a target or be associated with control costs. By definition it will be 
equal to the value of the optimal monetary policy generated by (2.31) .
In the new system matrix, A, of (4.7), the appropriate coefficients will 
be equated with as designated in the reduced form. With the
eleven newly defined variables, the state vector x^ will consist of
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twenty-six variables giving the system a state dimension of 26 x 26.
The matrix C will have a dimension of 26 x 2 and D will be 26 x 9.
Recall that in the original structural form of the model there are eleven 
exogenous variables. However, it is convenient to aggregate NT and GF 
and OT with IP (see the reduced form) thus reducing the dimensions of 
the system. As a point of comparison between the state space 
realisation used here and the engineering formulation, if the latter had 
been used there would not have been any need to map DM^ into the 
state vector. The state space form of the model is a crucial component 
of the study as it can be immediately used to analyse any flexible 
target problem and can be manipulated to derive the dynamic multipliers 
of the system in order to analyse any fixed target controllability problem. 
The relevant matrices are presented below. The state vector is given by
Y
MB 
FR 
CB 
YD 
TPY 
C 
I
IM 
RS 
RL 
CF 
T 
P
RLl
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RLl
RL2
RL3
RSI
RS2
RS3
SM
II
sx
SX1 
_ SX2 _
TARGET SPECIFICATION
The specification of targets or desired paths for both 
endogenous and control variables presents some difficulty as the choice 
of targets will necessarily affect the results obtained from either a 
flexible or fixed target approach to stabilisation. Studies in the past 
have tended to gloss over this problem and treat the problem of target 
specification in a simplified manner. The typical approach is to 
construct the desired paths for both endogenous and control variables as 
simple linear mappings of the initial conditions into a target vector. 
This approach would perhaps be satisfactory for examining the nature of 
policy over an historical time span but may not be satisfactory for an 
analysis and planning of policy when the economy is on an upswing or 
downswing for example. Consider a situation in which it is desired to 
gain insight into appropriate policies to move out of a recession. If 
the model was estimated over a recessionary period then the sluggish 
behaviour of the economy would be reflected in the structure and even if
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. n o o n . 0 0 0 0 . □ n o n . .22 0 0. CL • Ü D ü 0 ___ ........ 0 0  0-0.
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appropriate targets could be specified, there is no guarantee that the 
system could be moved into an upswing without generating unstable and 
unacceptable time paths for some endogenous and control variables. Even 
if the problem of the system structure can be overcome, the use of a 
mapping of the initial conditions into appropriate target vectors may 
produce unsuitable targets. The levels of income and other key variables 
may be so low at time t (initial conditions at any particular point in 
time) that a mapping of these variables into targets could produce a set 
of targets which would not allow the system to move quickly enough out 
of the undesired situation. A similar argument holds for the case of an 
upswing, in particular the targets may be over-estimated in this case.
For practical policy purposes a simple target rule would not be sufficient 
and a certain degree of intuitive assessment would be required to arrive 
at suitable targets. The discussion in Chapter two on some of the 
implications of uncertainty about the initial state vector suggests that 
policy planners would need to forecast the initial state vector in advance 
and if a simple target mapping procedure was employed it can be seen that 
if the forecast was incorrect then there will be some divergence between 
the estimated target vector and the "true" target vector which would be a 
function of the true but incorrectly forecast initial state vector. The 
breakdown between initial conditions and targets could make it more 
difficult to achieve desired targets. In the absence of any formal 
exhaustive theory of target specification, and it is beyond the scope of 
this study to produce one, the targets will be specified along the 
initial condition mapping lines outlined above although it is recognised 
that problems with this method do exist. It should be noted at this point 
that the very brief discussion of the topic outlined above merely touches 
on the whole problem of target specification. There is ample room for
122
considerable research to be carried out in this area.
Before discussing the choice of target paths it is useful to 
look at the procedure of breaking up the endogenous variables into two 
categories, specifically, a subset of what could be termed target or 
ultimate objectives and a subset of intermediate objective. (For a 
succinct discussion of this classification see Norton (1973)). Ultimate 
objectives are usually classified as those which have some intrinsic 
value in their achievement while intermediate objectives have no 
intrinsic value in their own right but are nevertheless important in 
helping to facilitate the achievement of the ultimate objectives. It 
should be clear that the distinction between ultimate and intermediate 
variables is very hazy and will largely rest on the particular philosophy 
or view of the economic system held by a particular individual. For 
example it is a simple matter to make variables either an ultimate or 
intermediate variable. A monetarist may focus on the supply of money as 
being the variable with the most intrinsic value while a "Keynesian" may 
regard the supply of money as being important only in the context of how 
it can facilitate the achievement of some other target such as income. 
This distinction will of course be important in the choice of appropriate 
stabilisation policies. An a priori selection of ultimate and 
intermediate variables would severely limit the scope of applied analysis 
in either a flexible or fixed target analysis of policy as the ultimate 
targets would have desired target paths specified while the intermediate 
targets would not. To ensure that the following applied analysis can 
shift instantaneously between differing definitions of variables, target 
paths will be specified for all endogenous variables. Thus, in the 
linear/quadratic framework, by appropriate weighting in the cost function
a variable can assume the role of ultimate or intermediate variable with
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a high positive weight for the former and a zero weight for the latter. 
This will enable the hypothetical policy planner to switch between 
income or supply of money as the ultimate target of the system, for 
example.
The specification of the target paths for the majority of the 
variables presented some difficulties due to the seasonality contained 
in the model and which results in time paths for the expenditure 
variables in particular, containing a substantial seasonal pattern. 
Experiments were performed, both optimal and non-optimal, in which the 
controls were used to try and remove the seasonality from variables such 
as Y ,C, TPY and T and to keep them close to a trend line. This 
approach produced severe instability in the solutions, as could 
probably be expected, and was abandoned in favour of maintaining the 
seasonal variation. The technique of specifying targets and models in 
seasonally unadjusted terms has taken on more importance in 
Australia as a result of the government's decision in 1976 to abandon 
seasonally adjusted unemployment figures, largely for political purposes, 
in favour of seasonally unadjusted data. (Seasonally adjusted figures 
were subsequently reintroduced at a later date.) Model builders and 
researchers interested in the specification and estimation of Phillips 
curves, for example, may be forced to work in purely seasonally 
unadjusted terms and present forecasts in the same format. To 
complement this approach, the following technique was derived to 
establish a target path which is a derivative of the appropriate initial 
conditions and reflects the underlying seasonal variation of the variable 
concerned. Targets for the expenditure variables C,I,IM,TPY, T and the 
control variable G, were selected in the following way. Values for the 
first four quarters of the planning period were obtained by increasing
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the corresponding historical values of the previous four quarters by 
ten percent (remember that this is a ten percent increase in nominal 
terms only and refers to a twelve month projection from each initial 
quarter). The value of the December quarter was projected four 
quarters further ahead by ten percent, that is to the next December 
quarter twelve months later. A trend line was then drawn between the 
two projected values for the December quarter. Targets for all December 
quarters for the remainder of the planning period were taken to lie on 
the trend line. All other values, from the second year on, were obtained 
by maintaining the relationship between the December quarter and the 
remaining three quarters in the first year of the planning period with 
respect to the December quarter trend line. To enhance accuracy, 
future values of the targets were computed from linear relationships which 
represented the December trend line and which represented the appropriate 
linear trend of the remaining three quarters specified as above. The 
result was a set of targets that incorporated a uniform pattern of 
seasonality for each particular variable (not necessarily uniform 
between variables). As an example, the equations based on the above 
procedure which were used to derive the desired paths for C and G are 
given below.
C = 2875 + 91t (4.19a)
C2 = 2975 + 91t (4.19b)
C3 = 2950 + 91t (4.19c)
subscript on C indicates which quarter the trend line refers
to and the time variable, t, refers only to the successive quarters 
designated by the subscript. Similarly, the equations relevant to G
are given by
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G. = 900 + 281 t
G2 = 1140 + 28
G3 = 890 + 28
G. = 1010 + 28^ 4 t
(4.20a) 
(4.20b) 
(4.20c) 
(4.20d)
Equations for all the expenditure variables listed above were calculated 
in the fashion of those for C and G. The chief advantage of the 
technique outlined above is that it avoids explosive values of the 
desired time paths towards the end of the planning period if a simple 
growth criterion is used. In particular, if we are trying to maintain 
the seasonal pattern of the data and merely let each quarter grow at a 
constant growth rate beginning with the corresponding quarter in the 
four quarter period immediately preceding the planning period, then a 
situation represented in Figure 6 will result where the gap between 
quarters increases greatly over time. Note that Figure 6 is over­
emphasised.
Time
FIGURE 6
Explosive Seasonal Target Path
The target values of C,I,IM and G along with the historical 
values of the exogenous variable, X, were used to construct a target 
path for Y. Although the components of the Y identity add together to
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give a consistent target for Y in terms of the components, there is no 
presumption that the resulting time path for Y would be able to generate 
the target level of the component variables. Therefore, the basic income 
identity contains possible inconsistencies. This assertion is best 
illustrated by a very simple example.
Y = C + G (4.21a)
C = 20 + .7Y (4.21b)
Let the target for G, G , equal 100 and the target for C, C , equal 200.
The target for Y is then found by adding G and C which gives 300. On 
the surface this would appear to be consistent but if the target for Y 
is fed back into (4.21b) then the resulting C ^ C . The position with 
the model developed in Chapter two is considerably more complex as 
feedback from I, IM and other variables is also important. The policy 
planner faced with this situation has two basic choices. The first is to 
set up the targets as have been done here and then compute Y and trade-off 
Y and the component parts of the identity. Note that in some cases the 
component parts will not be treated as ultimate objectives and the 
problem will not arise. The second alternative would be to initially 
specify a desired time path for Y and then allocate numerical values 
to the component parts such that in each time period they added together 
to give Y . The major disadvantage of this procedure would be 
deciding the value of each component which in this procedure is entirely 
arbitrary. As well as that problem it should be clear that this 
procedure would suffer from similar inconsistency problems. This can be 
seen from the previous example by setting Y equal to 300 and letting 
C and G equal 200 and 100 respectively. The arbitrary nature of the 
second method suggests that the first may be preferable but it is not
127
possible to arrive at any hard and fast rule as different target 
specifications will give varying degrees of trade-off. The above 
problem of consistently specifying targets within identities is very 
important in an applied framework and has, up until now, been largely 
ignored within the economic stabilisation literature with writers 
usually assuming that identities can be consistently achieved.
The targets for RS and KL were set at a constant 3.5% and 
4.0% respectively which is slightly lower than the corresponding values 
contained within the initial conditions. The choice of targets for RS 
and RL is not as important as choosing targets for Y as in many 
experiments the rates of interest will be treated as intermediate 
variables and the time paths of desired values will only be used as 
bench-marks from which the dynamic behaviour of RS and RL can be 
studied. The target level of FR was kept at its historical value of 
the quarter immediately preceding the planning period (that is, its 
initial condition). In other words, the balance of payments target was 
taken to be zero. The total money base and the money supply were 
specified time paths which grow at 1.5% per quarter and thus approximate 
one of the many versions of Friedman's (1968) rule. The target for the 
domestic component of the base was constructed by subtracting the FR 
target from the MB target. However, as with the case of Y, there is no 
indication as to whether or not the targets of FR,MB and d m  can be 
consistently achieved. The time paths for all the exogenous variables 
were set at their historical levels thus the target for the current 
balance was found by combining the historical values of X and GF with 
the target values of IM. CF was then set equal to the positive value of 
the corresponding value of CB in each time period hence
CF + CB = t t AFR = 0 (4.22)
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Similarly, the target for YD was constructed from the specified paths 
of TPY, T and the historical values of OT and IP. P was the only 
behavioural equation to have a consistent target specified as its sole 
purpose is to act as a deflator for Y and associated variables and 
provides a consistent link between the real and nominal sectors. The 
auxiliary variables defined to augment the state vector do not of course 
have target paths specified. As they constitute definitional relationships, 
they will always be equal to the lagged values of the variables they 
represent. The targets for all variables are set out in Table 2. Real 
targets are found by deflating by the price level. The targets derived 
above and set out in Table 2 constitute an acceptable and economically 
meaningful (based on the initial conditions from which the majority were 
derived) target set with which to pursue flexible and fixed target 
stabilisation experiments.
COST FUNCTION BIAS
The erratic desired time paths of some variables suggest that 
in the linear/quadratic framework the use of one set of weights for the 
entire planning period may not be appropriate. The seasonal nature of 
other variables also suggests this as it can be seen that moving from 
seasonal peak to seasonal peak in say the target path for Y, would 
yield different quadratic penalties for equal percentage deviations from 
the target given a fixed set of preference weights. Previous applied 
optimal stabilisation studies, in addition to overlooking a wide variety 
of practical considerations, have overlooked the ramifications of 
employing one set of weights in the cost function for the entire planning 
period. In the linear/quadratic work of Chow (1972a), Pindyck (1973a) and 
Pindyck and Roberts (1974), one set of weights was employed for all time
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Table 2
Target Paths - Nominal Values
Time Y MB FR CB YD TPY C I IM
1 5005 2619 1583 -226 3365 3871 3066 884 898
2 4760 2659 1583 -264 3418 3942 3132 868 946
3 5439 2698 1583 -207 4036 4664 3548 962 951
4 4930 2739 1583 -304 3559 4085 3239 857 945
5 5561 2780 1583 -270 3795 4357 3430 981 951
6 5341 2822 1583 -339 3849 4428 3496 965 999
7 6013 2864 1583 -290 4464 5149 3912 1060 1005
8 5568 2907 1583 -176 3984 4571 3603 954 998
9 6196 2951 1583 -176 4215 4842 3794 1078 1004
10 5899 2995 1583 -301 4265 4914 3860 1063 1053
11 6605 3040 1583 -195 4852 5635 4276 1157 1058
12 6060 3086 1583 -296 4367 5056 3967 1051 1051
13 6714 3132 1583 -259 4596 5328 4158 1175 1058
14 6460 3179 1583 -307 4645 5399 4224 1160 1106
15 7211 3226 1583 -314 5258 6121 4640 1254 1111
16 6690 3275 1583 -220 4783 5542 4331 1148 1105
17 7330 3324 1583 -293 5005 5813 4522 1273 1111
18 7222 3374 1583 -263 5050 5885 4588 1257 1159
19 7896 3424 1583 -220 5674 6606 5004 1351 1165
20 7464 3476 1583 -159 5199 6028 4695 1246 1158
All variables with the exception of RS, RL, and P are measured in 
millions of nominal Australian dollars
(continued)
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T a b l e  2 ( c o n t i n u e d )  
T a r g e t  P a t h s  -  N o m in a l  V a lu e s
Time M RS RL CF T P G DM
1 11200 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 226 408 9 4 .0 4 6 1168 1036
2 11368 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 264 427 9 5 .7 4 1 946 1076
3 11538 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 207 525 9 6 .4 5 7 1094 1115
4 11711 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 304 429 9 7 .6 6 9 1012 1156
5 11886 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 270 463 9 8 .0 7 0 1280 1197
6 12064 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 339 481 9 9 .6 4 8 1058 1239
7 12244 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 290 580 1 0 0 .1 7 4 1206 1281
8 12427 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 176 483 1 0 1 .5 7 1 1124 1324
9 12613 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 176 517 1 0 2 .1 8 1 1392 1368
10 12802 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 301 536 1 0 3 .1 2 0 1170 1412
11 12994 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 195 634 1 0 3 .9 8 0 1318 1457
12 13188 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 296 538 1 0 4 .6 5 1 1236 1502
13 13385 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 259 571 1 0 4 .7 9 9 1504 1549
14 13585 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 307 590 1 0 6 .4 2 5 1282 1596
15 13788 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 314 689 1 0 7 .7 0 4 1430 1643
16 13994 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 220 592 1 0 9 .4 6 3 1348 1692
17 14203 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 293 626 1 0 9 .5 2 3 1616 1741
18 14416 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 263 644 1 1 1 .8 0 4 1394 1791
19 14632 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 220 743 1 1 2 .7 5 1 1542 1841
20 14851 3 .5 0 4 .0 0 159 647 1 1 5 .1 0 8 1460 1893
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periods in a particular experiment. The above selection of authors is 
not meant to be exhaustive as almost the entire applied literature 
consists of such a procedure. The approach is not entirely confined 
to the linear/quadratic literature and examples can be found in 
Friedman's (1975a) piece-wise quadratic approach to stabilisation and 
numerous non-linear applications. As the study presented here is linear, 
the problems of a fixed set of weights will only be studied within that 
context. It is argued that the use of a fixed set of weights is not 
applicable in a situation in which variables are growing over time or 
vary considerably from time period to time period. The use of one set of 
weights for an entire planning period can lead to a bias in the penalties 
incurred in a cost function which in turn can result in an unwanted bias 
towards particular targets. As an example, consider two major 
objectives of the experiments that follow in this study, that is, the 
optimal achievement of internal and external balance. Internal balance 
is taken to be the achievement of the target for real Y (which is 
consistent with the target for P) while external balance is a zero change 
in the level of foreign reserves. The target path for Y increases 
considerably over time, especially in nominal terms which the optimal 
experiments are initially formulated in. In contrast, FR remains 
constant. If the policy planner desired a situation in which equal 
emphasis should be placed on both targets in the cost function, it would 
be inappropriate to assign one set of weights at the beginning of the 
planning period to be used for all time periods. In period one weights 
could be assigned which produced an equal penalty for one percent 
deviations in both targets. However, as the planning period progressed, 
the penalty associated with a one percent deviation of Y from its target
would increase relative to that associated with FR due to the fact that
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the target for Y is increasing over time while FR is being pegged at a 
constant level. If the penalty associated with a deviation of one 
variable from its target is greater than the penalty associated with 
another variable or variables, then the system will react in such a way 
so as to keep the variable with the highest penalty more on target 
relative to other variables. The result would be that total costs over 
the planning period would be minimised as required. The example given 
above illustrates that there could be a tendency for the system to have a 
bias towards the Y target at the expense of the FR target even though the 
initial intention was to have an equal weighting between the two. The 
bias would become more severe towards the end of the planning period. A 
similar situation could occur when policy planners decide to place a 
greater emphasis on one variable, or variables, relative to another.
For instance, in the example given above the initial preference situation 
may have been one where a one percent deviation in FR from its target was 
required to have a quadratic penalty equal to five times the penalty of 
a one percent deviation in Y. Assuming the cost matrix Q was set up in 
a manner which reflected this preference pattern in the first period, it 
can be seen that as the end of the planning period approached, the gap 
between incurred penalties would close (this can be seen directly from 
the table of targets and using a simple numerical example). It is 
conceivable that under certain weighting patterns, one variable may be so 
large or become so large relative to another that any initial preference 
position is negated or perhaps even completely reversed. The consequence 
of this for applied stabilisation work is only too clear. By retaining 
one set of weights for the entire planning period of an optimisation 
experiment, we may create an unwanted bias which is strong enough to 
reverse the intended trade-offs. The presence of bias in a solution is
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not a foregone conclusion as it will depend crucially on the dynamics of 
the system and the impact of the instruments on particular targets, but 
it may be very difficult or impossible to ascertain the possibility of 
the existence of bias from merely examining the structure or reduced 
form along with the desired target paths of variables. The applied 
results obtained from a particular experiment may not indicate the 
presence of bias. How do we disentangle the influences of system 
dynamics, the effect of instruments and possible bias unless of course 
it is so severe as to be obvious? The answer is that in most cases and 
particularly for very large models, it will be very difficult to detect 
bias so the obvious solution would be to ensure that the possibility of 
bias is eliminated from the outset.
To overcome the problem of cost function bias the applied 
control theorist can adopt one of several approaches. Firstly, the 
concept of using only one set of weights for an entire planning period 
can be abandoned. Multi-period weighting matrices can be employed in 
place of a single weighting matrix, which will adjust through time to 
maintain the desired trade-offs and the correct relativity of penalties. 
In the example given above, the weight for FR could be maintained 
throughout, while the weight for Y could be reduced over time in order 
to compensate for the growth in Y and the seasonal variation contained 
within Y. The use of varying weights in this fashion would strictly 
maintain the desired relationship between penalties. A second solution 
would be to formulate the entire system in terms of growth rates. This 
would entail keeping all targets constant over time. Under these 
conditions a single set of weights for the entire planning period would 
be acceptable. The use of a growth rate representation and estimation 
is not usually favoured by economists wishing to study short-run
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stabilisation so this option may not be acceptable in many cases. A 
further solution would be to use a single set of weights and set the 
weights so that penalties for percentage deviations in the last period 
are equal. This would solve the problem of end-point bias but could 
introduce bias in the early periods and would only be an acceptable 
solution if the final periods were considered to be the only periods of 
importance. The suggestion of varying the weights each time period 
appears to be the most acceptable solution and was adopted for the 
linear/quadratic experiments carried out for this study. Note that 
the problem of bias will not arise in the fixed target framework, where 
given the appropriate degree of anticipation and provided that the 
controllability requirements are fulfilled, the policy planner will 
exactly hit all his targets. The weights for the following experiments 
were constructed such that a one percent deviation from the target path 
of any variable included in the cost function of a particular experiment, 
would incur a penalty of 250 per time period. The choice of 250 is quite 
arbitrary with the choice governing the size of the weights and the scale 
of the subsequent welfare loss for a given experiment. There are no 
convenient units of measurement which can be used to measure the welfare 
costs. The values produced by a quadratic cost function can only be 
regarded as high or low relative to another cost. The weights for the 
first of the internal and external balance experiments (IEB1) discussed 
in Chapter 5 are given in Tables 3 and 4 and illustrate how the weights 
can be adjusted each time period to avoid cost function bias. The 
weights are constructed such that all weighted variables will incur equal 
penalties for equal percentage deviations. The cost matrix for that
experiment was specified to be diagonal while only the first fifteen 
diagonal elements of 0^ were considered in the assigning of weights.
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Table 3
Cost Matrix Weights - IEB1 (chapter 5) 
Diagonal Elements of Q^_
Time Y MB FR YD C I IM CF
1 .100 . 369 1.010 .223 .269 3.235 3.135 63.045
2 .112 .358 1.010 .216 .258 3.353 2.823 28.174
3 .085 .348 1.010 .155 .201 2.729 2.792 42.852
4 .104 .337 1.010 .200 . 241 3.443 2.831 52.599
5 .082. .327 1.010 .176 .215 2.626 2.794 38.409
6 .089 .318 1.010 .171 .207 2.712 2.530 25.022
7 .070 .308 1.010 .127 .165 2.251 2.503 23.906
8 .082 .299 1.010 .159 .195 2.778 2.537 44.424
9 .066 .291 1.010 .142 .176 2.174 2.505 147.522
10 . 073 .282 1.010 .139 .170 2.239 2.280 27.870
11 . 058 .274 1.010 .107 .138 1.889 2.258 27.263
12 .069 .266 1.010 . 133 .161 2.288 2.286 42.860
13 .056 .258 1.010 .120 .146 1.830 2.259 50.288
14 .061 .250 1.010 . 117 .142 1.880 2.066 21.552
15 .047 .243 1.010 .092 . 118 1.608 2.046 55.276
16 .057 .236 1.010 .111 .135 1.917 2.071 27.146
17 .047 .229 1.010 .101 .123 1.561 2.047 94.509
18 .049 .222 1.010 .099 .120 1.600 1.880 48.273
19 .041 .216 1.010 . 079 .101 1.385 1.863 41.380
20 . 045 .209 1.010 . 094 .115 1.630 1.885 105.858
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Table 4
Cost Matrix Weights - IEB1 (chapter 5).
Diagonal Elements of Rt
Time G DM
1 1.855 2.357
2 2.827 2.185
3 2.114 2.035
4 2.470 1.893
5 1.544 1.766
6 2.260 1.648
7 1.740 1.542
8 2.003 1.443
9 1.306 1.352
10 1.848 1.269
11 1.456 1.192
12 1.656 1.121
13 1.118 1.054
14 1.539 0.993
15 1.237 0.937
16 1.392 0.884
17 0.969 0.835
18 1.302 0.789
19 1.064 0.746
20 1.187 0.706
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The remaining eleven state variables are auxiliary variables and do not 
need to be incorporated into the cost function. Each row of Q^_ or R^_ 
in Tables 3 and 4 lists the positive diagonal elements of or
for one period of a twenty period planning period. The use of time 
varying cost matrices to maintain exact preference relationships has 
another important consequence for applied stabilisation research. It is 
only under conditions of maintaining exact scaling of weights that valid 
comparisons of welfare can be made between different sets of target 
preferences and instrument preferences. The absence of exact scaling of 
weights for all experiments, that is not reducing weights to a common 
bench-mark, could mean that in many instances the comparison of welfare 
between two different choices of targets may be quite meaningless. This 
factor has also been completely ignored in the applied stabilisation 
literature.
COMPUTATIONAL ASPECTS
The program for computing otpimal linear/quadratic target and 
instrument trajectories was written by the author and compiled and 
executed on the Australian National University's Univac 1100/42. The 
basic aim behind the construction of the program was to produce an 
efficient, flexible and simple to use package which could be utilised by 
the non-specialist programmer or control theorist. The need for such a 
package in Australia as compared with say the United States where a 
multiplicity of programs exist, is quite obvious when it is realised that 
at the time of preparing this study only one other optimal package was 
available. The alternative package had been developed by the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics and Australian Treasury and was not and still is not, 
available to the general public. The Treasury and Statistics package
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(Fitzgerald, Johnston and Bayes (1973)) is designed to handle non-linear 
piece-wise quadratic problems.
The linear/quadratic package developed for this study 
contains the following basic options.
1. The choice of constant cost matrices Q and R or time varying 
matrices to remove cost function bias.
2. A stochastic option which generates additive disturbances and 
simulates the system under stochastic control as well as 
deterministic control.
3. A test for instrument instability.
4. The computation of optimal controls under certainty and the 
resultant behaviour of the system when these controls are 
implemented in an uncertain (stochastic) world.
The choice of the above options is made through the use of simple 
control cards and once the basic data has been arranged it is a simple 
matter to adjust the control cards to utilise the alternative options.
The program requires only 30K of storage space thus making the 
application of optimal control to models of modest dimensions a feasible 
pursuit even with limited computing facilities.
INSTRUMENT INSTABILITY AND SYSTEM DYNAMICS
An analysis of fine tuning would not be complete without 
mention of the problem of instrument instability. Instrument instability 
first appeared in a formal framework in Holbrook's (1972) seminal paper 
in which he demonstrated that with the number of targets being equal to 
the number of instruments, instrument instability could occur during the
exact stabilisation of the targets. The essential feature of Holbrook's
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analysis is that the instrument exhibits a dynamic structure, a point 
which is often ignored in discussions of instrument instability. The 
requirement that the instruments possess a dynamic structure is crucial 
as it can be readily shown and is also intuitively clear that without 
such dynamics, instrument instability of the type discussed by Holbrook 
cannot exist. The problem of instrument instability would appear to be 
of some interest to both theoretical and applied practitioners of macro 
economic stabilisation but has received comparatively little attention 
in the literature either before or after Holbrook's contribution.
Cornwall (1965) analysed the problem within the context of simple fiscal 
models but did not provide an exhaustive theory while Chow (1973b) and 
Sims (1974) have attempted a more general approach to the problem but 
were unable to settle upon a final exhaustive framework for analysing 
the problem. Tumovsky (1974) has come closest to providing a general 
framework within the linear/quadratic context and provides the most 
general propositions. One major point to be gleaned from Turnovsky's 
analysis is that if alX endogenous variables are to be treated as 
targets (that is they are all weighted in the cost function) and if a 
positive weight is attached to deviations of aVl instruments from the 
appropriate desired time paths then instrument instability resulting 
from instrument dynamics and similar to the type defined by Holbrook 
cannot exist.^ If it is found that instability in the instruments does 
exist then the policy-maker simply attaches a weight to deviations of 
the instruments from the desired paths. The general conclusion obtained 
by Turnovsky and briefly outlined above appears to be completely opposed 
to the conclusion obtained by Chow whose work has been often quoted on 
this subject. The general conclusion obtained by Chow was as follows:
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"Fourth, instrument instability, insofar as it 
pertains to some characteristic of the time path of 
x^_ (instruments) , can exist no matter whether the 
welfare weights are assigned only to the originally 
endogenous variables, or also to the instruments 
(imbedded in y^ [State vector]). Holbrook treated 
only the former case, in fact, a rather special case 
of the former when the number of target variables 
and of instruments are both equal to one."
(Chow (1973b, p. 831)).
Can the conclusions of Tumovsky and Chow be reconciled? The answer 
is yes if it is assumed that in the Chow case only a subset of the 
endogenous variables are weighted in the cost function. If it is 
assumed that all endogenous variables are targets then using the Chow 
framework one must arrive at the same conclusion obtained by Turnovsky. 
However, if only a subset of endogenous variables are weighted in the 
cost function then it is possible for a type of instrument instability 
to exist even without any instrument dynamics. To intuitively illustrate 
this proposition consider the case where a policy planner wishes to 
stabilise two targets and has two instruments at his disposal and in 
addition there are other endogenous variables in the system which are 
not explicibly included in the welfare function but feed into the 
equations for the two targets. It is clear that if one or more of these 
intermediate variables are unstable then the impact of that variable on 
the targets could induce the instruments to behave in an unstable 
fashion as they will be forced to adjust to offset the unstable 
influence on the targets,which will in turn produce a further impact on 
the unstable variables thus requiring even further adjustment next period.
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The situation would be worsened if the instruments exhibited a dynamic 
structure which was also unstable. What is required in the above case 
is a redefinition of instrument instability to accommodate the type of 
instability outlined above and which is the only type of instability 
which can satisfy Chow's analysis when weights are assigned to the 
instruments, although Chow does not seem to have recognised this. It 
is this omission which has caused the confusion which exists in some of 
the applied literature when it is asserted that instrument instability 
exists in the presence of costs on controls. The very short run 
reaction of the system to the initial conditions could convey the 
illusion of instrument instability as can the response of the 
instruments and the system as a whole to severe short run fluctuations 
in the uncontrollable exogenous variables. A panic reaction by the 
planning authorities to such short run fluctuations may result in heavy 
costs being assigned to particular instruments in anticipation of 
instrument instability when in fact such costs are not required. To 
avoid this type of mistake it would be desirable to ascertain a priori 
to what degree, if any, instrument instability exists in the system to 
be controlled. The analysis of the existence of instrument instability 
could proceed in a number of ways. Firstly, if it was desired to control 
all endogenous variables and no instrument dynamics existed then 
instrument instability could be ruled out as it could if the problem 
satisfied the Turnovsky framework. (Tumovsky also briefly discusses 
the zero instrument cost case.) Secondly, if we were concerned only 
with a subset of endogenous variables, an indication of the existence of 
instrument instability could be gained by formally analysing the 
stability properties of the endogenous variables and instruments by 
computing the relevant characteristic roots (such a technique is
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advocated by Chow). Such a technique would be restrictive for very 
large models and an alternative procedure would be to apply the 
necessary conditions for discrete time stability of a system (see 
Baumöl (1970) for discrete time and Gandolfo (1972) for an analogous 
set of continuous time conditions) which are considerably easier to 
compute than the characteristic roots. The necessary conditions are 
not sufficient, hence, if the system fails to satisfy the necessary 
conditions we can be sure that the system is unstable but we can never 
be sure of the stability of another system which passes the test for 
necessity in the absence of a formal analysis of the characteristic 
roots. As a further alternative procedure, simulation studies can be 
carried out in which targets and exogenous variables are held constant 
over the duration of the planning period and the resulting behaviour of 
the controls is observed. As we shall see below, each technique, 
excluding the first mentioned examples where it can be seen quite 
clearly if instrument instability will be present, has problems at the 
application level.
A formal analysis of the characteristic roots of the system may 
tell the policy planner that instrument instability exists in the model 
either through pure instrument dynamics or through the presence of an 
unstable variable which is not included in the planners welfare function. 
Can it be inferred that instrument instability will be a severe problem 
under these circumstances? The answer is not necessarily yes as the 
degree of instability will be important as will the time span over which 
planning is to be carried out. Consider part (a) of Figure 7. The 
trajectories u^ and u^ (two alternative time paths for a given 
instrument) may represent instrument instability of differing degree. The 
government may be interested in stabilising the economy over the time
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u A
FIGURE 7.
Degrees of Instrument Instability
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span lying between t and t . During that time span the trajectory 
exhibits little explosive behaviour even though it has been 
established that instrument instability exists. On the other hand, 
u2 is more explosive relative to u and may be of more concern. If 
instrument instability is of the type given by u^ then the authorities 
may not take any immediate action as over the planning period, instrument 
instability would hardly be recognisable as such. The presence of a 
more explosive type could prompt the authorities to take action in the 
form of trading off targets against instruments to try and dampen the 
explosive nature of the instrument trajectory. Several writers 
including Chow, Turnovsky and Grämlich (1971) have queried this course 
of action arguing that if the prime concern of the authorities is the 
achievement of an ultimate objective then the unstable nature of the 
instruments will not be associated with any explicit costs and hence can 
be ignored. This view may be acceptable as long as the explosive 
behaviour of the instruments fails to generate any structural change in 
the system and the time paths of the instruments do not become politically 
unacceptable (regardless of how economically irrational this may be) or 
tax the resources of the government to a point where it becomes impossible 
to continue to implement the policy. The government may then be forced 
to abandon the fine tuning of the system in favour of a compromise course 
of action.
Part (b) of Figure 7 illustrates a situation in which the 
instrument exhibits constant amplitude oscillations, that is the relevant 
characteristic roots would be complex and the oscillations are the result 
of a sine or cosine function. The horizontal axis of part (b) does not 
necessarily refer to a zero position. In terms of policy, the axis can 
be referred to as a bench mark or some average level about which the
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values of the instrument oscillate. A formal analysis of the properties 
of the system which revealed non-explosive oscillatory behaviour of the 
instruments would indicate that instability is not a problem. For 
practical applications the time span of policy would once again be 
important, particularly if the time span t to t^ of part (b)
Figure 7 was the relevant policy period. Given this situation it could 
be possible for non-government economic agents within the system to 
conclude that instrument instability was a problem resulting in the 
political and structural consequences outlined above, thus forcing the 
government to act as if instrument instability did exist. The absence 
of any formal analysis of the model and the use of a simulation approach 
could quite easily lead policy planners to conclude that instability 
exists when in fact the instrument is only on the upward phase of a 
constant oscillation. In the absence of a model and where historical 
observation is the only means of detection available, a similar 
conclusion could be arrived at. Similarly in the situation illustrated 
in part (a), a simulation study or historical observation may convey the 
wrong information, particularly if the underlying instability is of the 
type depicted by u^ . An historical analysis will not be adequate from 
the point of view that the targets may be increasing steeply over time 
thus requiring a stable instrument to increase steadily over time. This 
type of behaviour will not be instability of the type discussed by 
Holbrook, Chow, Turnovsky, Sims and Grämlich and could be corrected by 
revising downward the desired time paths of the target variables. 
Finally, the explosive oscillations depicted in part (c) of Figure 7 
could be detected by formal analysis of the dynamics of the system but 
once again the degree of instability and the relevant time span is 
important. The explosive oscillations may only evolve slowly and will
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not be a problem for short run analysis, particularly if the planning 
period lies between t^ and t^ where the amplitude of the relevant 
oscillations is relatively close. The above observation has a general 
applicability to all forms of instability depicted in Figure 7 and that 
is that if instrument instability evolves very slowly then it can be 
largely ignored in the short run. It is highly unlikely that the same 
system structure will prevail too far into the future so that while mild 
instability may exist now, it may not exist in three or four years time. 
The problem here is that the government will not be able to accurately 
forecast the future structure of the system and may be forced to take 
unwarranted corrective action.
The problem of the correct structure is very important when 
examining instrument instability. If the intention of the optimal 
flexible target or fixed target experiments is to analyse historical 
policy and to suggest possible alternatives then it would be desirable 
to know if instrument instability existed over the particular period of 
interest. Historical observation of the instruments would not be 
completely effective for the reason given above and also due to the fact 
that the instruments may be reacting in the short run to severe 
fluctuations in the uncontrollable exogenous variables and the government 
may have been taking action and giving the impression that instrument 
stability (or for that matter target instability) did not exist. The 
only accurate means of detection would be a formal analysis of a model.
If the model was incorrect structurally or specified correctly but 
estimated with data that produced wrong values for key coefficients then 
it would be quite easy to erroneously conclude either for or against 
instrument instability. The problem of the model structure becomes more 
severe when the model is used to plan for the future. Instrument
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instability may have been present over the estimation period and may have 
been captured accurately in the estimated parameters of the model but 
structural shifts in the future may remove the instability thus making 
the model inadequate for planning purposes. Most economists and 
econometricians would readily concede that models, regardless of their 
sophistication, are only simplified abstractions of reality and should 
only be viewed as such. The choice of abstraction however, could lead 
to the inclusion of instrument instability in a model when none exists in 
reality and vice versa. Under these conditions it is very difficult to 
make any definitive statements about stabilisation and control in the 
real world and as such we can only comment on stabilisation given a 
particular model. The results of any experiments with such a model should 
only be viewed as indicative in the sense that some insight can be gained 
into the stabilisation process but we are unable to make any concrete 
proposals.
Having looked briefly at the problem of instrument instability 
and some of the difficulties in detecting it and detecting the severity 
of it, the model outlined in Chapter three will be briefly analysed. The 
first observation of importance is that government spending, or the 
fiscal instrument, only has a current period impact and thus if all 
endogenous variables are included in the cost function and zero costs are 
allocated to G then G will not exhibit instrument instability. The 
stability of the monetary instrument, DM, is not clear under conditions 
of including all endogenous variables in the cost function as DM 
possesses a dynamic structure through the lagged effect of DM on capital 
flows. The reduced form of the model set out at the beginning of this 
chapter gives the impact of DM^  ^ on all endogenous variables and it can 
be seen that with the exception of FR and CF f the absolute magnitude of
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the impact of DM^_^ is less than the absolute impact of DM . This in 
itself does not prove the absence of stability with respect to those 
targets (exclusive of FR and CF) but does indicate that it may be the 
case. FR and CF are subject to large impacts from DM^ (relative 
to the impact of DM ) suggesting that a degree of instability could 
exist in the monetary instrument. A simple numerical test with the 
reduced form whereby targets for FR and CR are specified and then DM 
is adjusted (G fixed) lends support to this assertion although it must be 
conceded that the feedback from other variables could have an influencing 
factor although this would not be expected to be very high due to the 
underlying dynamic structure. (See below.) Should instability in the 
monetary instrument be a problem? The answer is generally no as there 
is little reason for policy planners to attach any intrinsic value to 
its numerical value unless a monetarists type strategy is being adopted. 
The historical behaviour of DM illustrates that the monetary base 
(domestic) has been used in a very severe manner in response to adverse 
adjustments in the balance of payments but this may not be instrument 
instability in the strict sense as the monetary instrument settles down 
once the short run perturbation has been offset. The historical 
behaviour of DM serves to illustrate that the government attached very 
little, if any, cost to stabilising the monetary instrument as would be 
expected.
The experiments that follow only briefly focus on aiming for 
all endogenous targets within the system as in the case of the fixed 
target approach the use of only two instruments to stabilise so many 
variables would require a policy lead and policy interval of excessive and 
unrealistic proportions (provided that a policy sequence existed). In 
relation to the flexible target approach, the scant attention paid to
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stabilising all endogenous variables largely removes the analysis of 
instrument instability out of the general Turnovsky framework and places 
it within the context of only a subset of endogenous variables being 
weighted in the cost function with the possibility of unstable feedback 
behaviour of an uncontrolled variable causing excessive adjustment in 
one or both instruments (provided the costs on instruments are very 
small). The presence of an unstable endogenous variable does not 
guarantee instrument instability as the impact of such variables on the 
targets will also be important. If a variable is highly unstable and if 
it has a very small impact on a target then very little offsetting 
adjustment will be required by the instruments. Before proceeding to the 
internal and external balance experiments, each endogenous variable 
will be directly aimed for in the linear/quadratic framework with three 
alternative policy specifications. Firstly, both instruments will be 
aimed at the target and allowed to adjust in a free manner. Secondly, 
the fiscal instrument will be held constant while the monetary instrument 
is allowed to adjust freely and finally the monetary instrument will be 
held constant while G is allowed to adjust. All exogenous variables 
will be held constant to avoid the problems of short run adjustment in 
the instruments in response to exogenous perturbations and the targets 
for the endogenous variables will be set equal to (for all time periods) 
the first period desired values set out in Table 2. The purpose of the 
experiments is to detect any feedback from the system into individual 
targets which is likely to produce instability in the instruments. The 
requirement that each instrument is held constant in turn will test the 
behaviour of the freely adjusting instrument in relation to a particular 
target. The case of both instruments free will indicate, if in fact it
has been found that one instrument used by itself is unstable, whether
150
the implementation of an additional instrument will dampen the use of 
the other instrument. It could be argued that what really is required 
is a formal dynamic analysis of the model but it has been argued above 
that the time span of the analysis is important. If the behaviour of 
the instruments is relatively stable over the desired period then it 
will not be of any concern that instrument instability is inherent in 
the structure of the model and takes a significantly long period to 
emerge. The analysis will only give insight into instrument behaviour 
with one particular target and it may be that the inclusion of an 
additional target will dampen instrument behaviour relative to the 
situation in which only one target is stabilised.. Nevertheless, the 
experiments will give some insight into the dynamic properties and 
instrument properties of the system and should prevent the mistake of 
attributing severely fluctuating instrument trajectories to "instrument 
instability" which is a common procedure in the stabilisation 
literature. A recent example of this can be found in the work of Wells 
(1977) who attributes severely fluctuating instruments to instrument 
instability even though the structure of the model and his problem 
prevents the Holbrook type of instability from existing as is the case 
when it is analysed in terms of the more general linear/quadratic 
framework of Tumovsky. The only other possibility would be that the 
feedback from other variables is producing the instrument fluctuations 
but no attempt was made to disentangle this from the influence of 
exogenous perturbations and the reaction of the system to the initial 
conditions. The work of Wells is not the only study which contains such 
a loose approach to the term "instrument instability" as numerous 
examples can be found throughout the optimal stabilisation literature.
The technique outlined above and presented below can be
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regarded as a useful tool for gaining insight into the dynamic 
properties of stabilisation policies. It will be particularly useful 
when the size of the model makes a formal dynamic analysis prohibitive. 
The format of the experiments will be as follows. (Note that all 
targets and exogenous variables are held constant.) Let x_^ equal the 
endogenous variable to be aimed for. The weighting patterns for the 
three experiments per endogenous variable are given by
X . 1 G DM
1000 . 1 .1 Run 1
1000 1000 .1 Run 2
1000 . 1 1000 Run 3
The allocation of low positive costs to G and DM in Run 1 is 
essential as the stabilisation framework specifies more instruments than 
targets resulting in a failure of policy uniqueness and the non-existence 
of the inverse (C'H C+R )  ^ when zero instrument costs are assigned.
The costs are small enough to allow free adjustment of the instruments 
and ensure that a unique policy solution is obtained. For the case 
where both instruments are free to adjust, the results indicate that 
given the planning period length (twenty periods), the fiscal instrument, 
G, is very stable for most endogenous variables, allowing of course for 
a small adjustment at the beginning of the planning period due to the 
influence of the initial conditions. The reaction of G, when both 
instruments are permitted to adjust freely, when the target is the total 
base is one of damped behaviour. This is most likely due to the 
influence of FR on MB with FR being the most potentially unstable
variable in the system due to the term which appears in the
identity for FR . The influence of FR on the monetary variables
generally produces a slight dampening effect on G over the planning
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period. Of course it cannot be concluded that instrument instability 
does not exist but G is at least stable over the twenty periods of the 
policy interval. The only target which produces cause for concern is 
CF. The achievement of a constant CF target requires that G 
fluctuates between positive and negative values although the severe 
movements are not part of regular oscillary behaviour and would perhaps 
not be classified as instrument instability in the strict positive semi- 
definite cost matrix case. The behaviour of G is due largely to the 
time path of Y which fluctuates severely and feeds back into CF via 
CB and (Y^-Y^ • T^e movement of G to offset this influence produces
further severe movements in Y which require further adjustment in G. 
This result illustrates an important aspect of instrument stability in 
that the impact of a stable variable (stable in the strict dynamic sense) 
on a target can generate excessive movement in the instruments, 
particularly if there is a close trade-off involved as there is between 
G and Y .15 Perhaps what is required is a redefinition of instrument 
instability to concompass the type of behaviour mentioned above and which 
may not fall into the category of "pure" instability which is essentially 
the type discussed by the abovementioned authors.
The behaviour of the monetary instrument when both instruments 
are allowed to adjust is similar to that of G, that is, stable but 
exhibiting slightly damped behaviour for MB and the other monetary 
variables. Like G, the only "unstable" behaviour occurs when CF is 
treated as a target and occurs for similar reasons to those given above. 
DM must move to offset the influence of Y and CB and in doing so 
generates greater movements in these variables requiring more adjustment 
in later periods. Note that if Y,CB and the other endogenous variables 
were weighted then the excessive movement in both instruments would be
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removed as the severe fluctuations in variables would be largely, 
although not completely, removed.
The remaining instrument experiments with G and DM 
alternatively fixed and free provide the most interesting and revealing 
insight into the behaviour of the system. The requirement that only one 
instrument can adjust in a free manner would suggest that the behaviour 
of the free instrument would be significantly more severe than 
corresponding behaviour of the fixed instrument. The general indicative 
results are given in Table 5. The heading "stable" refers to a time path 
which does not exhibit any tendency to explode upwards or downwards 
(columns three and four) or exhibits severe oscillatory type fluctuations 
which are covered by the second heading "severe movements". It can be 
seen that for the majority of endogenous variables, the monetary 
instrument is characterised by severe fluctuating behaviour or explosive 
type movements. Only the rates of interest are compatible with a 
relatively stable time path and even then some fluctuations do exist in 
the instrument time path but at a level far removed from the fluctuations 
contained in the time paths included in the second column. On the other 
hand the behaviour of the fiscal instrument presents a more uniform 
distribution between stable and significant downward movements. The 
stability of the fiscal instrument in relation to the income variables 
is not surprising and reflects the historical behaviour of G, if we 
assume that G was historically aimed at income targets rather than 
open or monetary sector targets. The indications are that an incorrect 
assignment of fiscal policy could produce an unstable time path for the 
fiscal instrument while the assignment of monetary policy to a particular 
target without the assistance of fiscal policy, will most likely result 
in excessive fluctuations in the use of the monetary instrument. The
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Table 5
Instrument Behaviour - One Instrument Fixed
Target
Y 
MB 
FR 
CB 
YD
Try
C
I
IM
M
RS
RL
CF
T
Y 
MB 
FR 
CB 
YD
TPY
C
I
IM
M
RS
RL
CF
T
Note: Table headings refer to the behaviour of the 
freely adjusting instrument.
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important point to come out of the above analysis is that unstable 
instrument behaviour is possible within the constraints of the model 
and the analysis will assist in later experiments to ascertain whether 
or not severe fluctuations in the instruments, if there are any, are 
purely a function of any perturbations in the exogenous variables or 
are a result of the underlying structure of the model. It is likely 
that a combination of the two causes will be important but at least the 
preceding experiments will help to disentangle the problem. The results 
of the experiments also suggest that a combination of targets may remove 
instability, particularly if one target is compatible with a stable time 
path for one or both instruments. A further important aspect of 
stabilisation is suggested by the experiments and that is that it may not 
be possible to rely on one instrument or instruments of a similar nature 
to stabilise a given target or targets when the other instruments are 
specifically directed away from the desired targets. Further insight on 
this aspect will be gained from the following experiments.
The brief analysis of instrument instability carried out in this 
section not only gives insight into the particular dynamic instrument 
characteristics of the model but also presents a simple technique for 
detecting instability for particular targets when the time span is of 
concern and a formal analysis is prohibitive. A formal dynamic analysis 
would have been possible in this case but as it has already been pointed 
out even if instability had been present, if it did not become a problem 
until after the end of the policy interval then it would be of little 
concern. It may be of concern in the next policy interval but by then 
a structural shift may have occurred which would reverse the process.
A more exhaustive approach to the problem would have been to test all 
combinations of targets with the exception of the case of including all
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endogenous variables in the cost function as the latter case would fall 
directly into the Turnovsky framework. Testing all combinations would 
be a computationally prohibitive process so only selected sets of 
targets were chosen. The limited results obtained largely confirmed the 
above assertions. An experiment was conducted within the Turnovsky 
framework with zero costs on the monetary instrument with the result that 
the time path for DM did exhibit a tendency to increase over time, 
although not in an excessively severe manner, suggesting that instrument 
instability of the more conventional analysis of stabilisation policy.
It should be noted that the problem of instrument instability in a fixed 
target framework has been ignored mainly because at the time of writing 
no general theory had been developed in this context and was beyond the 
scope of this study to pursue such an investigation. Two observations 
can be made, however, concerning the fixed target approach. First of 
all it should be recognised that Holbrook's example is of a fixed target 
path problem (one instrument one target) and can be extended to include 
all strongly-Tinbergen dynamic stabilisation problems. Secondly, the 
situation in which the number of targets exceeds the number of 
instruments and a policy lead is required cannot be directly analysed in 
Holbrook's framework or the fixed target framework,but the results of 
the linear/quadratic experiments will give some indication of whether 
or not instrument instability may be a problem. The unsatisfactory 
nature of this approach can be counter-balanced by the fact that an 
alternative rigorous analysis within the fixed target, policy lead
context does not yet exist.
CHAPTER V
OPTIMAL AND FIXED TARGET PLANNING 
FOR INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL BALANCE
The analysis of this chapter focuses on the achievement of 
internal and external balance under a fixed exchange rate regime. Problems 
associated with uncertainty will also be considered. The linear/quadratic 
flexible target approach will be the dominant stabilisation procedure 
employed although the fixed target approach will be implemented for a 
particular set of targets, specifically in the case of the number of 
targets equalling the number of fvee instruments and the trading off of 
targets becomes unnecessary. Specific application of the dynamic fixed 
targets approach to a similar set of targets will be left until Chapter 
Seven.
The experiments that follow were carried out over a twenty period 
time horizon beginning with the second quarter 1965. In each case terminal 
conditions were not considered nor was the time horizon endogenous in the 
manner of Friedman (1975a) for any particular experiment. The choice of a 
twenty period time horizon was made firstly to enable a broad view of the 
optimal trajectories for both state and control variables to be obtained 
and secondly, to take account of the lag structure of the model. The 
longest lag in the model is a four quarter lag in the effect of the long 
rate of interest on investment. For the first four periods of the planning 
period only the initial values of RL will be important while the values of 
the optimal RL over the last four periods will not be of any concern 
within the current planning period. In effect there would be four periods 
of any planning period (greater than or equal to four) in which the 
current level of RL would not have any impact within the time horizon and
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four periods in which the initial conditions and not the optimal values 
would be important. To try and gain some insight into how the system 
reacts in between these two subsets of the horizon it is necessary to 
sufficiently extend the horizon to obtain a period over which all lagged 
variables feeding back into the system are in fact optimal and the optimal 
values of the current lagged variables generated within the intermediate 
subset have time to work their way through the system. It is conceivable 
that given a model with very long lags (for example RBA1) , the selected 
time horizon may be of a length which does not permit the optimal values of 
particular variables to feed back into the system and in a sense the model 
could not be regarded as evolving in a purely optimal manner. Strictly 
speaking, the solution will be an optimal solution but the absence of an 
optimal effect from certain variables will perhaps not yield sufficient 
information about the dynamic evolution of the system when all variables 
are optimal levels given a specific set of preferences.
The problem of long lags is important if the lags are as long as, 
or longer than, a specific time horizon and a new set of preferences 
(reflected in an allocation of new weights in the cost function) are 
assigned at the beginning of the next planning period when the optimal 
values of particular variables calculated over the previous time horizon 
are just beginning to have an effect. The result might be that the initial 
conditions may be so far away from the desired time path that the system 
takes an inordinately long time to settle down. A simple example of such 
a situation could be an initial set of preferences in which income and the 
balance of payments position are the two targets of concern and the time 
horizon has been selected to be of the same length as the lag associated 
with the influence of the rate of interest on income. The achievement 
or near achievement of the two targets (depending on the number of
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instruments and how those instruments are weighted) may be consistent 
with a wildly fluctuating time path for the rate of interest which, at 
the end of the planning period, attains a very high value and has no 
impact within the current planning period. The next planning period may 
specify the supply of money as one of the targets which will depend on the 
complementary movement of the rate of interest but the rate of interest 
which influences the supply of money may be the rate which is consistent 
with the targets from the previous planning period due to the lags 
involved, and may prevent the achievement of the new target. The practical 
consequences of this situation could be quite severe, particularly if 
there are many lagged variables in the system. The obvious approach to 
controlling such a system would be to avoid switching targets but this 
places considerable constraint upon the options of the policy planner.
The problem of specifying the planning period to be of insufficient length 
and then switching state preferences will not arise in the experiments 
discussed below but the applied control theorist should be aware of some 
of the consequences of selecting an inappropriate time horizon.
The experiments were carried out within a deterministic and 
stochastic framework. The stochastic analysis was confined to considering 
the influence of random additive disturbances on the optimal trajectories 
of both state and control variables. The disturbances were generated by 
the computationally efficient procedure outlined by Nagar ( 1 9 6 9 ) In 
addition to a graphical presentation of the major results and comparisons 
of welfare cost between experiments and between stochastic and deterministic 
results for a given experiment, system performance will in some cases be 
summarised by the comparison of root mean square deviations (RMSD) of 
particular variables. The RMSD for state and control variables is given by
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T
RMSDx (5.1)
T
(5.2)
where the x*, x, u* and u refer to optimal and desired values of the 
state vector and optimal and desired values of the control vector. The 
RMSD purports to illustrate the overall performance of a variable with 
respect to its desired time path. The results however, must be viewed 
with caution as one result for given time period can influence the final 
value of the RMSD for a specific variable. To avoid drawing any 
incorrect conclusions from the value of the RMSD, the actual values of the 
variables were inspected and if behaviour of the type mentioned above was 
detected then an appropriate comment was made below during the discussion 
of the results.
by the notation IEB followed by a figure signifying the number of the 
experiment. IEB1 consisted of attempting to achieve internal and 
external balance along with a number of other targets. That is, exact 
fine tuning was sacrificed in favour of a compromise approach. On the 
expenditure side Y, C, I, YD and IM were all assigned weights which 
would provide equal penalties for percentage deviations from their 
respective targets (see Table 3 of Chapter 4). In the monetary and 
external sectors, MB, FR and CF were assigned weights which would 
produce penalties of the same magnitude as those incurred by the 
expenditure variables. P was excluded from the cost function as the 
target was specified consistently with the target for Y and therefore 
the inclusion of P would bias the solution towards the target. Both
The experiments for internal and external balance are identified
control variables were weighted in the cost function on an equal basis
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with the endogenous variables. M, RS and RL were treated as 
intermediate variables in the sense outlined in the previous chapter 
(not to be confused with the notion of intermediate targets used by 
Brunner (1969) and other monetary economists) and were not allocated 
weights. Similarly, the remaining variables not included in the cost 
function were regarded as intermediate variables. The relative weighting
cost function for IEBl was
Y MB FR CB YD TPY C I
1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1
IM M RS RL CF T P
1 0 0 0 1 0 0
G DM
1 1
Multiple cost matrices were used to maintain the exact relativity and 
preferences. The decision as to whether or not to include a particular 
variable in the list of targets or to treat it as an intermediate variable, 
depends largely on the political philosophy of the planner involved, as 
does the proportionate weighting of various targets which are to be 
included in the cost function. The purpose of the experiment is largely 
exploratory and to examine the underlying trade-offs between variables 
and to test the degree of adjustment in the controls when the controls 
are weighted equally with the endogenous variables. Unless otherwise 
specified the discussion of the results will refer to the deterministic 
solutions.
As was to be expected in the case of multiple targets, the 
system failed to achieve all targets simultaneously due to the trade-offs 
between variables. The results for key variables are presented graphically
1C2
in Figures 8 to 11. Real and nominal G begins close to its target and 
by the end of the planning period moves significantly above the target 
level. However, this strong movement in G is not sufficient to maintain 
real Y at or above its target. Real Y is virtually on target at the 
beginning of the planning period but begins to move below its target as 
the end-point of the planning period approaches. This behaviour is not 
confined solely to Y. A similar pattern emerges in real C, the component 
of greatest magnitude in the Y identity. In contrast to Y and C, I 
performs better. Its time path for both real and nominal values is 
considerably above the desired target (although in terms of the quadratic 
cost function this will also be penalised). Possibly I would have 
exceeded its target by a greater amount if the long rate of interest had 
been closer to, or even below, its target. Higher levels of M would be 
required to achieve this which would require a more expansionary monetary 
policy than was provided by the optimal solution. The exclusion of C 
and I from the cost function would have allowed these variables to move 
in a manner complementary to the income target. The costs imposed on 
them prevents this action.
The other target of special concern in relation to this set of 
experiments, FR, behaves in a manner similar to Y in that it moves in a 
downturn towards the end of the planning period. This behaviour is the 
result of two main influences. Firstly, capital flows experiences severe 
one-period deviations from its target which are not counter-balanced by 
an opposite movement in the current account balance. These sudden 
deviations are sufficient to shift FR from its target and keep it there. 
The nature of the FR identity ensures that this will occur. (3.24) 
and (3.25) illustrate that any shift away from the desired level of FR 
can result in a permanent departure from the target, even if CF and CB
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return exactly to their target levels. That is, the change in FR can be 
on target but if it is added to a lagged value of FR that is off target, 
then the level of FR will be off target. Secondly, any movement off 
target by FR which results from CF movements, would require strong 
monetary action to return FR to its desired level. This can be seen 
from the structural and reduced form equations. The optimal solution does 
not provide for this monetary policy action due to the multiplicity of 
monetary and external targets which are weighted equally with FR.
The behaviour of the monetary instrument, DM, is not governed by 
the behaviour of CF and FR alone. It also has a major impact on the 
total monetary base MB and a lesser impact on Y. The reduced form 
coefficients reveal that DM moves MB and CF in an opposite direction 
to that of FR. The structure of the experiment required that the system 
achieve targets for MB, FR and CF simultaneously as well as allowing 
for a smooth domestic monetary expansion. The optimal results clearly 
show that these objectives are inconsistent and as a result monetary 
policy is used in an occasional stop-go fashion to try and produce the 
best trade-off in terms of the lowest penalties. In comparison to the 
optimal fiscal policy which allows for a steady but strong19 fiscal 
expansion, the optimal monetary policy is more volatile and more prone to 
be used to offset adverse external and monetary movements in the very short 
run.
The behaviour of the intermediate monetary variables M, RS and RL 
also requires some attention. Because these variables were excluded from 
the cost function, they were permitted to adjust freely in accordance with 
the requirements of the rest of the system. In this respect they are 
complementary to the control variables. M is virtually on target both at 
the beginning and end of the planning period but like DM, it is subject
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to short expansion and contractions which occur in the middle portion of 
the planning period and which are largely a direct result of the behaviour 
of the monetary instrument. The fluctuations in the money supply 
contribute substantially to the "wave-like" time paths of the interest 
rates. Interest rates lie above their respective targets for the entire 
planning period and towards the end of the planning period they begin to 
rise steeply. This movement of interest rates and the money supply 
illustrates a very important problem associated with the use of 
intermediate variables in an optimal framework. The need to steer the 
system towards particular targets may create some instability in 
intermediate variables which could produce problems in the next planning 
period. For example, due to the steep increase in the long rate, some 
attempt may be needed in the next period to bring RL down in order to 
maintain stability within financial markets and to remove the detrimental 
effects of high interest rates on investment and income. This may mean 
the specification of RL as an explicit target which could produce 
further instability in M due to the close simultaneous relationship 
between M and the rates of interest. (See structural equations.).
The stochastic solutions to IEB1 were initially obtained by a 
monte carlo technique whereby the solution was obtained fifty times, each 
with a new set of random additive disturbances. As could be expected the 
time paths of the endogenous variables displayed a tendency to converge 
towards the deterministic results. The monte carlo experiments when 
viewed as a whole failed to contribute much additional information to the 
deterministic results. A close inspection of the individual time paths of 
the state and control variables does provide some interesting information, 
particularly in relation to the response of the controls to the additive 
disturbances. As it would be impossible to present the results of each
169
monte carlo replication, one replication was chosen to be used for 
illustrative purposes and the additive disturbances generated for that 
example were used in each illustrative example that follows to enable 
feasible comparisons to be made. The use of one set of disturbances to 
illustrate certain propositions has been used elsewhere in the stabilisation 
literature, for example, Pindyck and Roberts (1974) .
The stochastic solutions do not provide any significant change in 
the behaviour of the weighted state variables if allowances are made for 
the introduction of the additive disturbances. In fact, the upper and 
lower time paths for real Y resulting from the monte carlo simultations 
are very close to the desired path. The illustrative stochastic paths 
for Y and FR are given in Figure 11. The welfare loss generated under 
stochastic conditions increased by approximately 100% with the majority 
of this welfare loss coming from the behaviour of FR and the controls.
It can be seen from Figure 11 that additive shocks can severely influence 
the time path of FR which is a direct result of the nature of the FR 
identity while the behaviour of Y varies little from the deterministic 
case. On the monetary side the movement of M becomes more severe as 
does the movement in RS and RL with the income sector being largely 
insulated from the shocks to M by the low coefficient for M in the 
consumption function. The additive disturbances can move variables closer 
to targets or further away from targets depending on the size and direction 
of shocks. In light of this and the fact that Y, for example, substantially 
follows its deterministic path in the illustrative case (as it does in 
many others) and G is weighted equally with Y, it would be reasonable 
to expect that G would not vary substantially from the deterministic 
solution. This is not the case. In the deterministic solution the
optimal fiscal policy required that G exceed its target values. In the
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stochastic example, G tends to decline relative to its target over the 
last few periods of the planning period. By comparison with the 
deterministic case, this represents the beginning of a more vigorous and 
contractionary fiscal policy. Recall that DM was used more extensively 
than G in the deterministic case. Monetary policy is still used 
extensively in the stochastic case but in addition we see that G is 
manipulated in a more extensive manner. The RMSD for G increased by a 
factor of 4 from the deterministic solution compared to an increase of 
2.5 for DM.
The stochastic case produces a new optimal mix of monetary and 
fiscal policy which produces the same general system behaviour as the 
policy mix in the deterministic case. However, the change in the behaviour 
of G raises the question of whether or not the presence of uncertainty in 
a system can in fact reverse the application of a particular instrument to 
achieve an optimal trade-off between targets. The following three 
experiments provide some important information concerning this question. 
Before proceeding to the next experiment it is of some interest to briefly 
compare the historical behaviour of the economy with the simulated 
behaviour. It could be argued that the weighting specification used for the 
above experiment would not be followed as a practical stabilisation 
exercise as the controls are weighted equally with the state variables and 
while there may be some argument for weighting fiscal policy in this manner 
to take account of social needs for example, there is little justification 
for attaching the same importance to the monetary instrument. The 
interesting thing is, that despite the apparent restriction on DM, the 
monetary instrument has been used more extensively in the deterministic 
case than the corresponding historical policy and FR has been stabilised 
slightly more effectively than the historical time path for FR. (Figure
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12 illustrates this proposition.)2  ^ If we believe that the model 
reflects the economy in a reasonably accurate way then it could be 
concluded that the government could have attained a more effective 
stabilisation of the balance of payments position over a twenty-period 
horizon beginning in the second quarter 1965. The historical results 
suggest that while monetary policy was moving in the correct direction, it 
was not manipulated sufficiently to produce results similar to those 
obtained in the IEB1 experiment. How can we account for what appears to 
be a historically cautious use of monetary policy (in terms of the linear 
quadratic framework a "cautious" policy could be a policy resulting from a 
reasonably heavily weighted control)? One answer is that the authorities 
were unsure about the correct system structure but had a general idea of 
the size of policy impacts and it is equally conceivable, and indeed most 
likely, that it was not possible to obtain precise forecasts or current 
information about the uncontrollable exogenous variables. This leads to the 
not surprising result that, given better information about the system and 
the exogenous variables, the easier it becomes to stabilise the system.
What is of interest however, is that even with a structurally estimated 
model and exact information on the uncontrollable exogenous variables, it 
may be possible to effectively fine tune the system within reasonable 
bounds given costs on the controls. This suggests that a substantial 
historical improvement in the performance of FR could have been obtained 
if the authorities had been willing to allow monetary policy to adjust in 
a more extensive manner. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that the 
above analysis depends on initially having a fairly accurate model. The 
model employed here obviously has weaknesses but if the policy multipliers 
are close to the "true" multipliers then the results and conclusions 
obtained from it could be regarded as fairly indicative of the true
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performance.
The second experiment, IEB2, consisted of trying to exactly 
achieve internal and external balance regardless of where the system 
directs the other endogenous variables. In this situation we have two 
targets and two controls and provided that the appropriate rank conditions 
on the matrix of instrument impact multipliers is met, exact fine tuning 
can take place. If the instrument impact multipliers have rank equal to 
two then the problem collapses to a simple strongly-Tinbergen target path 
problem whereby the authorities can hit the desired targets in every period 
without resorting to anticipation or compromising the targets. The matrix 
of instrument multipliers relevant to the targets of Y and FR is given 
by
2.1984 0.1651~
0.0512 -.2547
and p [tTq ] = 2 hence the policy planner is indeed operating within a 
strongly-Tinbergen framework and optimisation within the linear/quadratic 
framework is redundant. As a point of comparison IEB2 was carried out in 
two ways. Firstly, the problem was solved as a dynamic fixed target 
problem with zero anticipation and secondly, it was solved within the 
linear/quadratic framework. It has already been pointed out that the 
linear/quadratic approach is unnecessary. However, it is of some interest 
to compare the two results, particularly in light of the fact that in the 
linear/quadratic framework some initial adjustment may take place as the 
time paths of the targets react to the initial conditions (therefore even 
with two targets and two instruments it may not be possible to exactly hit 
the targets until the system settles down) while in the fixed target 
framework the initial conditions are explicitly included in the solution. 
The fixed target problem is solved period by period while the linear/
175
quadratic control laws are solved initially over the entire planning 
period and in this respect may be computationally more efficient than the 
fixed target approach.
To enable the achievement of internal and external balance 
within the linear/quadratic framework, both controls were allowed to adjust 
freely. In terms of the cost function, G and DM were assigned zero 
weights while FR and Y were weighted heavily using multiple weights to
maintain the exact desired trade-off between targets. The relative weights
assigned we re
Y FR G DM
1000 1000 0 0
All other state variables were allocated zero costs and allowed to adjust 
freely. The results illustrate the fact that both solutions are identical 
(allowing for some insignificant deviations in the linear/quadratic case) 
which indicates that the optimally derived solution did not need to settle 
down as a result of the initial conditions. Recall that the targets for 
Y and FR are simple mappings of the initial conditions into target 
vectors. Limited as the evidence is, a tentative conclusion can be drawn 
along the lines that as long as the desired target paths' are non-extreme 
mappings of the initial conditions, then the linear/quadratic solution 
will be identical to the fixed target solution (provided the number of 
targets and instruments are equal) for alX time periods of the planning 
period.21 The words "non-extreme" are very important qualifiers to the 
above statement and are best interpreted as meaning that economically 
meaningful targets are specified, for example, to specify a target of 10% 
annual real growth in Y from the appropriate initial condition for Y 
may require the system to settle down before the target is reached.
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As the results of the two solutions are identical the discussion 
that follows can be regarded as being applicable to either technique. The 
results are graphed in Figures 8 to 11. To keep real Y on target 
required an expansionary fiscal policy, particularly towards the end of 
the planning period. This can be seen from Figure 10. Note that only the 
latter part of the optimal G has been graphed. This procedure was 
adopted to avoid confusion as the optimal G for the first part of the 
planning period tracked between the optimal path of IEBl and the target.
The need for strong fiscal policy stems from the fact that the target level 
of G is not sufficient to sustain the target level of real Y. In 
addition, the optimal consumption path falls below its target. As 
consumption is the largest component of the national income identity, it is 
reasonable to expect that if it is declining then Y will tend to decline 
also unless strong fiscal action is taken to offset the movement in C.
The divergent movement in the optimal paths of Y and C illustrates the 
important problem for applied control theorists already mentioned above, and 
that is the consistent specification of identities in terms of the 
components of a particular identity. It will be remembered that the target 
value of Y was consistently constructed from the targets of the 
components of the national income identity. If all components are on 
target then Y will be on target. However, as we have seen in the earlier 
simple example and in IEBl and particularly IEB2, the value of Y that is 
chosen as a target will not necessarily be able to be achieved 
simultaneously with the target levels of its components. If policy 
planners are concerned about achieving target levels for all their income 
variables then high costs must be allocated to the appropriate variables 
in the cost function.
The achievement of external balance requires greater movement in
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the open and monetary sector variables (excluding FR of course) than the 
corresponding movement in income variables in the achievement of internal 
balance. The requirement that external balance be achieved implies that 
capital flows and the current account balance are equal. This has been 
achieved but at the expense of a stable total monetary base and a time 
path for the supply of money which exhibits more severe expansions and 
contractions from the path obtained in IEB1. To maintain external 
balance, monetary policy has been used more extensively than it was in the 
first experiment with the optimal path characterised by excessive expansions 
and contractions. Severe changes in monetary policy are necessary in 
order to maintain the equality between CF and CB and to ensure that FR 
has a constant effect on the domestic economy. Even though FR is at its 
target level throughout the planning period it does have a varying 
indirect effect on the income sector through the excessive use of 
monetary policy required to keep FR on target. The effect of the monetary 
sector on Y does appear to be largely negated by fiscal policy with little 
in the way of excessive counteractive fiscal policy required to offset the 
monetary sector. This result is particularly encouraging as it indicates 
that the internal balance target can be achieved without excessive fiscal 
policy and without substantially disturbing the application of fiscal 
policy to account for monetary and external factors. On the other hand 
the severe stop-go monetary policy is a result not only of the 
requirements of the purely external variables and the uncontrollable 
exogenous variables which directly affect the external and monetary 
sectors, but is also a result of the fiscal policy necessary to achieve 
internal balance. This result occurs through the strong influence of the 
income sector on the open and monetary sectors, an influence which is 
not reciprocated from the open and monetary sectors to the income sector.
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This can be seen from the reduced form coefficients set out in Chapter 
Ebur. The monetary instrument not only has to contend with trade-offs 
in the non-income sectors but has to offset the influence of the income 
sector as well. The model is not sophisticated enough to reveal all the 
implications of a stop-go monetary policy and resulting behaviour of the 
money supply and interest rates. In a more complete model the presence 
of a severe monetary policy could have serious consequences for financial 
and asset markets. If so, then it raises the question of whether or not 
there should be a money supply or interest rate target incorporated into 
the list of major policy goals of governments.
In contrast to IEB1, interest rates each higher levels in the 
second experiment. The short rate is forced up by the increase in Y 
relative to the first experiment and by the fact that generally there is 
not a large enough increase in M to offset the influence of Y. The 
result is that by the end of the planning period the long rate has risen 
to 7.67. The higher levels of RL are not sufficient to generate a 
significant downward movement in I as the strong fiscal action and 
high levels of Y are able to keep real I at a desirable level. As 
with IEBl, the high levels of RL over the last four periods have no 
influence on the system due to the lag structure but a significant 
downward shift in I could be expected in the next planning period.
Both monetary and fiscal policy have been strongly applied to 
achieve the desired targets. The requirement that both controls be allowed 
to move freely has meant that G and DM have been able to bear the 
burden of target achievement without excessive adjustment in all other 
non-weighted state variables with the possible exception of the total 
monetary base and the rates of interest. The variability in the total 
base and the rates of interest largely cancel out in the money supply
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function which accounts for the more subdued performance of M in 
comparison with these variables. With so many income variables taking on 
the role of intermediate variables, comparatively little adjustment to 
complement the controls in the achievement of internal balance is 
required. The behaviour of the intermediate monetary variables is 
reversed however from the income variables with the requirement that they 
move excessively to complement the achievement of external balance.
The optimal stochastic solution results in neither internal or 
external balance being exactly achieved, which is to be expected. Fifty 
monte carlo simulations reveal that the optimal paths for both Y and FR 
track very close to their targets for all combinations of additive shock.
An illustrative example is given in Figure 11. The optimal path for FR 
fluctuates about its target to a greater degree than real Y but the 
shocks are not sufficient to move FR away from the general area of the 
target as was the case in IEB1 (remember that identical shocks are used 
for the illustrative examples). The additive disturbances are not 
sufficient to shift real Y substantially off target with the optimal 
stochastic path closely tracking its target and deterministic counterpart. 
The stochastic example is so close to its target that it was not possible 
to graph a sufficiently distinguishable path from the target in Figure 11. 
The behaviour of the other major state variables is also similar to the 
deterministic case, allowing of course for the impact of the additive 
disturbances. The results clearly illustrate the self-correcting nature 
of the optimal control laws in the linear/quadratic framework to additive 
uncertainty. The fixed target solution is also self-correcting in relating 
to past shocks as x^_ is explicitly included when we solve for the 
appropriate values of the controls in each time period. It is worthwhile 
at this stage to re-emphasise a point made in Chapter Two and that is that
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it is only in a strongly-Tinbergen world with as many instruments as 
targets that the dynamic fixed target approach to stabilisation will be 
able to adjust to additive disturbances from period to period.
The optimal stochastic paths of the control variables provide 
some interesting results. In the deterministic case strong expansionary 
fiscal policy was required to achieve the desired goals. The illustrative 
stochastic results (not graphed) indicate that under uncertainty this need 
not be the case. The optimal G becomes closer to its target over the 
final periods of the planning period than the corresponding deterministic 
G. Monetary policy is once again of a stop-go nature but in the stochastic 
case it is more severe, particularly in periods fifteen to twenty.
Although the direction of monetary policy has not been reversed, it is 
severely contractionary in the last five periods by comparison with the 
deterministic results and the target. More importantly, we have a switch
in the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy from a situation of an 
expansionary fiscal policy in the perfect information case to a less 
expansionary fiscal policy and more severe monetary policy in the imperfect 
information case. The change in the mix of policy can be illustrated by 
the change in the RMSD value for both control variables when we shift from 
perfect information to imperfect information.
RMSD RMSDG DM
D 167 516
S 153 807
The letters D and S refer to deterministic and stochastic solutions 
respectively.
The third experiment, IEB3, consisted of attempting to achieve
internal and external balance as before, but in this case monetary policy
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was emphasised relative to fiscal policy. To achieve this policy mix a 
low cost was placed on deviations of DM from its target path while high 
costs were placed on G,Y and FR. G,Y and FR were weighted such that 
a one percent deviation from the relevant target would have a thousand 
times the cost of a similar movement in DM. The relative weights were as 
follows
Y FR G DM
1000 1000 1000 1
The computer program accepts the relative weighting specifications and then 
generates actual weights which will maintain the desired relativity for all 
target values and all time periods. Once again we have a situation in 
which the number of targets equals the number of instruments but with the 
restriction that only one instrument can adjust in a completely free 
manner. This situation is not completely removed from the real world as it 
is not uncommon for governments to try and maintain a level of government 
spending to satisfy social and political needs and then rely on monetary 
policy to carry the burden of economic stabilisation.
The optimal deterministic paths for Y and FR indicate that 
given a restricted application of fiscal policy and a free application of 
monetary policy, the dual targets of internal and external balance cannot 
be achieved simultaneously (see Figures 13 to 15). Initially, real Y is 
very close to its target (the first four periods for Y have not been 
graphed in Figure 13 to avoid unduly complicating the diagram) but as the 
planning period progresses it begins to fall just below target with the net 
result being an optimal path for Y which is very similar to the 
corresponding path obtained in IEB1 where Y and G were also weighted 
equally. In contrast to the behaviour of Y, the optimal path of FR
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begins just below its target and gradually converges to its target path. 
The optimal trajectory for FR is so close to its target that in a 
graphical form it is very difficult to distinguish it from the target and 
hence has not been graphed. FR performs better than Y because the 
structure of the model is such that monetary policy has a limited impact 
on Y compared with its impact on the open and monetary sectors, Y is 
only affected through a current low wealth effect on consumption and 
through the interest rate mechanism and then only with a lag of four 
periods. If G is forced to follow its target path then it will force 
the income sector to move in accordance. The trade-off between the 
targets of Y and G that we have seen in IEBl and IEB2 will limit the 
ability of G to exactly steer Y on target under the current 
preference allocation but the general movement of the two variables will 
be similar. Monetary policy is virtually left free to offset the impact 
of G on the external sector and to ultimately steer FR on target. To 
achieve external balance, CF must equal CB. This condition is met at 
the end of the planning period although the two variables are not on 
target. A severe stop-go monetary policy is required once again although 
not quite as severe as the policy specified in IEB2. This is an 
interesting result as it indicates that the same target can be hit with 
the use of only one active instrument and the use of that active 
instrument is less severe than when both instruments are active. The 
reason for this lies in the fact that the difference in the use of G 
from an active to a passive instrument when we shift from IEB2 to IEB3 
has meant that the monetary instrument has not been required to offset 
any strong bursts in fiscal policy in order to stabilise the external 
sector. By comparison with IEB2, the optimal monetary policy required in 
this case becomes much more expansionary at the end of the planning
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period (it is still contractionary in relation to the desired time path). 
The resulting mix of policies is a combination of fiscal policy which is 
close to its target and a monetary policy which is less severe over 
particular periods than the corresponding mix in IEB2 where both controls 
were active, that is, allowed to adjust freely. To some extent this 
result is counter-intuitive as one would generally expect that monetary 
policy would need to be more severe to take account of the passive nature 
of G. The analysis outlined above gives some insight into why this may 
occur. Another point to consider when attempting to analyse why a 
particular policy is severe or not is the degree of consistency between 
targets. A set of very inconsistent targets may well produce a severe 
monetary policy under the above conditions. Before discussing the 
stochastic results it should be noted that while FR performs better than 
Y, the degree of superiority of performance is only marginal and indeed Y 
has been effectively stabilised close to its target which is not 
particularly surprising considering that it was weighted so heavily in 
the cost function.
The stochastic solutions to IEB3 provide some very interesting 
results. The behaviour of FR differs considerably from the 
deterministic solution. See for example the illustrative case in 
Figure 15. However, as in IEB2 the stochastic path of FR fluctuates 
about the target and any shocks which tend to move FR off target are 
compensated next period by the movement of DM. A close comparison of 
the optimal stochastic paths of FR for both IEB2 and IEB3 reveals that 
they are almost identical in all of the fifty monte carlo solutions 
(remember that identical random shocks were used for each IEB experiment). 
The example graphed in Figure 15 shows that the optimal trajectory for FR
in IEB3 was only marginally more off target in particular quarters than it
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was in IEB2. This suggests that the monetary instrument was adjusting 
almost exclusively to the uncertainty present in the open sector. The 
optimal path for Y tracked reasonably close to its target and in some 
instances performed better than the deterministic solution. Figure 15 
illustrates a situation in which the stochastic solution tracked close to 
its target and indeed, toward the end of the planning period, became 
slightly closer to the target than the deterministic solution. Not too 
much should be made of this difference as in both cases the differences 
between the target and optimal path are minimal and are differences which 
would certainly be disregarded by governments who would most likely claim 
to have implemented a successful stabilisation program based upon the 
results obtained here.
The stochastic performance of Y appears to be counter-intuitive 
as it would be expected that given a restricted use of fiscal policy, 
shocks to the system would produce significant fluctuations in Y. It 
must be concluded, at least in relation to the illustrative example, that 
the shocks have been complementary to G in relation to stabilising Y. 
However, as a general safety first rule, to reduce the impact of 
uncertainty, the controls should be allowed to adjust more freely than 
would be the case under perfect information. The larger the shocks the 
less restriction there should be on the controls and while it has been 
illustrated that shocks can be stabilising, it is generally not always 
possible to know the size and direction of shocks beforehand. If some 
attention is not paid to the effects of shocks then the system may not 
move in the desired direction.
As could be expected, the optimal stochastic paths of G, both 
real and nominal are very close to their targets. This is due to the 
high costs allocated to G and because G is not subject to direct
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shocks itself. The failure of G to adjust to the shocks in the system, 
particularly in the income sector, is a direct result of the nature of 
the feedback matrices, F^ _, and vindicates to some extent the comment 
contained in Chapter Two of the direction in the movement of the feedback
coefficients when costs on controls are increased relative to other costs.
Table 6 lists the feedback matrices for selected periods for IEB3.22
When assessing the impact of feedback effects one should bear in mind the
relative magnitudes of the variables of concern. (See the nominal target
paths set out in Chapter Four and the graphs presented in this chapter for
an indication of relative magnitudes.) The important point is that the
increase in costs on G in IEB3 compared with IEB2 has meant that the
optimal G in any period is less responsive to lagged values of the income
variables and FR and hence will be less responsive to past shocks to the
income sector and open sector than was the case in IEB2. In IEB2, G was
exceptionally responsive to past shocks. It will also be noticed from
Table 6 that while the income coefficients for IEB3 relevant to G have
declined in relation to IEB2 (coefficients for: Y = .17, C = -.12,t-1 t-1
= -.52, for IEB2 linear/quadratic solution), the monetary coefficients,
in particular the lagged interest rates, (with the exception of RS3t and
KL3^ __^ ) have increased making G more responsive to those variables
(coefficients for: FRt__1 = -.38, RS = -22.61, for IEB2 linear/quadratic
solution). However, as the shocks to those variables are minimal in
relation to Y, little adjustment is produced in G when we move from a
deterministic to a stochastic situation. The major contribution to the
formation of G comes from the additive vectors f . In contrast to Gt '
it can be seen that DM remains just as responsive to all lagged variables
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as it was in the corresponding IEB2 case. Note that in the fixed 
target solution to IEB2, all lagged variables play an integral part.
Of particular interest is the dominance of lagged FR in the feedback 
matrix thus explicitly illustrating why DM adjusts more readily to 
shocks in the open sector at the expense of the other sectors. The 
importance of FR  ^ in the feedback matrix also ensures that monetary 
policy is predominantly assigned to external balance and illustrates how 
the linear/quadratic procedure effectively employs all information within 
a reduced form to make a correct policy assignment.
Like G, DM is not subject to any direct shocks itself (by 
direct shocks we are referring to structural shocks associated with 
particular variables), yet its behaviour is strongly influenced by the 
shocks to the endogenous variables of the system as it is free to adjust 
in accordance with the requirements of the rest of the system, in 
particular in relation to FR as has been demonstrated above. In 
comparison with the deterministic case and the target, period 13 onwards 
is a period of strong contractionary monetary policy. A similar situation 
occurred in IEB2. However, in that case G was allowed to adjust freely 
as well and thus was able to take away some of the emphasis on monetary 
policy. In IEB3 G is unable to adjust so a more severe monetary policy 
is required to try and maintain the system objectives. This was true for 
all monte carlo repetitions as well as the illustrative example. The 
presence of uncertainty in the illustrative example and other unreported 
stochastic solutions, almost resulted in a reversal in the direction of 
monetary policy in the last few periods of the stochastic case as 
compared with the deterministic case. The possibility of this situation 
occurring suggests that serious consequences could arise for policy­
makers. In particular, the optimal mix of policy in both cases highlights
192
the problems that could result if policy is formulated on the basis of 
perfect information when in fact, because of uncertainty, an opposite 
or more severe policy is required to achieve the desired trade-off between 
objectives. The effects of applying an inappropriate policy are only 
too well known. The shift in the use of monetary policy from IEB2 to 
IEB3 (deterministic and stochastic) is illustrated by the appropriate 
RMSD's as follows:
RMSDDM
IEB2 IEB3
D 516 378
S 809 860
where the letters D and S refer to deterministic and stochastic 
respectively. Note that the deterministic DM in IEB3 was less severe 
than IEB2 while the stochastic DM in IEB3 was more severe than IEB2.
For the fourth experiment the emphasis on the control variables 
was reversed from IEB3. In IEB4, G was allowed to adjust freely while 
DM was forced to track closely to its target path. As before, high costs 
were placed on Y and FR and zero costs were assigned to all other 
state variables and as was the case with all other experiments, multiple 
cost matrices were used throughout the planning period in order to 
maintain the desired trade-offs. The relative weighting position (as 
distinct from the actual weights) was specified as,
Y FR G DM
1000 1000 1 1000
The requirement that G be used extensively rather than DM 
produced an optimal solution whereby both targets of internal and external 
balance were not simultaneously achieved. The deterministic results
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somewhat surprisingly reveal that the optimal path for Y was almost 
identical to that obtained in IEB3. The closeness of the overall result 
is indicated by the respective RMSDs which are 146 for IEB3 and 144 for 
IEB4, a negligible difference. The achievement of similar RMSDs was not 
due to the fact that one or two opposite and extreme levels of Y 
counterbalanced the other values to give the impression of an overall 
closeness of performance, but was a direct result of both paths being 
almost identical. The closeness of the two paths is illustrated by the 
fact that they could not be easily separated graphically and hence real Y, 
IEB4, has not been included in Figure 13. A strong burst of fiscal policy 
towards the end of the planning period is not sufficient to exactly 
achieve the internal balance target over the same period although it must 
be conceded that real Y has been effectively stabilised at an acceptable
level. Real consumption lies below its target as does total personal 
income and real disposable income. The increasing paths of Y and G are 
not sufficient to keep real consumption on target. Because of the 
simultaneous nature of the model, the failure of C to reach its target 
in turn helps prevent Y from consistently reaching its target. The
optimal paths of Y and G are sufficient however to generate an
optimal path for real I which exceeds its target, even though interest
rates are increasing severely over time. It should be noted that a strong 
movement in investment is not sufficient in itself to sustain a corresponding 
movement in real Y. Complementary movements must take place in 
consumption and government spending.
The behaviour of FR is not as acceptable as that of Y. It is 
apparent from the three preceding experiments that strong monetary policy 
aimed specifically at the external sector is required to achieve external 
balance. In this case, the requirement that DM follows its target
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implies that the authorities are aiming for a smooth domestic monetary 
expansion. In relation to the target of external balance, this is a 
passive policy and the results clearly show (see Figure 13) that it is 
incompatible with external balance. A smooth increase in domestic base 
money will have a continual negative impact on capital flows. An easy 
domestic monetary situation will mean that less foreign capital will be 
required. At the same time the optimal paths of Y and G generate an 
increasing time path for imports, thus upsetting the balance between 
capital flows and the current account balance. IEBl indicated the 
difficulties in moving FR back on target after it had moved off. The 
results from this experiment help to confirm that unless corrective 
monetary action takes place, severe undesirable fluctuations in foreign 
reserves will continue to occur.
The optimal path for DM does keep relatively close to its 
target except for the last few time periods where there is a slight 
deviation which suggests that as G is unable to keep both variables on 
target without policy anticipation. Without some movement in DM to 
complement G, the welfare costs associated with FR would have been 
exceptionally high. Even with the slight deviation in DM from its 
target the welfare costs compared with IEB3 are very high
IEB3 IEB4
welfare cost (D) 78.4 195.8
It can be seen from the above figures that even in a deterministic world, 
an attempt to achieve both targets without anticipation will result in a 
welfare loss of nearly 300% from the case where DM adjusts freely to the 
case where G adjusts freely. This suggests that if a policy is to be
passive then that policy should be fiscal policy as the results of IEB3
195
compared with IEB4 show that an excellent degree of stabilisation can be 
achieved by the use of monetary policy alone provided that the desired 
paths for Y and G are growing at approximately the same rate and there 
is an absence of severe price inflation. The increase in the value of 
the cost function from IEB3 to IEB4 is due almost entirely to FR as Y 
is virtually identical in both experiments.
Because of the trade-off between DM and FR, the smooth 
expansionary action of DM is offset and upset by FR. As a result 
the total monetary base and the money supply fail to follow a smooth 
expansionary time path. The time path of the money supply is further 
complicated by the short rate of interest which influences the money supply 
directly and at the same time is influenced by the money supply. The 
smooth expansion of DM, along with RS , produces a reasonably smooth 
expansion in M for the first half of the planning period. After period 
ten, the money supply begins to contract and does not return near to its 
target until the end of the planning period. The contraction is initially 
brought about by a fall in the short rate of interest generated by a 
decline in the demand for money (reflected in the nominal level of Y) 
relative to money supply. This type of behaviour was also present in IEB3 
but was more severe in the third experiment than the fourth. The shift in 
the emphasis of the intermediate monetary variables between IEB3 and IEB4 
can be illustrated by the relevant RMSDs
RMSDM RMSD „ RS RMSD T RL
IEB 3 703 1.80 1.27
IEB 4 362 1.71 1.23
The differences between the rates of interest are negligible while it is
apparent that there is a 50% improvement in the overall performance of M
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from IEB3 to IEB4. Even though there is little change in the performance 
of the rates of interest, their actual values may be of some concern as in 
both cases the levels become high towards the end of the planning period.
It appears that the goals of internal and external balance 
cannot be exactly achieved in an optimising framework if one instrument 
is restricted (although Y has been effectively but not exactly 
stabilised in all experiments), especially if the restricted instrument is 
the monetary instrument. As effective as fiscal policy is, it is not 
sufficient by itself (unless perhaps a fixed target approach is adopted) 
to move the economy in the desired direction. An appropriate mix of 
policy is required.
The stochastic solutions provide little additional information 
about the behaviour of the state variables and the trade-off between Y 
and FR. Y performs in a manner similar, in the illustrative example, 
to the deterministic case with the exception of a reasonably large 
contraction in periods twelve to sixteen (see Figure 15). The fact that 
G does not move to offset the shocks which contribute to the short 
contraction is an indication that, unlike DM in IEB3, G adjusts in 
response to movements in both targets rather than being predominantly 
assigned to Y. The coefficients of the feedback matrices presented in 
Table 7 confirm this assertion. An interesting feature of the feedback 
coefficients is that while G responds to both income and external/ 
monetary variables, the response to FR^ _  ^ declines towards the end of 
the planning period which is partly a result of scaling the cost weights 
to avoid cost function bias but at the same time the coefficient for DM 
increases over time to a point where the coefficient relating FR^ __^  
current G and DM is virtually equal in absolute terms (with different 
signs). The equality of the size of the coefficients accounts
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substantially for the deviation of DM from its target towards the end 
of the planning period in the deterministic solution and the even 
greater deviations found in stochastic solutions. The response of G to 
both targets results in a severe movement in G in the illustrative 
stochastic solution (as it did in other unreported experiments). The 
jRMSDs listed below indicate the shift in policy from deterministic to 
stochastic.
RMSD RMSDu !
D 95 10
S 240 65
% Change 250 600
The shift in the use of DM must be viewed with caution as the high 
percentage change is somewhat misleading. The high percentage change is 
due to the fact that DM showed very little target deviation in the 
deterministic case. Nevertheless, DM was forced to deviate under 
uncertainty but compared to G, the deviation of DM in the stochastic 
case was minor. The deviation of DM from its target in the stochastic 
solution IEB3 solution was of a similar percentage difference to the 
deterministic case as was the situation for G in IEB4 but it can be seen 
from the feedback coefficients and results for IEB3 that the adjustment was 
largely as a result of the external sector only. Towards the end of the 
planning period G declines relative to the deterministic case with the 
shocks once again being complementary to G in respect to stabilising the 
income target at a position close to its desired path. It has already 
been pointed out that DM was forced to move off target in the stochastic 
solutions and indeed in the illustrative example DM was subject to a 
noticeable contraction towards the end of the planning period. The
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important result arising from the stochastic solutions is that the more 
vigorous use of fiscal policy required to maintain internal and external 
balance in the absence of policy mix from the deterministic case which is 
able to keep real Y moving in the right direction but at the expense of 
the external balance target.
SINGLE TARGET ACHIEVEMENT AND A FURTHER COMMENT ON INSTRUMENT INSTABILITY
The preceding experiments show that the type of unstable behaviour 
predicted by the instrument instability test for one target, does not 
necessarily exist when an additional target is introduced and the 
instruments are required to trade off targets. Of course this result will 
not hold for all models and all targets but it does suggest that it is 
possible that even though the underlying structure of the system predicts 
a rapidly increasing or decreasing time path for a particular instrument 
aimed at one specific target, the need to trade-off targets and to offset 
exogenous influences may result in the explosive tendency being 
neutralised, eliminated or swamped by the additional requirements of the 
system and instruments. As such, the underlying instrument instability 
associated with a particular target will not be of any concern to the 
policy-maker from the point of view of taking some corrective action in the 
future to prevent an adverse response by the private sector manifested in 
detrimental changes in expectations and undetected (by the government) 
structural shifts, for example.
The single target instrument instability tests discussed in the 
preceding chapter indicated that fiscal policy directed specifically 
towards the external balance target with DM fixed at its desired level, 
resulted in an unstable income sector which fed back into the open sector
producing a destabilising influence thus requiring unstable compensatory
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responses by G which generated further instability. The identical 
instrument weightings used in IEB4 along with the inclusion of Y in 
the cost function with FR has removed this unstable instrument behaviour. 
Similarly, DM directed specifically at Y produced instrument problems 
which were subsequently eliminated by the inclusion of an additional target. 
DM also illustrated an explosive tendency when aimed at FR alone (due to 
the influence of CF). This explosive tendency was not detected in the 
four preceding experiments although it must be conceded that the inclusion 
of the historical exogenous variables may have been an important offsetting 
factor. Thus, an appropriate selection of multiple targets can eliminate 
single target instrument instability as distinct from Holbrook's original 
concept of instrument instability and Tumovsky' s later analysis within 
the linear/quadratic framework.
The problem of hitting a single target will be examined further 
within the context of external and internal balance. The experiments 
discussed will differ from the earlier single target experiments in that 
target paths growing over time are assigned to G, Y and DM as distinct 
from constant targets and the historical exogenous variables are included. 
The experiments are exercises in exact fine tuning and examine in turn the 
effects of hitting either the external balance or internal balance target 
on the remainder of the system and also examines whether or not undesirable 
instrument variations occur within a more realistic framework than the 
framework initially employed in the single target experiments. The 
relative cost function weightings for the six experiments are presented 
below. As before, multiple cost matrices were used to eliminate cost
function bias.
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Table 8
IEB5 - IEB10. Relative Cost Weights
Y FR G DM
IEB5 1000 0 . 1 . 1
IEB6 1000 0 1000 .1
IEB7 1000 0 .1 1000
IEB8 0 1000 . 1 . 1
IEB9 0 1000 1000 .1
IEB10 0 1000 .1 1000
Small positive costs are associated with the controls when both controls 
are freely adjusting to overcome the problem of a lack of uniqueness if 
zero instrument costs were allocated. Small costs were associated with the 
free instrument when the other is fixed to ensure the exact freedom of 
adjustment between experiments and to avoid any rank failures which may 
occur through computational rounding and so on. RMSD results for 
selected state variables and the instruments are given in Table 9 while 
selected time paths for Y and FR are presented in Figure 16. Note 
that the RMSDs cannot be compared between different variables due to 
different scaling and can only be compared between different experiments 
for the same variable. The first thing to be noted is that DM should 
not be assigned to the income target. The RMSD for DM indicates the 
severity of the policy required which produces the worst overall result 
for MB, FR and M for the six experiments. The interesting factor is 
that monetary policy is unstable even though fiscal policy follows its 
target exactly. We have seen above that if fiscal policy follows its 
target then Y will be stabilised very close to its desired path. To 
close the gap between Y and its target requires an unstable monetary
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policy, that is, a small movement in Y requires an exceptionally 
severe movement in DM. On the other hand fiscal policy should not be 
exclusively directed towards external balance when the domestic monetary 
base is allowed to follow a smooth time path. These results are perhaps 
not surprising as they reflect the concept of effective market 
classification put forward by Mundell (1962) some time ago and do not 
differ substantially from the results obtained in the single target 
instrument instability analysis. The achievement of both Y and FR 
individually using both instruments produces a feasible mix of policy 
with very little monetary policy being used to assist G in steering Y 
to its target while both instruments are used extensively to achieve the 
FR target. Reasons for this can be found in the reduced form where it can 
be seen that G strongly influences all sectors of the system as opposed 
to the limited impact of DM. Of the six experiments only four can be 
regarded as feasible in terms of the required policy mix. These are IEB5, 
IEB7, IEB8 and IEB9. A brief comment on particular policy specifications 
in light of the results obtained here and the earlier stability results is 
warranted. Firstly, the optimal monetary policy required in IEB9 is of a 
severe nature but feasible, with a time path that appears to be somewhat 
oscillatory. The earlier stability result for the identical cost function 
specification indicated a severe, almost explosive upward movement in DM. 
Can the two be reconciled? The answer is yes when it is remembered that in 
IEB9 exogenous variables are included not only directly in the FR 
relationship but also in the variables that feed back into FR and in 
addition G is following an increasing rather than constant time path.
The net result is that the optimal monetary policy indicates that DM is 
not explosive when coupled with FR when in fact the underlying structure 
of the system indicates that DM may be explosive. The implications of
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t h i s  a r e  o n ly  t o o  c l e a r .  An i n c o r r e c t  a s s e s s m e n t  o f  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  b y  t h e  p o l i c y  a u t h o r i t i e s  c o u l d  l e a d  t o  an 
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  w e i g h t i n g .  F o r  e x a m p le ,  t h e  m o n e ta r y  p o l i c y  
o f  IEB9 m ig h t  s u g g e s t  t h a t  DM i s  n o t  u n s t a b l e  and  t h e r e f o r e  no  
c o r r e c t i v e  a c t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d .  H ow ever ,  an e a s i n g  i n  t h e  v o l a t i l e  n a t u r e  
o f  t h e  u n c o n t r o l l a b l e  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  f u t u r e  may a l l o w  t h e  
s t r u c t u r e  t o  d o m in a te  t h e  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  
u n d e r l y i n g  e x p l o s i v e  n a t u r e  o f  DM w i l l  e m e rg e .  The a u t h o r i t i e s  may 
r e g a r d  t h i s  a s  a  s h o r t  r u n  p e r t u r b a t i o n  an d  n o t  t a k e  any  a c t i o n .
R e a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  p r o b le m  may n o t  o c c u r  u n t i l  i t  i s  t o o  l a t e  due  t o  t h e  
o r i g i n a l  m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  d y n am ic  s t a b i l i t y  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  
i n s t r u m e n t .  The s e c o n d  s e t  o f  i m p o r t a n t  r e s u l t s  c o n c e r n s  IEB10 i n  w h ich  
t h e  m o s t  s e v e r e  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  i s  e m p lo y e d .  The o p t i m a l  G o b t a i n e d  i n  
t h i s  e x p e r i m e n t  i s  one  i n  w h ic h  t h e  t i m e  p a t h  f l u c t u a t e s  s e v e r e l y  i n  a 
m an n er  w h ich  s h o u l d  n o t  b e  a c c e p t a b l e  t o  any  p l a n n i n g  a u t h o r i t y .  H ow ever,  
i n  t h e  e a r l i e r  s t a b i l i t y  e x p e r i m e n t s  i t  was c l a i m e d  t h a t  g i v e n  t h e  same c o s t  
w e i g h t i n g s  a s  IEB10 an d  c o n s t a n t  t a r g e t s  a n d  c o n s t a n t  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s ,  
t h e  o p t i m a l  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  e x h i b i t e d  a  t e n d e n c y  t o  move i n  a  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  
s e v e r e  downward d i r e c t i o n .  I n  t h i s  c a s e  we h a v e  a  s i t u a t i o n  i n  w h ic h  t h e  
u n d e r l y i n g  t e n d e n c y  o f  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t  t o  s e e m i n g l y  e x p l o d e  dow nw ards h a s  
b e e n  r e p l a c e d  b y  a  s e v e r e l y  f l u c t u a t i n g  t i m e  p a t h .  The c o n c l u s i o n  t o  be  
draw n h e r e  i s  t h a t  t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  h a s  i n  t h i s  c a s e  b e e n  g e n e r a t e d  s o l e l y  
by  t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  an d  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  
d e s i r e d  t i m e  p a t h  f o r  FR and  i s  n o t  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  s t r u c t u r e .  
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h e n  t h a t  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  s y s t e m  can  
l e a d  t o  i n c o r r e c t  c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  i n s t r u m e n t  i n s t a b i l i t y  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  
s y s t e m  u n l e s s  a  f o r m a l  a n a l y s i s  i s  p u r s u e d  o r  t h e  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  h a v e  
v e r y  l i t t l e  im p a c t  o r  a r e  h e l d  c o n s t a n t .  A l th o u g h  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  h a s  n o t
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arisen here, the importance of the exogenous variables in the dynamic 
behaviour of the system suggests that it would be possible to conclude 
that instrument instability exists in the system when in fact the system 
does not reveal any underlying tendency for the instruments to explode 
over the time period of concern. Even in the case where all endogenous 
variables are weighted and positive costs are allocated to all instruments, 
it would be easy to conclude through simulation studies that instrument 
instability does exist if the movement in exogenous variables is severe 
over the time span of concern, when in fact pure instrument instability of 
the type discussed by Tumovsky cannot exist. ^  This could lead to an 
unnecessary increased weighting of an instrument.
Returning now to the original internal and external balance 
framework of this chapter, it is reasonable to conclude that aiming for 
either target on an individual basis will cause distruptions to the rest 
of the system and in particular aiming for an FR target will result in a 
trade-off with Y and similarly aiming for Y will produce a trade-off 
with FR. It is clear that we can do better by aiming for both targets, 
even with one instrument restricted. Experiments IEB5 to IEB10 are of 
course extreme examples of exact fine timing and should only be treated as 
polar cases as it is fairly obvious that a government will not 
continuously focus on a balance of payments target at the expense of the 
income sector. The experiments are useful for placing outer limits on the 
trade-off between internal and external balance and indicating how single 
target instrument instability can be disguised or mistakenly indicated 
when time variant targets and time variant exogenous variables are
present in the system.
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DETERMINISTIC CONTROLS IN A STOCHASTIC WORLD
If optimal control or fixed target approaches to macroeconomic 
stabilisation are to be used in real world applications then the problems 
of unforeseen shocks to the system will become important. Carrying out 
monte carlo experiments will not give us the desired result for a 
particular cost function specification because we could never know before­
hand what the actual disturbances will be. In the linear/quadratic 
framework the control laws are self-adjusting to additive perturbations 
but for practical purposes this will not be sufficient as we have argued 
in Chapter Two, because for a variety of reasons, government will not be 
able to react instantaneously (at least in a quarterly model) to the past 
periods' disturbances except perhaps in the case of open market operations 
by the central bank. If control techniques are only to be used for 
historical evaluation and as part of the learning process in gaining 
additional information about the behaviour of the system and the reaction to 
possible policy combinations, then it is feasible to simulate the system 
with stochastic disturbances. The use of control techniques for future 
planning will not be able to account for future stocks or adjust in time 
to account for them when they occur. The preceding analysis has shown 
quite clearly that while additive disturbances do not necessarily result in 
a change in the trade-off between targets, significant adjustment can 
occur in the instrument mix if instruments are in fact able to adjust in 
accordance with past shocks. This suggests that a knowledge of the size 
and direction of past shocks would be of crucial importance in actual 
stabilisation situations (of course policy planners cannot be sure of 
current shocks, particularly in the income sector) and if some attempt 
is not made to incorporate them into the stabilisation plan, serious 
sub-optimal behaviour could occur.24 To gain some insight into this
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behaviour, the first four experiments were re-computed in a manner which 
firstly calculated the optimal controls in a perfect information 
framework and then implemented the controls in a stochastic environment.
The values of the welfare function for the particular target and instrument 
weightings were calculated with the welfare cost indicating the amount of 
desired path deviation when deterministic costs are implemented in a 
stochastic world. Two distinct sets of experiments were carried out. 
Firstly, the average welfare cost was computed from monte carlo 
replications and secondly a specific example was computed to illustrate 
some of the economic implications. The illustrative example employed the 
same shocks as those used in the internal and external balance experiments 
to enable a meaningful comparison to be carried out. The experiments are 
identified as IEBll, IEB12, IEB13 and IEB14 and correspond to the first 
four internal and external balance experiments. The general results are 
presented in the following table. The welfare cost in the monte carlo 
case was computed in the usual manner by averaging out the welfare costs of 
all replications. Selected results are graphed in Figure 17.
Table 10
JEB11 - IEB14. Welfare Comparison
D Illust. MonteCarlo
IEBll .223 17.5 15
IEB12 0 1131.8 960
IEB13 COr- 1059.6 900
IEB14 195.7 1514.1 1070
Note that "D" refers to the deterministic or certainty solution to IEB1,
IEB2, IEB3 and IEB4 and that the welfare cost for the final three experiments 
is greater than the first due to the difficult scaling of weights.
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The monte carlo averages lie below the illusxrative costs due to the fact 
that the same set of weights was employed in each example with those 
weights producing a solution lying closer to the upper bound replication 
than to the average- Nonetheless the same general results hold. The 
increase in the size of the value of the welfare function from deterministic 
to stochastic should be viewed with caution and not taken too literally or 
as a general rule as the result will depend on the size of the weights 
used. Smaller weights will give a smaller increase and vice versa.
The most striking result which can be obtained from inspecting 
the values in Table 10 is that the implementation of controls developed 
under the assumption of certainty (whether by choice or necessity) in a 
stochastic world is potentially disastrous from a stabilisation point of 
view. All experiments indicate a very significant increase in welfare loss 
but perhaps the most surprising result is that the case of two targets, two 
instruments which results in exact deterministic target achievements and 
near exact stochastic achievement when the controls are allowed to adjust 
instantaneously to past shocks, is not as acceptable in cost terms as 
IEB13 when the fiscal instrument is fixed. That is, we can do better by
aiming for two targets with only one active instrument than allowing both
instruments to be active when past shocks are not incorporated into the
solution. The reason for this can be seen from the results of IEB2 where
an extensive monetary policy was required in the deterministic case and 
on even more severe monetary policy was required in the stochastic 
solution, indicating the high degree of importance attached to being 
able to adequately compensate for disturbances.
The main cause of the increase in welfare exhibited in Table 10 
is the behaviour of FR which, as we have seen, has a tendency to move 
rapidly off target if additive disturbances are not corrected for. On
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the other hand, Y is reasonably stabilised in most cases and is a direct 
result of shocks to the income sector being of considerably smaller 
relative magnitude than shocks to the open and monetary sectors. The size 
of the shocks is of course a direct result of the structural estimation 
where the income sector provides "a better fit" to the data than the open 
sector. This situation is not too far removed from the real world as it 
is likely that the open sector would be subject to greater unforeseen 
shocks than the income sector due to the inability of planners and fore­
casters to adequately predict what will happen in the world economy and how 
the world economy will affect Australia.
The results also suggest that a quarterly model may not be 
sufficient for planning purposes when the foreign sector is incorporated 
in the model. Reasons for this have been suggested in Chapter Three 
and further elaboration and evidence is provided in Chapter Eight. The 
major objection to a quarterly model is that it does not allow monetary 
policy to operate in the very short run such as monthly or weekly which 
is the case with actual monetary policy (open market operations) in 
Australia (and other countries for that matter). The result is that 
cumulative shocks could occur. It is also likely that the monetary 
authorities will have sufficient information about shocks contained 
in the previous quarters' reserves to allow instantaneous adjustment of 
the monetary instrument for the current quarter, but not so for the 
income sector and fiscal policy which is subject to a wide variety of 
lags and implementation problems which require that future levels of 
spending be determined some time before that level is manifested in the 
system. The experiments reveal in a graphic way what could occur if the 
authorities are forced to plan in advance of the planning period and are 
therefore unable to fully take account of any shocks. Even stochastic
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forecasts of the future will not be adequate as we can only attempt to 
predict "average" shocks (which of course will converge to zero) and effects 
when in fact single shocks occur in any given time period. Once again, the 
analysis would perhaps suggest that optimal control would be better 
confined to historical evaluation and insight about possible policy 
combinations, rather than actual planning due to the effects of uncertainty. 
The results presented above can only be regarded as an extreme example as 
different instruments will be capable of instantly adjusting to past shocks 
such as S.R.D. ratios and tax rates but only if the correct information 
is forthcoming about the value of the lagged state vector, x^ ^.25 
Further information about the behaviour of the system under deterministic 
control in an uncertain world will be provided by experiments in following 
chapters.
HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF OPTIMAL ECONOMIC POLICIES
Assuming that the model adequately reflects the basic instrument 
responses of the Australian economy then it is fairly clear from the results 
that the government could have done better in relation to the targets of 
internal and external balance by allowing the monetary instrument to be 
more active. The results of IEB1 indicate that the two targets could be 
stabilised more effectively than the historical performance, even with 
restricted instruments, when a set of structural coefficients are available 
to the planner. Of course, the government of the day may have had a 
different set of preferences in mind and may have been more concerned with 
stabilising Y, FR and additional targets such as M and C. The historical 
time path of DM indicates, as we have said, that the authorities appeared 
to be cautious in the application of the monetary instrument. The fact 
that historically, the monetary instrument was not used in a stop-go 
manner as severely as the optimal monetary policy in IEB1, IEB2 and IEB3
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(see Figure 12) doesn't necessarily rule out an historical cost function 
specification of only Y and FR but could just reflect a lack of information 
and it should be recalled that the preceding experiments assumed full 
information about the structure, the uncontrollable exogenous variables 
and in the stochastic case, certainty about the distribution of the errors, 
even if the exact value of the stocks were not known until after they 
occurred.
To gain a depper insight into the historical performance of 
stabilisation policy it would be beneficial to know the specification of 
the governments cost function, if indeed it had one, over the period of 
concern. Theoretically this is a simple matter. We began with a specific 
set of preferences, a model whose structure was known with certainty and 
certainty about the exogenous variables. From this information linear 
feedback equations were obtained. It should be clear that we can work 
backwards starting with the feedback equations and ultimately determining 
the initial preferences. However, this procedure would break down in a 
real world analysis as it would depend on having the absolutely correct 
model specification and estimation which exactly characterised the economy 
and furthermore, was known with certainty by the planning authorities of 
the time. Several attempts have been made to carry out this type of 
analysis beginning with the early work of Wood (1967) and more recently 
Friedlaender (1973). The results are unconvincing, for example, the 
work by Friedlaender abstracts from the large number of exogenous 
variables that are present in the system and assumes that the governments 
preferences were quadratic, and that the Wharton model is an exact 
replica of the economy. Even the abstraction from exogenous variables 
in the system will make the estimation of historical feedback equations 
untenable. This is clear from the preceding analysis. The feedback
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matrices presented in Tables 6 and 7 show that the optimal control in any 
period depended substantially on the past behaviour of the system and 
upon the newly defined auxiliary variables of the state space realisation. 
What they do not show is that the additive vector, f ^ , is equally as 
important and this vector varies substantially from period to period as it 
is largely a function of the exogenous variables. Table 11 indicates the 
degree of divergence of f per time period for experiments IEBl, IEB2,
IEB3 and IEB4.
IEBl
IEB2
IEB3
IEB4
Table 11
Additive vector, f , - selected periods. 
Period Period Period
1 10 20
G 1290 1456 2180
DM 970 1264 476
G 1427 1592 1885
DM -3956 -4283 -2975
G 1110 1158 1527
DM -3553 -3930 -2957
G 110 - 113 1819
DM 891 1110 1472
How then in a least squares estimation can the correct intercept term be 
found? The relevant feedback matrices also show how the coefficients of 
particular lagged state variables can differ considerably over time. For 
example the coefficient relating G to lagged FR for periods one, ten and 
twenty in IEB4. A least squares estimation will yield only one coefficient 
for a particular variable. Chow (1972a) has also attempted a crude 
historical analysis of policy by working in reverse to the formation of 
optimal policy by initially estimating historical feedback matrices, using 
the lagged variables of his model as the explanatory variables. The
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analysis cannot be regarded as a significant contribution as the model 
contains no exogenous variables whereas the simplicity of the model suggests 
that important areas have been omitted which could have been treated as 
exogenous and the amount of endogenous feedback is limited. The net result 
is that the least squares estimated intercept, f , and the optimally derived 
intercept do not tally as could be expected with a further result being 
that the feedback coefficients cannot possibly be correct. Furthermore, 
the least squares version of the historical feedback matrices only explain 
approximately two percent of the variation in monetary and fiscal policy 
and while the coefficient of determination should not be considered the be- 
all and end-all of the acceptability of an equation, it does suggest 
that among other things, either Chow's model is substantially incorrect or 
that the government did not have a set of quadratic preferences or the 
same targets as Chow (assuming that the model is correct). In either case 
the results are highly dubious and substantially inferior to Friedlaender's 
approach. The exclusion of relevant exogenous variables, however, will 
ensure that the "true" intercept cannot be obtained unless of course the 
government used the identical model to that proposed by Chow to carry out 
stabilisation policy - a highly unlikely occurrence in view of the 
exceptionally crude nature of the model. As a further example of the 
futility of attempting to work in reverse to obtain historical preferences, 
a similar exercise to Friedlaender's (although Friedlaender did not 
include the auxiliary variables which are important - see Tables 6 and 7) 
and Chow's was carried out using the model employed in this study. The 
results, as could be expected, are worthless due to the multicollinearity 
between the large number of lagged variables which appear as explanatory 
variables in the feedback equations for G and DM and for the reasons
outlined above. The results have there fore not been included. An attempt
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to remove the multicollinearity by deleting variables or aggregating 
variables did not rectify the problem and even if it did, the aggregation 
and deletion of variables would ensure that the true feedback equations 
would not be obtained and even if the model was the unique, exact, true 
replica of the economy, the incorrect feedback matrices would result in 
incorrect preferences being obtained.
What value then is an attempt to analyse the historical 
behaviour of stabilisation policy? The attempts to systematically ascertain 
past policy and target preferences are extremely limited given the existing 
state of knowledge. The argument outlined above only touches the surface 
of the problem but serves to indicate the limitations. The best method 
in the absence of a knowledge of historical preferences is probably to 
simply compare optimal and historical results^ and assuming that the model 
adequately represents the trade-offs and policy impacts in the system 
(although the exact structure of the economy may differ from the model); 
then evaluate the relevant policies in light of the similarities between 
the general behaviour of historical and computedsituations. To reiterate, 
using this technique it would be reasonable to conclude that the Australian 
government did not specifically aim for internal and external balance alone, 
or if they did they were largely unsuccessful due to the lack of adequate 
adjustment in the monetary instrument in particular (see Figure 12 for 
historical DM). Note that comparisons are carried out in terms of 
deterministic results as presumably historical shocks would be built into 
the data used to estimate the structural coefficients. Y has not been 
specifically analysed as it was reasonably well stabilised historically 
and effectively stabilised in the first four experiments of this chapter.
The results obtained in this chapter show that the simultaneous 
achievement of internal and external balance under a fixed exchange rate
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regime can only be exactly achieved in the deterministic case and then 
only if both monetary and fiscal policy are allowed to adjust freely.
Even in the presence of additive disturbances, internal and external 
balance can be almost exactly achieved but only by using both 
instruments in a rigorous fashion. The results also indicate that the 
monetary instrument should only be directed towards external balance 
(rather than internal balance) which is an example of Mundell^s (1962) 
Principle of Effective Market Classification and which concurs with the 
theoretical results obtained by Turnovsky (forthcoming). In terms of 
exact fine tuning, it can be seen that the system can be effectively 
stabilised with one instrument or effectively stabilised with many targets 
and the instruments weighted equally with the targets, and the closing 
of the usually small gap between acceptable time paths for Y and FR 
and the respective targets required a considerable shift in the use of the 
instruments, particularly monetary policy. Pindyck (1973a) has shown how 
it may be necessary in a closed economy for the optimal monetary policy 
to be a policy which consists of strong bursts. A similar conclusion 
holds for the open case when the open sector target of external balance 
is added to the closed target of a specified level of income. The results 
show that monetary policy, in contrast to fiscal policy, is used in strong 
expansions and contractions in a stop-go manner, except when monetary 
policy is explicitly prevented from deviating from its target path.
The introduction of additive disturbances prevents exact fine 
tuning and results in a substantial welfare loss which concurs with the 
results of Chow (1972a), Pindyck and Roberts (1974) and Garbade (1975a) 
for example. In addition, the introduction of additive disturbances 
resulted in the optimal mix of policies changing relative to the 
deterministic results with the change in some cases being quite dramatic,
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particularly in monetary policy, although it must be conceded that 
in many cases (not all) the characteristics or general behaviour of the 
optimal stochastic policies do not differ greatly from the deterministic 
results. The emphasis on different instruments can change, for example, 
the mix of policy from a strong use of both policies to a more extensive 
use of monetary policy and a less vigorous fiscal policy in the stochastic 
case. Turnovsky (1975) has shown how the introduction of parameter 
uncertainty can lead to a switch in the choice of optimal instrument. 
Although Turnovsky's theoretical work refers to the optimal choice of 
monetary instrument, it is still possible to make a general comparison.
The experiments reported in this chapter illustrate how the presence of 
additive disturbances can switch the emphasis placed on particular 
instruments. Of course, structure of the problem does not allow the
complete exclusion of one instrument as can be done in Turnovsky's 
framework but nevertheless there are clear switches in preference between 
the extensive use of a particular instrument relative to another. In 
this general aspect, the results provide some empirical support for the 
theoretical work without resorting to parameter uncertainty.
The problems associated with achieving internal and external 
balance in either a deterministic or stochastic framework under a fixed 
exchange regime, are highlighted by the trade-off between the monetary 
instrument, foreign reserves, capital flows and the total monetary base. 
Any attempt to neutralise the effect of foreign reserves on the domestic 
economy necessitates strong monetary action which produces instability 
in the monetary sector. Under these circumstances, external balance may 
not be a desirable target. The instability in the monetary sector raises 
the possibility of incorporating a monetary target, for example the rate 
of interest, as a major target in the cost functions of policy planners.
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Experiments which feature the incorporation of monetary targets in the 
cost function along with Y and FR are reported in the chapter on the 
fixed target approach to stabilisation.
The results presented in this chapter have a broader application 
than merely to the problem of achieving internal and external balance.
The results illustrate quite graphically the problems that can arise from 
imperfect information. The co-ordination and control of economic activities 
becomes extremely difficult under uncertainty. This is especially so when 
the presence of uncertainty gives rise to different and sometimes opposite 
policy applications to those required under certainty. If policy is 
formulated, whether optimal or non-optimal, on the assumption of full 
information, then incorrect policies can easily be applied with disastrous
results.
CHAPTER VI
OPTIMAL ACHIEVEMENT OF MONETARY TARGETS
A common approach to the theory of monetary policy is to treat 
the money supply as an instrument which the central bank can directly 
manipulate in the same manner as government spending. Similarly, in many 
instances it is convenient to treat the rate of interest as an instrument 
variable. The treatment of the money supply and the rate of interest as 
instruments has not been solely confined to the theoretical literature. 
Applied econometric studies have for a long time treated the money supply, 
in particular, as a control or exogenous variable. (There are of course 
examples of studies treating both variables as being endogenous but these 
are in the main restricted to the few very large models that have been 
constructed.) The treatment of the money supply and the rate of interest 
as controls is of course a simplified abstraction, even in a deterministic 
world. Both variables are in fact endogenous and are simultaneously 
determined by the interaction of other endogenous variables in the system 
and the genuine monetary and fiscal instruments available to the authorities. 
In this respect a more appropriate view to adopt in relation to the money 
supply and the rate of interest would be to treat both variables as 
proximate targets through which the achievement of what we may term 
ultimate targets, (income, unemployment, inflation and so on) can be 
attained by stabilising our proximate targets in accordance with some 
specified set of target values. Implicit in this approach is the belief 
that there is some unique link between proximate targets and the ultimate 
targets in the system. Even in a deterministic world, the simultaneous 
link between the money supply and the rate of interest may be so 
significant that the monetary authorities are prevented from achieving
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targets for both,unless both targets are perfectly consistent. In the case 
of incompatible monetary targets it would be necessary to trade-off 
targets or drop the desire to hit both targets and aim for either one.
If the economy is closed and the only ultimate target is, for example, 
real income, it could quite reasonably be concluded that either proximate 
target would be appropriate. When the system is opened up the choice of 
proximate target becomes complicated by the reaction of the open sector 
to the achievement of a particular target and more importantly by the 
feedback of the open sector into the system as a whole, particularly the 
monetary sector. This may exclude both the money supply and the rate of 
interest as proximate targets to be directly aimed for.
In this chapter, the choice of proximate target will be studied 
in the framework of the model developed in Chapter 3. In particular, the 
trade-offs between M, RL and MB will be studied along with the effects of 
hitting a monetary target on the ultimate objectives of Y and FR. The 
results of the preceding chapter suggested that if policy planners wish to 
maintain internal and external balance then some instability in the money 
supply and the rates of interest must be tolerated. A further aim of this 
chapter will be to determine whether or not the reverse is also true.
That is, will the achievement of a proximate target produce instability 
in the internal and external sectors? If instability does result then 
serious doubt must be placed on utilizing the concept of proximate targets. 
The use of what may be termed "true" controls to achieve a proximate 
monetary target should not be confused with the monetary instrument problem, 
although in some respects they are closely related (Waud (1973)), which 
first appeared in Pooles' (1970) seminar paper and which has been the 
subject of a profuse literature since. See for example Moore (1972),
Sargent (1971), Turnovsky (1975) and Kareken (1970). It should be noted
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that the instrument problem as defined in Poole and subsequent papers, 
only becomes non-trivial in a stochastic theoretic framework. The 
proximate monetary target problem as presented here can be non-trivial 
in a deterministic world depending on the behaviour of the remainder of the 
system, particularly the behaviour of the ultimate targets and the degree 
of adjustment required by the controls. The results that follow support 
this assertion.
The work of Pindyck and Roberts (1974) (1976) (PR) has probably
been the predominant applied study of recent times in relation to 
studying the effects of hitting a money supply or interest rate target in 
an optimising framework. This is not to say that PR have produced the only 
work in this area, for example Friedman (1975a) and Garbade (1975a) have 
also addressed monetary problems via an optimising framework, but the 
work of PR has probably been the most specific and has appeared in journals 
which has ensured a wide readership by control theorists. For these reasons, 
the results presented in this chapter are specifically compared with the PR 
results. Before proceeding to a discussion of the experiments it is worth 
noting that the PR studies suffer from treating the monetary sector in 
isolation with the consequence the Y is treated as exogenous.2b Placing 
the monetary sector into a fully integrated model would mean that every 
adjustment to M or RL would produce a response in Y which would in turn 
produce a further adjustment in the proximate targets. The model used in 
this study is a modest attempt to incorporate feedback from sector to 
sector and as we shall see in the experiments that follow, the presence of 
such a feedback results in fiscal policy being able to be manipulated in 
response to monetary targets as well as income variables, a feature which 
is absent from PR's analysis. A model which incorporates both monetary 
and income sectors in a close interrelationship highlights the problems of
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decentralised policy making when any action by fiscal authorities who 
may be aiming exclusively for an income target, results in monetary 
adjustments which can shift the money supply, for example, off the 
monetary authorities target path and vice versa.
One further point needs to be discussed and that is if we have 
a complete structural system, why bother to aim for proximate targets in 
the first place? The question is valid but it is a fact of life that 
monetary authorities persist in adhering to monetary targets, particularly 
the money supply, regardless of the compatability of such a target with 
any specified time path for Y, for example. By focusing solely on the 
achievement of a monetary target information can be obtained firstly 
about any trade-offs between monetary variables and secondly information 
can be gained about trade-offs between monetary variables and the remainder 
of the system.
The experiments that follow focus on the achievement of one 
particular proximate monetary target. The targets for M, RL, RS and MB 
are those which are specified in Chapter 4 and once again a twenty period 
time horizon is used. The retention of the exact experimental structure 
to that employed in the internal and external balance.experiments ensures 
that valid comparisons between experiments can be made. The experiments 
that follow are identified by the letter M and a numeral designating the 
number of each monetary experiment.
THE OPTIMAL ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MONEY SUPPLY TARGET
The first experiment (Ml) consisted of forcing the money supply 
to follow its target and at the same time emphasising monetary policy 
relative to fiscal policy with the relative weighting in the cost function
being -
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M G DM
2000 500 1
Following Chapter 4, weights were adjusted each time period to avoid cost 
function bias and to ensure that the above relativity was maintained for 
the entire planning period. Even though the weight on G is high, with the 
weight on M being four times that on G we would expect some adjustment in 
G to complement DM.
The optimal results indicate that the achievement of a steady 
growth in the supply of money is feasible, although the money supply did 
not hit its target until approximately half way through the planning period. 
One would expect that under conditions of certainty and instantaneous 
policy response (within the unit time period), monetary policy could be 
manipulated to keep M on target. It must be concluded that the relatively 
greater restriction placed on fiscal policy has been the influencing 
factor with the adjustment in G being less than expected. If fiscal policy 
was allowed to adjust freely then some of the emphasis could be removed 
from the use of monetary policy, suggesting that fiscal policy needs to be 
specifically directed towards the money supply target (allocated zero costs 
in the cost function).
In relation to the target for DM, monetary policy has been used 
extensively and severely throughout the planning period. The optimal path 
is characterised by huge expansions and contractions. It is doubtful if 
the private sector could be persuaded to shift its portfolio composition 
in such a drastic manner in such a short time, thus throwing some doubt 
on the feasibility of this action. The severe monetary policy required to 
achieve the money supply target has important consequences for the 
remainder of the monetary and open sector variables. Severe upward and
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downward pressures on the term structure of interest rates has occurred.
The short rate drops to 2.44% in period sixteen and then climbs to 10.0% 
four periods later. The close relationship between the long rate and the 
short rate means that the optimal path of the long rate will closely follow 
that of the short (the behavioural pattern not the values). This does occur 
with the long rate falling to 3.0% in period sixteen. Figure 19 indicates 
the severity of the movement in the long rate. The behaviour of the rates 
of interest indicate that given the relative importance attached to monetary 
policy, fiscal policy and the money supply, the pursuit of a money supply 
target will induce instability into asset markets. The model is not 
sophisticated enough to capture the full effects of asset market 
instability but it seems reasonable to suggest that such instability in 
interest rates could have far reaching effects on the financial sector, 
particularly through changes in expectations and possible loss of 
confidence experienced by financiers and investors. If orderly asset 
markets are deemed to be highly desirable then an interest rate proximate 
target may be more appropriate.
So far we have ignored the consequences of pegging the money 
supply on the ultimate targets such as Y and FR. The optimal path for 
real Y is stable and feasible as it tracks reasonably close to its target 
(Figure 18) with the exception of the final time periods in which monetary 
policy is restrictive. However, the divergence is not severe as G is 
close to its target and is of an expansionary nature which tends to 
partially offset monetary policy. In contrast to Y, FR, or the external 
balance position, is very unstable. This is a result of the severe stop-go 
optimal monetary policy which in turn results in huge variations in 
government generated domestic liquidity. As a result of the portfolio 
equilibrium nature of capital flows, substantial compensating movements
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in capital inflow are induced, creating a similar movement in foreign 
reserves. Note that while monetary policy upsets the external sector, 
the external sector feedback into the monetary sector induces even more 
instability in monetary policy as the monetary instrument must then be 
used to offset this feedback. The instability generated in the interest 
rates and the open sector seems to indicate that if the authorities wish 
to hit a money supply target then the reliance on monetary policy to the 
exclusion of fiscal policy, which intuitively seems to be a reasonable 
course of action to adopt, is not a particularly satisfactory mix of 
policy. Fiscal policy is also required.
The second experiment (M2) consisted of once again allocating 
very high costs to deviations of the money supply from its target but 
at the same time fiscal policy was weighted equally with monetary policy 
to try and remove the instability found in experiment one. The relative 
weights of the variables were as follows -
M G DM
2000 1 1
The money supply is exactly on target from the beginning of the planning 
period to the end. The relaxation of the restriction ön G has resulted 
in a significant shift in the optimal mix of policy from that obtained in 
experiment one and confirms the earlier assertion that fiscal policy is 
required in addition to monetary policy to achieve a money supply target 
in an open economy. The stop-go, excessive and probably unobtainable 
optimal monetary policy of the previous experiment has been replaced by a 
relatively smooth expansion of base money, only occasionally interrupted 
by a more severe expansionay movement whereupon the optimal path returns 
to a steady expansion almost immediately after. The nature of the optimal
monetary policy implies a more restrained intervention by the central
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bank into the asset market and greater stability in the composition of 
the private sector's portfolios.
The implementation of a more subdued monetary policy has meant 
that a more extensive and expansionary fiscal policy to that obtained in 
Ml has been employed (see Figure 20). Recall that in experiment one 
G was largely on target. In some respects the broad behavioural pattern 
of G resembles the behaviour of DM in the first experiment, thus in 
effect, combining with a stable monetary policy to produce a reversal 
in the application of both instruments. The change in the policy mix has 
not substantially altered the optimal path for real Y. The strong bursts 
in fiscal policy required to keep M on target, combined with the steady 
monetary policy, have the effect of keeping Y close to its desired time 
path. This is a particularly encouraging result as it allows the planning 
authorities to select a mix of policy which is as complementary to the 
income sector as it is to the monetary sector. The fact that a 1.5% 
quarterly increase in the money supply is consistent with policy 
stability and a time path for real Y which tracks close to its desired 
path (see Figure 18) supports the contention that under certain 
circumstances it would appear to be feasible to focus on a proximate 
target. The acceptability of such a situation depends on the behaviour of 
the rest of the system.
A close inspection of the structural equations reveals that 
there is a trade-off between DM, FR, CF and MB which has a direct impact 
on the money supply. If the money base and hence money supply are forced 
to follow a smooth path then substantial adjustment would need to take 
place in the external sector. In experiment one, FR carried the burden 
of adjustment over the other non-control and non-proximate target
variables. The results of this experiment reveal that the behaviour of
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FR has been improved (along with DM) which of course is a direct result 
of the more subdued monetary policy. Fiscal policy generates a greater 
degree of fluctuation in the current balance than in the previous 
experiment but the influence of monetary policy in the capital flows 
equation ensures that capital flows do not fluctuate erratically as before 
and contributes to the increased stabilisation of the open sector. As 
before, the feedback from the open sector to the monetary sector is 
important but in this case it is complementary to monetary policy in the 
sense that severe monetary policy is not required. The other area of 
importance is the behaviour of the interest rates. Figure 19 reveals that 
the severe cyclical movement which was characteristic of the first 
experiment has been eliminated. After an initial decline the otpimal path 
settles down to a continued expansion; a trend which may need to be 
reversed in the future to overcome any detrimental effects on investment 
and income. This again raises the question of whether or not an interest 
rate target would be more appropriate.
The results presented so far indicate that an appropriate 
weighting of monetary and fiscal policy can produce a mix of policy which 
will keep the money supply increasing at a constant rate and which is 
consistent with a stable optimal path for Y, traditionally regarded as 
the major ultimate target. We can also obtain an acceptable set of time 
paths for interest rates and external balance although it must be pointed 
out that a trade-off between M, RS and hence RL does occur as was 
suggested in the introduction, a trade-off which can become severe with 
an inappropriate policy weighting. The results also indicate that we can 
follow a Friedman type rule although we are operating in a non-Friedman 
World subject to requiring that both fiscal and monetary policy be 
directed towards the money supply target. This last requirement rules
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out the possibility of setting government spending in accordance with 
political and social welfare requirements, that is, treating it as passive 
in relation to the economic requirements of the system as in experiment Ml.
THE OPTIMAL ACHIEVEMENT OF THE INTEREST RATE TARGET
Theoretical work on the choice of proximate target generally 
consists of choosing the money supply or 'the' rate of interest with only 
one rate being present in the model. The model presented in this paper 
contains both a short and long rate linked by a simple term structure thus 
permitting only one rate to be directly controlled. As the long rate, RL, 
directly influences income it would seem appropriate to focus on this rate 
for policy purposes. This procedure will of course break the direct 
simultaneous link between the money supply and the short rate. The term 
structure ensures that if we force the long rate to follow its target we 
will also be imposing a highly restricted time path on the short rate, 
effectively pegging it and indirectly maintaining any trade-offs which 
may be present in the model.
The third experiment to be reported (M4) assigns high costs to 
deviations of RL from its target and zero costs to all other state 
variables. The relative weightings were as follows -
RL G DM
2000 1 1
The results indicate that RL was on target throughout the planning period 
with the achievement of the proximate target being consistent with total 
instability in the income sector. The instability arises from directing 
fiscal policy through CB, CF and M to achieve the interest rate target. 
Figure 21 illustrates what must be foregone in terms of national income 
to achieve the interest rate target. We have in fact a reversal in the
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result obtained in M2 where both instruments were also assigned to the 
proximate target. Rather than having freely adjusting instruments 
being consistent with stability as in experiment two, we now have freely 
adjusting instruments being consistent with instability. The results of 
the third experiment are indicative of a situation in which the 
achievement of the interest rate target results in a trade-off between 
the income sector and the money supply and open sector with the income 
sector being totally unacceptable. The pegging of the rate of interest 
has not produced instability in the money supply. In comparison with 
experiment one this is a more satisfactory result as in the initial 
experiment the achievement of the money supply target resulted in severe 
fluctuations in RL. The external balance position, FR, is also acceptable 
in comparison with the two previous experiments. Of particular importance 
is the absence of the severe rundown in foreign reserves found in 
experiment one. The optimal path of foreign reserves begins in a manner 
which appears to be a forerunner of instability but then becomes almost 
perfectly stabilised, although at a very high level. Similarly, the 
optimal monetary policy, after an initial contraction, settles down to 
move in the general direction of the target suggesting that severe open 
market operations are largely unnecessary (with the exception of the 
initial contraction and subsequent expansion). The relaxation in the use 
of monetary policy is of course a direct result of the excessive and 
unstable use of fiscal policy, with the subdued monetary policy not 
generating undesirable feedback responses from the open sector requiring 
further compensatory and severe monetary policy. The behaviour of G and 
Y would immediately eliminate the use of the particular policy weighting 
employed in this experiment but the results do suggest that if policy 
planners wish to achieve an interest rate target and maintain a stable
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income sector then the remainder of the monetary sector and especially 
the open sector may need to be sacrificed. The following experiment 
substantiates this assertion.
One question that arises from this analysis is whether or not 
it is actually feasible to hold interest rates constant over time in an 
open growing economy, given a different policy mix from that used above.
It may be that there is no optimal mix, or for that matter non-optimal 
mix, of monetary and fiscal policy which is capable of holding rates 
constant and stabilising the system at the same time. It is unlikely 
that a stable rate of interest would be preferred to an unstable income 
sector. Adherents to monetary policy would argue that monetary policy 
can be used to keep interest rates down and still maintain system 
stability. The applicability of this view in practice is, as the results 
show, conditional upon the complementary use of fiscal policy and the 
degree of impact of the open sector on the remainder of the system with 
the significance of the open sector also influencing the use of monetary 
policy. To gain a more definite picture of the use of monetary policy to 
peg interest rates we would need to consider the situation in which fiscal 
policy is purposefully directed away from the interest rate target, that 
is, fiscal policy is treated as a passive instrument. This procedure 
was adopted for the fourth experiment.
The fourth experiment consisted of placing high costs on 
deviations of RL and G from their respective targets while leaving DM 
free to adjust. The relative weighting in the cost function was as 
follows -
RL G DM
2000 1000 1
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The optimal path for RL closely tracks its target with the exception of 
minor deviations at the beginning of the planning period. The delay in 
the exact achievement of the target is due partially to the fact that 
monetary policy only operates on the long rate through the short rate 
and the importance of the dynamic characteristics embodied in the long 
rate equation. The delay is also a result of the inability of fiscal 
policy to adjust as in experiments M2 and M3 where the proximate target 
in question (alternatively the money supply and the long rate) was 
achieved exactly from the beginning of the planning period. This is an 
important result, when combined with the results of M2, as it indicates 
that in an open economy monetary policy alone is insufficient to achieve 
monetary targets exactly due to the close two-way relationship between 
the monetary and open sectors. Assistance from fiscal policy is also 
required.
An improvement in the performance of the income sector has 
accompanied the change in emphasis on instruments. The optimal path for 
real Y is very close to its target, which once again is not surprising 
as G is very close to its target (compare with Ml). The burden of 
adjustment is carried by monetary policy, the optimal path of which is 
characterised by an initial extreme contraction, producing similar 
behaviour in the money supply with the time paths of both variables 
being more undesirable than the corresponding time paths in the third 
experiment. In contrast to real Y, the optimal path for foreign reserves 
exhibits some instability, initially induced by the severity of monetary 
policy and thereafter compounded by a combination of monetary policy and 
extremely erratic and totally unacceptable capital flows. The time path 
of FR begins at a low level, rapidly climbs to a high level then falls 
significantly. This behaviour is likely to trigger speculation in
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relation to exchange rate adjustments further complicating the open and 
monetary sectors and placing additional pressure on the monetary 
instrument.
The direction of G away from the interest rate target has 
improved the income sector at the expense of the open sector. This is in 
contrast to experiment three where the open sector was improved at the 
expense of the income sector. Other experiments were performed in which 
the costs associated with G were gradually adjusted such that the desired 
policy mix varied between the two extreme cases presented in M2 and M3.
As fiscal policy was progressively directed away from the interest rate 
target (greater emphasis placed on the achievement of its own target) 
the optimal path for fiscal policy and real Y became more stable and 
economically feasible. The stabilisation of the income sector had 
detrimental effects on the monetary and open sectors. As Y became more 
stable an upward pressure was placed on RL through an increased demand 
for money reflected in the nominal value of Y. The removal of this 
upward pressure entailed severe monetary policy resulting in violent 
repercussions throughout the remainder of the monetary sector and the 
open sector. Therefore we have a trade-off between, for simplicity, 
internal and external balance when we wish to include RL as an explicit 
component of the welfare function. If the rate of interest is to be 
treated as a target the planning authorities must decide in which sector 
the system and community as a whole can best tolerate instability and 
then apply the instruments accordingly.
THE OPTIMAL ACHIEVEMENT OF THE MONETARY BASE TARGET
The interest rate and money supply experiments indicate that 
while the achievement of RL and M targets can be consistent with a
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reasonable stabilisation of income, considerable fluctuations exist in 
other variables, particularly in foreign reserves. In this section, 
the total monetary base will be explicitly aimed for and the resulting 
behaviour of the system will be observed and compared with the M and RL 
experiments. As before, the experiments should only be viewed as 
exploratory polar cases as for most practical policy implementations 
the money base target would most likely be included in the planners' 
welfare function along with Y etc. Before proceeding directly to the 
experiments a number of observations on the previous performance of MB 
should be made. Up to this stage of the study, MB has only been 
explicitly included in the welfare function for one experiment, IEB1.
In that case the results were reasonable compared with IEB2, IEB3, IEB4 
(although IEB4 gives the best result) and the RL and M experiments.
The respective RMSD's are given below in Table 12:
TABLE 12
RMSDMB
D S
IEB1 169 184
IEB2 516 743
IEB3 376 775
IEB4 99 124
M2 454 246
M2 130 168
M3 485 660
M4 12 35 1715
The results show that given particular instrument weightings, 
the fluctuations in the optimal path of MB can be quite severe.
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Surprisingly, the best overall result is obtained for IEB4 where the 
monetary instrument was forced to follow its desired path. The re­
striction of DM of course resulted in the FR target being substantially 
compromised. However, the combination of DM and FR produced an 
effectively stabilised monetary base compared with other results. The 
second best solution was obtained for M2 with both instruments 
adjusting freely. In this case, both DM and FR followed severely 
fluctuating time paths which largely cancelled each other out to give a 
stabilised total monetary base. Focussing solely on the IEB experiments 
one could possibly conclude that because the trade-off between FR and DM 
is so strong (see the structural and reduced form equations), the more 
vigorous monetary policy becomes the more destabilised MB becomes, even 
when FR is on target. However, the monetary target experiments show that 
an exceptionally vigorous monetary policy (and a destabilised external 
balance position) coupled with a strong fiscal policy both directed at 
the supply of money is also consistent with a stabilised MB (compared 
with other experiments). Obviously the choice of target is important but 
the diversity of results makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible 
to make any a priori assessments about the effect of stabilising MB on the 
remainder of the system. The results of the M and RL experiments were 
relatively predictable. In all the IEB experiments when M and RL were 
treated as intermediate variables, the achievement of Y and FR was 
consistent with optimal paths for M and RL which tended to exhibit severe 
movements, if not for the entire planning period at least for significant 
subsets. The achievement of M and RL largely produced the reverse 
reaction, particularly in FR (depending on the particular instrument 
weighting used).
The first experiment to be reported (M5) consisted of aiming
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for MB with both instruments free to adjust. The relative weightings 
were as follows:
MB G DM
2000 1 1
Recall that the above instrument weighting was consistent with a 
stabilised Y when M was aimed for and a destabilised Y when RL was aimed 
for. In this case, the perfect stabilisation of MB results in an 
effectively stabilised Y as in the money supply case (see figure 23).
The time path for real Y is initially very close to its target, in fact 
for practical policy purposes it would be regarded as being perfectly 
stabilised up until period 12. A comparison of the RMSD's for Y for 
the money supply experiment, M2, and the first money base experiment 
show that a base target is inferior to an M target in respect to 
stabilising Y.
RMSD,
M2 174
145 225
Once again a result which would gratify the monetarists although it must 
be reiterated that the transmission process modelled here would perhaps 
differ to a monetarists conception of the world. However, the results 
do suggest that they could be right in a 'Keynesian' world as well. It 
should be stressed that this result should not be accepted as a hard and 
fast rule as clearly considerable additional research would need to be 
carried out with alternative model specifications before the general 
applicability of such a conclusion could be accepted.27
The presence of a strong trade-off between M and the rates of 
interest was indicated by the M and RL target achievement experiments. 
Does the achievement of an MB target result in severe movements in M and
ft BdJ
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RL? F i g u r e  24 i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  o p t i m a l  p a t h s  f o r  M and  RL. The t im e  p a t h  
f o r  RL i s  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h e  IEB e x p e r i m e n t s  an d  i s  
l e s s  s e v e r e  t h a n  t h e  t im e  p a t h  o b t a i n e d  f o r  t h e  money s u p p l y  c a s e  when 
f i s c a l  p o l i c y  was s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e s t r i c t e d  b u t  i s  c l e a r l y  l e s s  a c c e p t a b l e  
t h a n  t h a t  o b t a i n e d  i n  t h e  f r e e l y  a d j u s t i n g  i n s t r u m e n t ,  money s u p p l y  c a s e .  
The p r o b le m  o f  f i n a n c i a l  an d  a s s e t  m a r k e t  s t a b i l i t y  o n c e  a g a i n  becom es 
i m p o r t a n t  an d  i f  i t  was deem ed t o  b e  d e s i r a b l e  t o  e l i m i n a t e  e x c e s s i v e  
s w in g s  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  t h e n  RL w o u ld  n e e d  t o  b e  e x p l i c i t l y  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  b u t  n o t  a s  t h e  s o l e  co m p o n en t  a s  we h av e  
s e e n  t h a t  t h e  e x a c t  a c h i e v e m e n t  o f  an i n t e r e s t  r a t e  t a r g e t  c a n  be 
d e s t a b i l i s i n g .  The o p t i m a l  money s u p p l y  p a t h  i s  e f f e c t i v e l y  s t a b i l i s e d  
f o r  t h e  f i r s t  h a l f  o f  t h e  p l a n n i n g  p e r i o d  b u t  b e g i n s  t o  c o n t r a c t  i n  
p e r i o d  12 . T h i s  c o n t r a c t i o n  i s  n o t  b r o u g h t  a b o u t  by  t h e  money b a s e ,  
o b v i o u s l y ,  b u t  r e s u l t s  f ro m  a  downward movement i n  t h e  s h o r t  r a t e  o f  
i n t e r e s t .  The r e s u l t  i l l u s t r a t e s  a  d i lem m a o f  m o n e ta r y  p o l i c y  i n  t h a t  
e v e n  i f  t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  a b l e  t o  s u c c e s s f u l l y  s t a b i l i s e  t h e  t o t a l  
m o n e ta r y  b a s e ,  a  sm o o th  m o n e ta r y  e x p a n s i o n  w i l l  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e s u l t  
due  t o  t h e  p r o f i t  m a x i m iz a t i o n  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  t r a d i n g  b a n k s  t o  t h e  
r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t . 28 The p r e s e n c e  o f  a  s t r o n g  t r a d e - o f f  b e tw e e n  MB and  
RL w i l l  n a t u r a l l y  r e s u l t  i n  o n e  v a r i a b l e  b e i n g  s a c r i f i c e d  u n l e s s  b o t h  
a r e  e x p l i c i t l y  a im e d  f o r  a n d  e v e n  t h e n  t h e y  can  o n l y  b o t h  b e  a c h i e v e d  i n  
a  s t r o n g l y - T i n b e r g e n  w o r l d .  To e n a b l e  b o t h  t a r g e t s  o f  MB an d  RL t o  be  
a c h i e v e d  i n  a  f i x e d  t a r g e t  f ra m e w o rk  we r e q u i r e  t h a t  t h e  r a n k  o f  t h e  
m a t r i x  o f  i n s t r u m e n t  m u l t i p l i e r s  b e  e q u a l  t o  tw o .  The a p p r o p r i a t e  
m a t r i x  i s  g i v e n  by
“ .0512  .7 4 5 3  ~
.0 0 0 7  - . 0 0 0 3
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which has rank equal to two. Solving for both targets in the fixed 
target framework yields results which are totally unacceptable, for 
example, the RMSD for Y is 1076 which is completely destabilising 
compared with the RMSD results listed earlier. In addition, the required 
values of the controls are not feasible with government spending taking on 
negative values in some quarters. The results suggest that the monetary 
authorities can do little to overcome the dilemma of a smooth base time 
path and a fluctuating interest rate time path.2  ^ The more closely the 
two variables are controlled, the more destabilised becomes the rest of 
the system. A smooth money supply expansion can only be obtained by 
allowing both MB and the rate of interest to freely adjust in a 
compensatory manner.
The other endogenous variable of importance is FR and the 
optimal path for this variable is certainly worse than all the IEB 
experiments as could be expected (remember that a different scale on the 
vertical axis was used for the IEB experiments) with large fluctuations 
which would most likely produce speculative capital flows. The RMSD for 
FR is 95 while the RMSD for the 'best' FR from the money supply and rate 
of interest experiments was 93 - a negligible difference. We have then a 
situation in which the achievement of a money base target is consistent 
with a stable income sector and a fluctuating external balance sector 
which is certainly not totally destabilised and no worse than the best 
result obtained from the achievement of other monetary targets. Is such 
a target configuration feasible in terms of the policy required to 
achieve it? The answer is yes, and indeed, the optimal policy mix 
required to achieve the target exhibits some particularly interesting 
characteristics. Firstly, fiscal policy has been entirely neutral in 
that for the entire planning period it was almost exactly on target even
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th o u g h  i t  was l e f t  f r e e  t o  a d j u s t .  The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s  can  be  fo u n d  
i n  t h e  r e d u c e d  fo rm  w h e re  i t  can  b e  s e e n  t h a t  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  G on MB i s  
e q u a l  t o  0 .0 5 1 2  w h i l e  t h e  i m p a c t  o f  DM i s  e q u a l  t o  .7 4 5 3  an d  a s  s u c h  
m o n e ta r y  p o l i c y  c o m p l e t e l y  swamps f i s c a l  p o l i c y .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t o  e n s u r e  
p o l i c y  u n i q u e n e s s ,  G an d  DM w ere  a s s i g n e d  p o s i t i v e  w e i g h t s  ( a l t h o u g h  
e x t r e m e l y  s m a l l )  an d  a s  t h e  im p a c t  o f  G i s  s o  i n s i g n i f i c a n t ,  f o r  G t o  be 
a c t i v e  w o u ld  h a v e  r e q u i r e d  an  e x c e p t i o n a l l y  s e v e r e  p o l i c y  (a n d  p r o b a b l y  
n o t  f e a s i b l e )  o v e r  t h e  e n t i r e  p l a n n i n g  p e r i o d  t h u s  c r e a t i n g  h i g h  w e l f a r e  
c o s t s  e v e n  w i t h  a  low w e i g h t .  The n e t  r e s u l t  h a s  b e e n  a  p a s s i v e  u s e  o f  
f i s c a l  p o l i c y .  U nder  t h e s e  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i t  w o u ld  n o t  be  u n r e a s o n a b l e  t o  
c o n c lu d e  t h a t  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  an y  a s s i s t a n c e  f ro m  f i s c a l  p o l i c y ,  
m o n e ta r y  p o l i c y  w o u ld  b e  u s e d  i n  a  v e r y  s e v e r e  f a s h i o n  a s  i t  was u n d e r  
s i m i l a r  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  p r e v i o u s  e x p e r i m e n t s .  F i g u r e  25 i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  
t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  and  i n d e e d  t h e  o p t i m a l  m o n e ta r y  p o l i c y  r e q u i r e d  f o r  
t h i s  e x p e r i m e n t  i s  t h e  l e a s t  s e v e r e  o f  a l l  t h e  m o n e ta r y  e x p e r i m e n t s .  To 
e n a b l e  a  c o m p a r i s o n  w i t h  t h e  IEB e x p e r i m e n t s ,  t h e  o p t i m a l  DM h a s  a l s o  
b e e n  g r a p h e d  w i t h  t h e  same s c a l e  on t h e  v e r t i c a l  a x i s  a s  i n  t h e  IEB 
e x p e r i m e n t s .  A c o m p a r i s o n  o f  t h i s  g r a p h  an d  t h e  f i r s t  f o u r  IEB o p t i m a l  
m o n e ta ry  p o l i c i e s  r e v e a l s  t h a t  t h e  t im e  p a t h  f o r  DM f o r  M5 i s  l e s s  s e v e r e  
t h a n  t h e  p o l i c i e s  t o  a c h i e v e  e x t e r n a l  b a l a n c e .  I t  s h o u l d  b e  c l e a r  t h a t  
t h e  n e x t  e x p e r i m e n t  w i t h  G f i x e d  i s  l a r g e l y  r e d u n d a n t  a s  i t  c o u l d  
r e a s o n a b l y  b e  e x p e c t e d  t h a t  t h e  r e s u l t s  w i l l  be  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  M due t o  
t h e  p a s s i v e  n a t u r e  o f  f i s c a l  p o l i c y  i n  t h a t  e x p e r i m e n t .  The c o s t  
f u n c t i o n  w e i g h t i n g  f o r  t h e  f i n a l  e x p e r i m e n t  was a s  f o l l o w s :
MB G DM
2000 1000 1
and  i n d e e d  t h e  r e s u l t s  a r e  a l m o s t  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  p r e v i o u s  e x p e r i m e n t  
a s  i s  shown by  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  RMSD's ( d e t e r m i n i s t i c ) .
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TABLE 13
RMSD Comparisons - MB Target
RMSDM5 RMSDJ
Y 381 353
FR 95 110
C 370 365
M 587 600
RL 1.1 1.
CF 101 102
G 25 O.i
DM 95 115
The important result to come out of the money base experiments is that MB 
can be forced to follow a steady growth path which is consistent with a 
stable income sector and an external balance sector which is not as 
acceptable as the optimal FR's obtained in the IEB experiments but is not 
totally destabilised and is as good a result as the 'best' FR obtained in 
earlier monetary experiments. Furthermore, to achieve the base target 
the optimal monetary policy required to hit a money supply or interest 
rate target and as such the excessive shifts in domestically created 
liquidity have been eliminated implying greater stability in the 
composition of the private sectors' portfolios. One of the reservations 
associated with earlier experiments was that the optimal monetary policies 
were of dubious feasibility due to the implication that the private sector 
would need to shift rapidly between extreme portfolio compositions, that 
is, from virtually no assets to saturation levels and vice versa. This 
dilemma has been eliminated. The absence of any significant fiscal policy 
effect is also important as it allows the monetary authorities to 
independently aim for an MB target regardless of what the fiscal
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authorities are doing in the income sector. Hence, the phasing and 
complementarity of monetary and fiscal policy becomes less important in 
this case. This is certainly the reverse of the money supply and rate of 
interest examples. The insignificant feedback of the income sector to the 
monetary base resembles the PR framework mentioned earlier and it is clear 
that only in the case of a dominant monetary policy and passive fiscal 
policy is it reasonable to treat the income sector as exogenous in 
relation to the monetary sector. The analysis carried out above also 
illustrates that it is only feasible to treat income as exogenous in 
relation to a subset of the monetary sector as it is clear that the 
influence of Y and G can vary between individual variables within the 
monetary sector itself.
INSTRUMENT INSTABILITY
The monetary experiments are very amenable to an analysis of 
instrument instability within the framework of Chapter 4 (instability 
with one target) as in each case only one target is explicitly included 
in the cost function. Of particular interest is the result that in only 
one case are predictions summarised in Table 5 of Chapter 4 realised in 
the six single target experiments discussed in detail. That experiment 
is the achievement of the money supply target with G fixed and DM free.
A surprising result is that the significant downward explosive nature of 
the monetary instruments associated with the MB target and detected in the 
instrument instability experiments has been eliminated. Instead, the 
optimal monetary policy is the most stable of all - the policies required 
for experiments Ml to M6. The switch from a severely unstable to a stable 
behaviour once again illustrates the problems facing policy planners.
The underlying structure suggests that the monetary instrument is
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inherently unstable when assigned exclusively to a monetary base target 
but the inclusion of uncontrollable exogenous influences and the 
specification of a numerically increasing target path has resulted in 
the instrument appearing to be stable. The implications of this are of 
considerable importance as policy planners may well be inclined to weight 
the potentially unstable instrument to avoid any explosive behaviour.
This action would be unnecessarily restrictive and would prevent the 
achievement of the desired target when the target could be exactly 
achieved with non-structural influences forcing the instrument of concern 
to act as tf i-t were stable. ^  The behaviour of DM in relation to the 
rate of interest is also important and lends support to the conclusions 
obtained in the preceding chapter. The analysis of Chapter 4 produced 
the result that DM is structurally stable with G fixed in relation to RL, 
allowing for a four period adjustment at the beginning of the planning 
period to compensate for the influence of the initial conditions. The 
results obtained in this chapter indicate that DM is used in a very severe 
manner in relation to RL and gives the appearance of instability and could 
lead to the weighting of DM for an incorrect motive. The stability 
results briefly discussed in this and the previous chapter illustrate the 
importance of disentangling pure structural instability from induced 
instability or stability. A failure to do so could lead to completely 
inappropriate responses by the planning authorities.
STOCHASTIC EXTENSIONS
As with the internal and external balance experiments, the 
monetary experiments were carried out in a stochastic framework in 
addition to the deterministic framework already discussed in some detail. 
The results of the stochastic monetary experiments deserve some attention
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as the structure of the model could have an important influence on the
stochastic responses of the system. The structure of the model excludes
lagged effects of the supply of money and the monetary base. Thus, the
optimal controls will not adjust to past shocks in those variables but
to past shocks in other possibly largely unrelated variables. This is in
contrast to the situation in the IEB experiments where both and
FR figured predominantly in the feedback matrices and G and DM were
able to adjust to past shocks in the target variables. Tables 14 to 16
contain the feedback matrices for selected periods for experiments M2,
M4, and M5. Note that for M2 (money supply target with both instruments
free) the influence of past state variables on the controls is spread
fairly evenly indicating that shocks from all sectors of the model could
have a reasonably significant effect on the stochastic adjustment of G
and DM. As in Chapter 5 the magnitude of variables needs to be considered
when feedback influences are being discussed. Of particular interest is
the influence of RS3, (RSL „) and RS, n on both controls which ist-1 t-4 t-1
probably the most significant of all. The close relationship between M 
and the rates of interest which was apparent in the earlier discussion of 
the monetary experiments means that any movement in the short rate will 
have a definite distinct influence on M of a substantial degree which 
leads quite naturally to adjusting the instruments in response to past 
movements in RS. FRt_g also plays an important role in the formulation 
of numerical values of the controls which once again is a reasonable 
result due to the influence of FR on the total monetary base. While the 
feedback effects are apparently spread fairly evenly over the whole range 
of lagged state variables, the behaviour of particular coefficients over 
the planning period is of considerable interest. Firstly, while the 
lagged effect of income consistently has a positive effect on G, lagged
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C an d  I  h a v e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t s  on G. The e f f e c t  o f  t h i s  i s  a s  f o l l o w s .
An i n c r e a s e / d e c r e a s e  i n  Y^_^ w i l l  g e n e r a t e  an upw ard /d o w n w ard  movement
i n  G w h i l e  t h e  r e v e r s e  w i l l  o c c u r  i n  C and  I  and  a s  C a n d  I  a r e
c o m p o n e n ts  o f  Y, t h e  incom e e f f e c t  on G^_ c o u l d  be  n e g a t e d  d e p e n d in g  on
t h e  r e l a t i v e  m a g n i tu d e s  o f  v a r i a b l e s  a t  t im e  t - 1 .  T h u s ,  w h i l e  incom e
v a r i a b l e s  a p p e a r  i n  t h e  f e e d b a c k  m a t r i c e s ,  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l s
w i l l  be  m ore d e p e n d e n t  upon t h e  m o n e ta r y  an d  o p en  s e c t o r s  i f  t h e  in co m e
e f f e c t s  a r e  i n  f a c t  n e g a t e d .  (The incom e s e c t o r  w i l l  o f  c o u r s e  i n f l u e n c e
t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  o m n e ta r y  v a r i a b l e s  t h r o u g h  t h e  s y s t e m  s t r u c t u r e . )
S e c o n d l y ,  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  FR^__^ b e h a v e s  i n  a  s t r a n g e  m an n er  i n
r e l a t i o n  t o  G^ _. I n i t i a l l y ,  FR^_^ h a s  a  p o s i t i v e  i m p a c t  on G^ _. T h u s ,  i f
FR^_^ h a s  f a l l e n ,  p r e s u m a b ly  r e d u c i n g  MB an d  M, t h e n  G i s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e
n e x t  p e r i o d  w h ic h  w i l l  f o r c e  Y up an d  h e n c e  M t h r o u g h  t h e  demand f o r
money an d  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  m ech a n ism .  H ow ever ,  a s  can  b e  s e e n  f ro m  T a b le  1 4 ,
t h e  e f f e c t  o f  FR^ . i s  r e v e r s e d  i n  l a t e r  p e r i o d s  w i t h  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  FR, , t - 1  t - 1
l e a d i n g  t o  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  G a n d  c e te r is  paribus  a d e c r e a s e  i n  Y an d  M. 
S w i t c h i n g  e f f e c t s  a r e  l a r g e l y  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  t a r g e t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  
a n d  t h e  s c a l i n g  o f  w e i g h t s  t o  e l i m i n a t e  c o s t  f u n c t i o n  b i a s . S u c h  
b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  f e e d b a c k  c o e f f i c i e n t s  c a u s e s  no  p r o b le m s  i n  a w o r l d  o f  
c e r t a i n t y  b u t  c o u l d  b e  i m p o r t a n t  when s t o c h a s t i c  s h o c k s  a r e  i n t r o d u c e d  
o r  a c c u r a t e  f o r e c a s t s  o f  t h e  e x o g e n o u s  v a r i a b l e s  h a v e  n o t  b e e n  made w i t h  
t h e  n e t  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  t a r g e t s  may no  l o n g e r  b e  f e a s i b l e  ( e s p e c i a l l y  
w h e re  i d e n t i t i e s  a r e  c o n c e r n e d )  an d  t h e  c o r r e c t  c u r r e n t  an d  im m e d ia te  
p a s t  s t a t e  v e c t o r  c a n n o t  b e  a c c u r a t e l y  p r e d i c t e d .  U nder s u c h  c o n d i t i o n s  
a  m o d i f i c a t i o n  o f  t a r g e t s  may b e  r e q u i r e d  o r  a  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  s i g n  o f  t h e  
p r e v i o u s l y  c o m p u te d  f e e d b a c k  c o e f f i c i e n t s  may d i r e c t  t h e  s y s t e m  away 
f ro m  t h e  d e s i r e d  p o s i t i o n .  The ch a n g e  i n  m a g n i tu d e  an d  s i g n  o f  t h e  
f e e d b a c k  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o n c e  a g a i n  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  i n  t r y i n g  t o
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empirically estimate short-run historical feedback matrices. The 
convergence of F to a steady state solution would provide a more 
amenable framework for such an analysis but the use of multiple cost 
matrices precludes this. In any case, historical policy has tended to 
be constructed on a short run basis and a steady state approach to its 
analysis may be inappropriate. It would appear to be advantageous to 
have lagged values of each endogenous variable explicitly included in 
the structure of the model to ensure that the instruments always respond 
to past movements in the target of concern (of course the degree of 
response will largely depend on the importance of the lagged variable 
in the system). The feedback matrices presented in Table 15 illustrate 
the importance of the presence of lagged values of the variable being 
controlled. It can be seen that the lagged value of the long rate 
completely dominates the formulation of the optimal monetary policy 
although is °f some importance also. With the introduction of
additive disturbances, it would appear to be certain that the monetary 
instrument would adjust in a completely complementary manner to past 
shocks in RL with the result that the long rate would track very close 
to its target. The response of G^, in contrast, is spread more evenly 
over the entire range of lagged state variables. Also note that the 
switching effect is not present in this case. Finally, Table 16 
contains the feedback matrices for the case where MB is the target, and 
as MB does not appear in the model, the controls will only respond to 
structural disturbances in other, possibly largely unrelated, variables. 
As with the case of a money supply target, the feedback effects are 
distributed more evenly than in the rate of interest case and once again 
the switching of feedback effects occurs although, not in such a serious 
way compared with the coefficients in Table 14.
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Keeping in mind the properti-es of the relevant feedback matrices, 
we now turn to a stochastic analysis of the monetary experiments. For 
illustrative purposes only, the same set of single shocks, as opposed to 
monte carlo repetitions, as those employed in the IEB experiments will be 
used. The results are graphed in Figures 26 and 27. The results confirm 
the analysis of Chapter 5 in that the optimal control laws are self- 
adjusting to stochastic disturbances in a manner which is complementary 
to the achievement of the relevant targets. In particular, the absence 
of lagged values of the target has not hindered the achievement of 
optimal paths for M and MB which fluctuate about their respective targets.
We know from previous experiments that FR in particular is prone to react 
adversely to additive disturbances but this has not resulted in severely 
destabilised time paths for M and MB even given the switching of feedback 
effects. However, the stochastic time path for M does exhibit some large 
percentage deviations from its target whereas the time path for RL tracks 
much closer to its target. This is best illustrated by comparing the 
welfare loss for both variables. The welfare loss for M in M2 is 10.73 
while the welfare loss for RL in M4 is 7.94. (Note that the use of time 
varying cost matrices and exact scaling of weights to a common bench-mark 
makes a comparison of welfare feasible even between variables of such 
divergent magnitude.) The results illustrate the extremely robust nature 
of the linear/quadratic technique in that the presence of additive 
disturbances need not be destabilising even when the controls are adjusted 
to shocks in variables which have little influence on the target of concern': 
This adaptability in adjustment is a feature which is absent from the 
dynamic fixed target approach to stabilisation.
An analysis of the behaviour of the remainder of the system 
under uncertainty is also important. In particular, it is desirable to
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Target 
M4 ( S ) 
M4 deterministic controls in
a stochastic world
$ Bil
Nominal M
Tcirget
M1 (S)
deterministic controls in
a stochastic world
FIGURE 26
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$ Bil
Nominal MB
HistoricalTarget
FIGURE 27.
Note: The time path for MB with deterministic 
controls in a stochastic world is almost 
identical to the purely stochastic case 
where the instruments are allowed to 
adjust.
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ascertain if the presence of uncertainty results in a reversal in the 
performance of the state variables not incorporated in the cost function. 
Of course, it could be argued that any change in the bahaviour of the 
non-weighted variables is of no concern - if it was then those variables 
would be explicitly included in the cost function. However, it should be 
remembered that the experiments carried out in this chapter are meant to 
be polar cases designed to illustrate what would happen to the remainder 
of the system if indeed monetary targets were aimed for. That is, is the 
achievement of a monetary target feasible in terms of its effect on the 
rest of the system? In this context a comparison is valid. A comparative 
summary of the deterministic and stochastic results is given in Table 17.
The results broadly indicate that the basic trade-offs have been 
retained within the stochastic framework and although the monetary targets 
have been able to adequately adjust for past shocks, the remainder of the 
variables have in general performed in an unsatisfactory way in 
comparison with the deterministic results. Two notable exceptions to 
this are MB in Ml and Y in M3. The optimal stochastic path for MB 
actually is a substantial improvement over the corresponding 
deterministic path. Similarly, there is a slight improvement in the 
performance of Y in M3 when uncertainty is introduced. The improvement in 
Y does not represent a major shift in system performance or change in 
relative performance of the system between experiments as the resulting 
time path is still far more severe than time paths for other experiments 
and of a nature which would not be regarded as feasible. When the 
improvements in Y and MB are viewed in the context of the overall results 
it is clear that no adjustment in the choice of monetary target on the 
grounds of significant system responses would be made. That is, a money 
supply target would still be preferable to a rate of interest target in
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relation to the variability in Y and FR which occurs when uncertainty is 
introduced. Further research needs to be conducted using parameter 
uncertainty to ascertain whether or not uncertainty can induce a switch 
in the choice of monetary target to be aimed for. At the theoretical 
level, Tumovsky (1975) has shown how the introduction of parameter 
uncertainty can result in a switch in the choice of monetary instrument 
and while it must be conceded that the empirical work carried out here 
falls outside of the instrument problem it should be' remembered that some 
similarities do exist (indeed Tumovsky recognises that the instruments 
employed in his study are really proximate targets) between the instrument 
problem and the choice of proximate target. The theoretical work then, 
provides some foundation for more extensive empirical research on this 
topic.
The analysis of the preceding chapter showed that under certain 
conditions of uncertainty, a significant switch in the emphasis of 
instruments could occur from a certainty situation. The results in 
Chapter 5 indicated a significant switch in both instruments, except when 
either instrument was explicitly prevented from deviating from its target 
path. The stochastic monetary results, while generally supporting that 
contention, do not reveal such a significant effect particularly in the 
use of the fiscal instrument. The result of most importance is the 
relaxation in the use of monetary policy in Ml where the variation in DM 
about its desired path fell by 50 per cent from the deterministic results. 
This represents a clear switch in the use of monetary policy but it is not 
compensated for by a corresponding increase in the use of fiscal policy.
It can be concluded from this that uncertainty has been complementary in 
relation to the use of monetary policy, that is, the money supply can be 
stabilised very closely to its target (see Figure 26) without resorting
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t o  t h e  s e v e r e  an d  p o s s i b l y  u n o b t a i n a b l e  m o n e ta ry  p o l i c y  r e q u i r e d  i n  t h e  
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  c a s e  w h ic h  l e a d s  t o  t h e  s u r p r i s i n g  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e  required 
policy  becomes more fea s ib le  under uncertainty. T h i s  c e r t a i n l y  i s  n o t  a  
g e n e r a l  p r o p o s i t i o n  b u t  t h e  r e s u l t s  i n d i c a t e  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  a n d  i s  a 
r e s u l t  i n  t h e  same v e i n  a s  t h a t  o b t a i n e d  by M acrae  (1972) who 
d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  t h e  u s e  o f  l e a r n i n g  t e c h n i q u e s  i n  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  
c o n t r o l  p o l i c i e s  may l e a d  t o  a l o s s  o f  s t a b i l i s a t i o n  co m p ared  w i t h  a  
s i t u a t i o n  o f  no l e a r n i n g .  One w o u ld  g e n e r a l l y  assum e t h a t  c e r t a i n t y  an d  
l e a r n i n g  w o u ld  b e  p r e f e r a b l e  t o  u n c e r t a i n t y  an d  no  l e a r n i n g .  The 
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  f o r m a l  o p t i m i s a t i o n  p r o c e d u r e s  f o r  s e l e c t i n g  p o l i c i e s  h a s  
b e g u n  t o  r e v e a l  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  p o l i c i e s  o r  s i t u a t i o n s  w h ic h  a p p e a r  t o  be  
c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e  a r e  i n  f a c t  ' b e s t ' .  A f u r t h e r  ex a m p le  o f  t h i s  t y p e  o f  
r e s u l t  c a n  b e  fo u n d  i n  T u rn o v s k y  (1975) w h e re  i t  i s  d e m o n s t r a t e d  t h a t  a 
p r o - c y c l i c a l  m o n e ta r y  p o l i c y  i s  o p t i m a l  -  o n c e  a g a i n  a  r e s u l t  w h ic h  
a p p e a r s  t o  b e  c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e  on t h e  s u r f a c e  a n d  w o u ld  m o s t  l i k e l y  n o t  
b e  made by  a  p o l i c y  p l a n n e r  d e c i d i n g  on p o l i c y  w i t h o u t  any  f o r m a l  
o p t i m i s a t i o n  o r  e v e n  n o n - o p t i m i s a t i o n  c o n t r o l  t e c h n i q u e .
The s t o c h a s t i c  r e s p o n s e s  o f  t h e  i n s t r u m e n t s  i n  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  
e x p e r i m e n t s  a r e  p r e d i c t a b l e .  I n  e a c h  c a s e  t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  
u n c e r t a i n t y  l e a d s  t o  a  more v i g o r o u s  u s e  o f  p o l i c y  w i t h  t h e  g r e a t e s t  
v a r i a t i o n  o c c u r i n g  i n  t h e  m o n e ta r y  i n s t r u m e n t .  As w i t h  t h e  IEB 
e x p e r i m e n t s ,  s i t u a t i o n s  o c c u r  i n  w h ic h  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  p o l i c y  i s  a l m o s t  
r e v e r s e d  fro m  t h e  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  c a s e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i n  M2 a n d  M4. T h i s  
w o u ld  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  c o n t r o l s  co m p u ted  u n d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  c e r t a i n t y  w o u ld  b e  d i s a s t r o u s  i f  im p le m e n te d  i n  an u n c e r t a i n  s i t u a t i o n .  
To t e s t  t h i s  a s s e r t i o n ,  t h e  s i x  m o n e ta r y  e x p e r i m e n t s  w e re  r e p e a t e d  w i t h  
t h e  m o d i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  c o n t r o l s  w e re  u s e d  i n  a  s t o c h a s t i c  
s i m u l a t i o n .  The r e s u l t s  a r e  g r a p h e d  i n  F i g u r e  2 6 .  N o te  t h a t  t h e  t im e
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paths for MB have not been presented. This is because the stochastic 
results and the deterministic controls in a stochastic world framework 
results are almost identical. Once again a surprising result in view of 
the fact that a significant switch in the optimal mix of policy occurred 
from the deterministic to the stochastic case. One could conclude that 
particular shocks to the system are largely complementary or minimised 
by the system structure in relation to the MB target, thus enabling the 
effective stabilisation of the system with deterministic controls. Further 
experiments were conducted with different sets of randomly generated 
additive errors with the results largely duplicating the illustrative 
example presented. In any case, the example is sufficient to provide 
a counter example to any generalised statements along the lines of "the 
formulation and execution of policy under supposed conditions of 
certainty will be disastrous or destabilising in an uncertain world".
The money supply results are also of a similar nature although not to 
the same degree as the MB results. Figure 26 reveals that for most 
periods (with the exception of the final three) the money supply tracks 
very closely to the purely stochastic optimal path. This implies that 
the restriction placed on fiscal policy has a nil effect on the 
performance of the system when deterministic controls are implemented 
in an uncertain world. In contrast to M and MB, the sub-optimal path 
of RL with deterministic controls in a stochastic world, diverges 
significantly from its purely stochastic counterpart and the desired 
target. The time path is initially very close to the RL target but 
begins to systematically diverge about half way through the planning 
period. Once again, the difference between purely stochastic results 
are negligible. As a result M3(S) has not been graphed. The behaviour 
of RL can be traced back in part to the original structure of the
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system where the lagged effect of RL plays a significant role in the long 
rate equation. Thus, the high level of dependence of RL^ _ on RL^ can 
result in shocks in RL^  ^moving RL^ _ off target and even in the absence 
of any future shocks, it could be expected that RL^ _ will continue to 
systematically diverge from its target. The presence of additional 
shocks, depending on the size and direction, could be expected to keep 
RL^ away from its target in the absence of any compensatory movement in 
the instruments. The results of the purely stochastic experiments show 
quite clearly that if the instruments are free to adjust to past shocks 
then the presence of uncertainty has an almost negligible effect on the 
behaviour of RL^. The excellent compensatory stochastic instrument 
adjustment is a direct result of the dominance of RL^  ^in the appropriate 
feedback matrices (see Table 15). A direct comparison can be made between 
the RL results and the results obtained for FR under the same conditions 
in the IEB experiments. It was found that FR behaved in a similar 
manner to RL (stochastic with instrument adjustment) due to the 
presence of FR^ _  ^ in the identity for FR^ _. The results would seem to 
suggest that the implementation of controls derived from conditions of 
certainty in an uncertain environment could be destabilising if the 
target(s) of concern is/are a function of the lagged target, with the 
qualification that the lagged dependent variable has a coefficient 
greater than say .5. The generality of such a proposition cannot be 
established from one applied model but the results seem to be important 
enough for more research to be carried out as it is clear that if control 
techniques, and in particular the linear/quadratic technique, are to be 
used as an aid for policy specification by governments who will not have 
complete knowledge of system disturbances to incorporate into the policy 
specification procedure, then the choice of model specification will
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become crucial. Given the present state of knowledge concerning what 
is the 'right' specification of a particular model, it appears that 
the above problem may not be adequately overcome in a real world 
application. One could only hope for a solution similar to that 
obtained for M and MB. Perhaps the ideal situation would be to have 
lagged dependent variables with small coefficients to avoid the strong 
dependence found in this and the preceding chapter. Such a situation 
cannot be guaranteed without 'rigging' the data and problem to give 
the desired results. The resulting structural estimation would of course 
then be worthless.
The results indicate that, given the model and given adequate 
adjustment to additive uncertainty, policy planners should choose the 
supply of money as the appropriate monetary target to aim for and then 
only if fiscal policy, monetary policy and the rate of interest are 
allowed to adjust in a completely free manner. That is, fiscal policy 
is specifically directed towards achieving the monetary target as opposed 
to being specifically directed towards stabilising the income sector. The 
choice between the supply of money and the monetary base as the 
appropriate target rests mainly on the behaviour of the rate of interest 
as the trade-off between MB and RL is very pronounced. The conclusion 
reached here is opposed to the conclusion obtained by PR who found that 
the use of a monetary model with an exogenous income sector led to the 
choice of the rate of interest as the appropriate target. While certain 
institutional factors may partially account for the difference in the 
results, it is important to bear in mind that the experiments discussed in 
this chapter show quite clearly that in the case of the money supply and 
the rate of interest, the feedback into and from the income and open sector 
in relation to the money sector is quite important - a factor which has not
271
been considered in PR's analysis. The results obtained here cannot be 
regarded as the final conclusive evidence on the choice of monetary 
target. The final selection will clearly depend on the richness of the 
model and the particular targets towards which we attempt to steer the 
system. At least the results obtained here concur with a portion of the 
very limited amount of empirical work which has been carried out in the 
above framework. For example, Shaprio and Holbrook (1970) also concluded 
that the supply of money was the appropriate monetary target to aim for. 
The model employed in that study was even more simple than the model used 
here, but nonetheless illustrated the importance of specifying an 
interaction between sectors of the economy. A further result of some 
interest and importance is the reversal in the direction of fiscal policy 
required when we switch from the money supply target to the rate of 
interest target and at the same time maintaining an effectively 
stabilised income sector. In the case of the money supply we can 
specifically direct fiscal policy towards the monetary target and 
maintain income stability while in the interest rate case to achieve 
income stability, fiscal policy must be directed away from the monetary 
target; a result that is not intuitively clear.
As we have seen, the pegging of the interest rate as opposed 
to the money supply may be destabilising or even impossible in an open 
growing economy. A more appropriate interest rate target to aim for may 
be one that is growing over time which would perhaps allow the target 
to be achieved without resorting to the severe policy actions set out 
in this chapter. If the achievement of proximate monetary targets, given 
various instrument weightings, is likely to produce instability in other 
sectors then doubt must be placed on the usefulness of aiming for 
proximate targets in the first place; unless of course policy planners
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feel tin at they can exert greater control over monetary variables than 
say income variables due to a lack of information for example (control 
over monetary variables implies excellent knowledge of the open sector 
which in itself is a doubtful proposition). Nonetheless, we have seen 
that a reasonably acceptable result can occur, although perhaps not as 
successful as being able to aim directly for the achievement of ultimate 
targets.
The results of the experiments presented in this chapter (and 
the previous chapter) have a much wider application than merely to the 
optimal choice of proximate monetary targets. They also illustrate a 
graphic divergence between the theory of optimal macro stabilisation and 
the application of this theory to empirically estimated models. The 
theoretical procedure, especially in the case of fully stochastic models, 
is to assume the existence of optimal controls. Analytical results 
for the optimal control vector are then obtained. This approach makes 
no distinction, and in fact is unable to make a distinction, between 
economically viable and economically impossible controls. The actual 
constraints in a system may mean that a control which can be found to 
exist may be totally unfeasible such as government spending in M3. On 
this basis, many theoretical propositions may not hold in an empirical 
framework. A theorist using a simple analytical model could quite 
easily conclude that in a non-stochastic world it does not matter which 
monetary target we choose. The results of this chapter clearly show that
this need not be the case.
CHAPTER VII
THE FIXED TARGET APPROACH TO STABILISATION 
STRONGLY-TINBERGEN ANALYSIS
Having looked at the linear/quadratic approach to stabilisation, 
the analysis now shifts to the fixed target framework and extends the 
linear/quadratic approach to a wider variety of target configurations 
for comparative purposes. A convenient point to begin the analysis is with 
the strongly-Tinbergen situation of as many instruments as targets and 
where the satisfaction of the instrument rank condition unifies the target 
path and target point approaches to stabilisation. Each target can be hit 
in each time period to result in a target path achievement which of course 
is constructed from a series of exactly achieved target points. The policy 
planner has the option of doing nothing for a given period of time and 
then steering the system instantaneously (within the unit time period) to 
a target path or a target point with the choice of a target path or target 
point depending largely on political considerations. The strongly- 
Tinbergen framework would enable a government to pursue a course of action 
designed to attract one sector of the community but sacrificing another 
sector of the economy in doing so and then stabilising the economy of the 
appropriate point in time to achieve maximum political gain. The model 
presented in this study only contains a fiscal and monetary instrument 
but in practice a government has a wide variety of instruments available 
to it and in most cases it would be possible to achieve the necessary 
conditions for a strongly-Tinbergen solution - as many instruments as 
targets. Thus, it would not be unreasonable for a government to pursue 
a target package consisting of an income, balance of payments position, 
money supply and unemployment target and given policy existence, a 
solution will be possible. Indeed, the pursuit of the four targets outlined 
above would be feasible in terms of the number of instruments from which
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a government is able to choose. The problem at the application level is 
that while policy may exist, the trade-offs between variables and selected 
target levels may be so strong that the required policy is not feasible. 
Consider a simple Phillips curve analysis where a government seeks to 
achieve price and unemployment targets given two instruments with 
independent affects on both targets. Low target levels for both variables 
may be able to be achieved but perhaps only with explosive, negative or 
other undesirable features in the instruments. Indeed, to obtain a feasible 
instrument package it may be necessary to specify politically or socially 
unacceptable target levels (5% inflation and 10% unemployment for example) 
and as such the existence of a strongly-Tinbergen situation should not be 
viewed as a panacea in relation to the achievement of an economy exactly 
stabilised at a desirable level.
The limited amount of strongly-Tinbergen analysis already considered 
in this study illustrates to some extent the problem outlined in the 
preceding paragraph. In particular the exact achievement of internal and 
external balance (IEB2) illustrates the degree of adjustment in the monetary 
instrument required to achieve that target mix. The structure of the model 
and the feedback between the income, open and monetary sectors contributed 
to the behaviour of the controls and indeed the same general type of 
behaviour was found to exist with a wide variety of target specifications 
for both Y and FR. Similarly, the monetary analysis of Chapter six 
illustrated that both a money supply and rate of interest target could be 
simultaneously achieved in a strongly-Tinbergen framework but only with 
disastrous results for the controls. It is safe to say that most economists 
would not specify the money supply and rate of interest as simultaneous 
targets due to the inherent trade-off between those variables established 
by conventional theory. However, many economists would also argue that
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the money supply and the rate of interest would not be compatible with 
policy existence. This need not be the case as many models, particularly 
those with an endogenous money supply will yield existence and the 
fundamental problem is really the inherent structural relationship of the 
model giving the undesirable trade-offs. Of course, a failure of policy 
existence with as many instruments as targets is the extreme or polar case 
of variable trade-offs. For example, a situation in which the achievement 
of one variable automatically fixes the level of the other target with no 
possibility of independent instrument manipulation. This proposition will 
become clearer within the context of an examination of the strongly- 
Tinbergen properties of the model.
Recall that the Tinbergen properties of a model can be simply 
determined by an analysis of the reduced form (impact) instrument multipliers. 
A rank analysis for the model of Chapter Three is given in Table 18 . Note 
that with fifteen exogenous variables and two instruments we can obtain 105 
sets of target configurations where the number of targets equals the number 
of instruments. Many of these lack any real interest from an economic point 
of view (why aim for a Total Personal Income target and a Disposable Income 
Target in the absence of tax adjustments) and many others are not compatible 
with policy existence. Specifically, only endogenous variables of major 
concern are considered in detail - Y, FR, M and RL. The results indicate 
a large number of rank failures. The reason for a majority of these rank 
failures lies not with the value of the structural parameters but with the 
specification of the behavioural equations and identities. For example, 
consider targets of Y and imports, IM. The coupling of these two targets 
results in an instrument rank failure directly as a result of the appearance 
of only one endogenous variable in the import function (Y). The remaining 
variables are either exogenous or lagged endogenous. Thus, the achievement
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of a level of Y fixes the level of IM and the two cannot be achieved 
independently. This is an obvious example of an extreme or polar trade-off 
between variables. In many cases the structure will be more complex and 
the reason for the rank failure will not be as obvious. While the 
behavioural relationships for particular variables in the model are very 
simple and lead directly to rank failures in many cases, larger and more 
complex models can, and do, suffer from a similar constraint. This is 
particularly so for short-run models which contain many lagged endogenous 
variables within particular behavioural relationships thus precluding the 
achievement of particular combinations of targets and perhaps severely 
restricting the options of authorities. Of course, such an analysis would 
depend upon the correct specification of the model which gives rise to the 
important potential consequence of a government being advised that its 
targets cannot be achieved, when in fact they can. Friedman would argue 
that this type of outcome justifies the use of "rules".
The assessment of the instrument rank properties specified in 
Table 18 was made on the basis of a quantitative analysis of the impact 
multipliers and an inspection of the structure. Pure reliance on the 
numerical values of the appropriate multipliers can be misleading due to 
problems of rounding either by the researcher, the computer or in the format 
of the output obtained from the computer. The multipliers listed in 
Table 18 are given to four decimal places and it would appear at first sight 
that this is sufficient. Consider RL and RS. A rank analysis based on four 
decimal places gives a rank of two (the determinant is exceptionally low 
however) which is clearly incorrect as it can be seen from the structural 
equations that the targets are not independent. It is a relatively easy 
matter to detect the error when only a small model is involved but it could 
be extremely difficult to detect such an error in a large complex model.
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At another level, rounding could produce rank failures in a situation 
where the targets and instruments of concern are linearly independent, 
resulting in the abandonment of an otherwise feasible target set. The 
problems caused by rounding are potentially quite severe and are 
particularly important in a target path analysis with more targets than 
instruments as we shall see below. The small magnitude of many instrument 
multipliers adds to the problems of rounding and also poses an additional 
problem. The low values of particular multipliers result in very low values 
for determinants which can make matrix inversions questionable, particularly 
if rounding has produced near linear dependence between instruments. The 
problem is not as severe in a strongly-Tinbergen framework in the case of 
two or three instruments but once again can be quite severe in the target 
path framework where the number of time indexed instruments may be as large 
as forty or fifty with a matrix to be inverted of dimension forty or fifty.
Having looked at some of the problems associated with an applied 
strongly-Tinbergen analysis we now turn briefly to an analysis within the 
context of the model. The target pairs included in each experiment should 
be viewed as natural extensions to the internal and external balance and 
monetary experiments of previous chapters although a less detailed analysis 
will be presented here. The target groupings and the general feasibility 
results are presented in Table 19. The results of Table 18 are used to 
establish existence. The experiments in this chapter are identified by 
the prefix FT followed by a numeral indicating the sequence of the 
experiment. The designation of feasible or infeasible is made on the basis 
of the required policy mix and or the behaviour of the remainder of the 
non-target endogenous variable. Note that the target groupings which 
specify an income target and one monetary or open target are all feasible
while groupings of monetary targets and open targets are with one exception,
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Table 19
Strongly-Tinbergen Target Pairs
Feasible Infeasible
FTl Y FR / /
FT 2 Y M /
FT 3 Y MB /
FT4 M RL /
FT 5 M FR /
FT 6 MB RL /
FT7 Y CF /
FT8 FR CF /
FT 9 FR RL /
FT10 RL CF /
infeasible. In each infeasible case the controls took on negative values 
or fluctuated to such an extent that the resulting time path could not 
be regarded as a feasible policy option. Stochastic experiments were also 
performed but the general results remained unchanged under uncertainty.
A detailed analysis of the results of the feasible solutions is largely 
redundant as identical or similar results have already been obtained. For 
example, FTl is identical to IEB2 and FT2 and FT3 are similar to the 
monetary experiments in the previous chapter where G was fixed (and Y 
tracked close to its target), with DM allowed to adjust. In this case 
both controls are perfectly free to adjust but the inclusion of Y as a 
target produces a policy assignment in which G is predominantly directed 
towards Y thus giving the same indicative behaviour (but stronger in 
relation to desired G) as the optimal monetary experiments. Recall that 
in particular monetary experiments G was restricted and Y tracked
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reasonably close to its target. In many cases the gap between the target 
level and the optimal Y was very small. The results of this chapter 
illustrate that to close the gap between actual and desired levels requires 
what appears to be a proportionately larger adjustment in G in spite of the 
fact that the impact multiplier for G in relation to Y is relatively large. 
For example, see figures 28 and 29. This type of behaviour was found in 
the internal and external balance experiments when the system was shifted 
from attempted exact stabilisation (IEB1) to a position of exact fine 
tuning in IEB2. The overall results show that in terms of the model, exact 
fine tuning requires strong and sometimes excessive adjustment in both 
fiscal and monetary policy when in fact a high degree of stabilisation can 
be obtained by sacrificing exact fine tuning (IEB1 for example) and opting 
for less adjustment in the mix of policy. This would be of particular 
importance if the parameters of the system are likely to adjust through the 
private sectors response to the government's policy actions. A less active 
policy package may result in less parameter response and a less volatile 
adjustment in the private sectors expectations. The problem of excessive 
instrument adjustment when exact fine tuning is required suggests that a 
similar and perhaps more severe result will occur in a non strongly- 
Tinbergen fixed target framework where perhaps four or five targets can be 
exactly achieved by varying only two instruments, rather than just hitting 
two targets as we have done here. Related to this issue is the fact that 
a large number of target pairs are not consistent with feasible policies 
and the coupling of these targets with feasible pairs may result in the 
total target package being unattainable in relation to negative or other 
infeasible policy levels. On the other hand, it would be desirable for 
the introduction of policy anticipation to result in the feasible pursuit 
of targets which are unattainable in a strongly-Tinbergen framework.
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Unfortunately, the results so far suggest that the policy lead target 
path problem may produce undesirable results given the range of independent 
targets available. This question will be pursued in some detail in the 
remainder of this chapter.
Before turning to a target path and target point analysis it is 
appropriate to briefly comment on a further area of comparison between the 
linear/quadratic and fixed target approaches. Recall that in a strongly- 
Tinbergen framework, the initial conditions are incorporated in the solution 
procedure. Not so however, in an optimisation framework where the control 
laws are computed independently of the initial and subsequent states of the 
system. Thus it could be expected that in an optimising framework with as 
many independent targets as instruments, some settling down of the system 
may occur as the system adjusts to the initial conditions. The result being 
that the targets may not be exactly hit until after the planning period has 
commenced (assuming no stochastic disturbances). The detailed discussion of 
IEB2 in chapter five illustrated that only a negligible difference occurred 
between the optimisation and fixed target solutions. This result followed 
directly from the relationship between the target values of Y and FR and the 
appropriate initial conditions and from the presence of an<^  FRt-l aS
significant components of the feedback matrices. A similar comparison 
between experiments FT2 to FT10 with corresponding linear/quadratic solutions 
was made with the result that in most linear/quadratic solutions some 
settling down was required. This tendency was possibly reinforced by the 
non-appearance of M, MB and CR in the relevant feedback matrices. In most 
cases the divergence between optimal path and target path was slight and in 
all cases the target variable of concern was exactly on target by the mid 
point of the planning period. Thus, the two techniques are largely 
interchangeable with either technique giving the same general indicative
285
results. If the targets were extremely divergent from the initial 
conditions then the linear/quadratic solution could become substantially 
inferior to the fixed target solution.
TARGET PATH AND TARGET POINT ANTICIPATION
The dynamic analogue to Tinbergen's famous counting rule can be 
used to establish a priori the dimensions of the required controllability 
matrix and necessary lead for given numbers of targets and instruments.
The counting is given by
"k" = k (s + T + 1) > "m" = m(T+l) (2.75)
where it will be recalled from Chapter Two that "k" and "m" represent the 
number of time indexed controls and targets respectively, s is the policy 
lead, T+l is the target path and consequently k+T+1 equals the planning 
period. The choice of s and T+l given the targets and instruments rests 
crucially on the length of the planning period. To maintain consistency with 
the linear/quadratic experiments the policy horizon will also be set equal 
to twenty periods. Given two instruments we are then able to establish 
some properties of the fixed target experiments. Firstly consider four 
targets. From the necessary conditions it is immediately established that 
the number of time indexed instruments is equal to the number of "true" 
and "natural" instruments times the length of the policy horizon which equals 
40 in this case. It then remains to determine the length of s and T+l 
which will then give us "m". The establishment of s and T+l can be pursued 
by a process of elimination by specifying various policy leads until the
necessary conditions are met. A simpler procedure is to simply multiply the
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number of targets by specific numbers (less than the length of the planning 
period) until equality with "k" is established or the closest integer to 
it is obtained. This will then give T+l from which the value of s follows 
immediately. The process is exceptionally simple in the case of two 
instruments and four targets: "k" = 40 and it is obvious from the
necessary conditions that T+l must equal 10. Thus s = 10. This implies 
that provided the controllability matrix for specific targets has full rank 
(p[Rj = 40) then the entire four targets can be exactly achieved provided 
the policy planner begins to manipulate his instruments ten periods in 
advance. Now consider three targets. Once again the number of time 
indexed instruments equals 40. With three targets the closest integer less 
than 40 we can obtain will be 3 (T+l) = 3x13 = 39. Thus equality in the 
necessary conditions will not hold. The dropping of one target now allows 
the policy planner to hit his targets for three additional periods with a 
policy lead of only seven periods. However, as "m" and "k" are not equal 
we will be unable to solve for "m" unless the controllability matrix of 
dimension "k" x "m" is adjusted such that it is of order "m" [and full rank 
is obtained]. In our example, this can be achieved by dropping one time 
indexed instrument as clearly we have a surfeit of instruments. The deleted 
or slack instrument can then be assigned a value a priori, treated as given 
and then included with the uncontrollable but known exogenous variables.
The choice of a suitable "instrument" to delete can be quite crucial and we 
shall consider this question below. The above analysis of the necessary 
conditions illustrates some important factors associated with fixed target 
solutions. Firstly, the more targets we have relative to natural instruments 
the smaller in length will be the required target path and the longer will 
be the necessary policy lead given a specific policy horizon. As the 
analysis assumes a fixed structure and fixed structural parameters, the
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extension of a planning period to obtain a greater degree of exact fine 
tuning could result in destabilisation, particularly if the structure 
shifts, as it is likely to do, during the process of policy implementation. 
This problem is also faced in the linear/quadratic framework but in that 
case the problem can be minimised by reducing the length of the policy 
horizon and updating our knowledge of the system structure. A reduction 
in the length of the policy horizon in the fixed target framework will 
result in the abandonment of our original target path objective and of 
course, given our present state of knowledge, there is no provision for 
updating our knowledge of the system structure through a learning process 
given the nature of the fixed target solution procedure. Returning 
briefly to the strongly-Tinbergen framework we can see that only in this 
special case is the specification of a specific planning horizon largely 
irrelevant and a learning process is feasible as decisions are made from 
period to period. Secondly, the more targets we have relative to natural 
instruments and the longer we require our target path to be, the more 
difficult computation becomes as the dimensions of the controllability 
matrix will increase dramatically making inversion extremely difficult, 
if not impossible. This will become apparent below as particular solutions 
are considered. For this reason and because the preceding analysis has 
established that not all endogenous variables represent independent 
targets and some of those that are cannot be combined in an economically 
meaningful fashion, the maximum number of natural targets considered in 
this portion of the study will be 4. The policy lead and target path 
requirements for this situation have already been established and should be 
stressed again that the dimensions of the controllability matrix will be 
40x40 - a matrix which could be difficult to invert. Ideally, we would like 
to have at our disposal as many instruments as possible as this would
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allow us to hit more targets with the same policy lead or extend the 
length of the target path with a considerably reduced policy lead for 
the same number of targets. As yet no mention has been made of the 
necessary conditions for target point problems. The counting rule 
requirements for target point problems are relatively simple and the matrix 
inverted will always be equal to the number of natural targets. A 
discussion will be developed in conjunction with the solution presented below.
Having discussed and established the necessary conditions for the 
fixed target study of this chapter, we can establish one other property 
related to the model before proceeding to a discussion of sufficiency for 
particular target configurations. Recall from chapter two that the Cayley- 
Hamilton Theorem placed an upper bound on the pursuit of varying lengths 
in the target path by specifying a maximum policy lead after which no 
additional linearly independent time indexed instruments could be obtained.
In relation to the state space version of the model this constraint confines 
the analysis to a policy horizon of 52 periods and s = 26 (assuming four 
targets) and allows considerable scope for the extension of the target path 
over and above that obtainable with a twenty period horizon. However, the 
solution of the problem with a 26 period lead would be prohibitive as it 
would require the inversion of a matrix of order 104. This may be possible 
if the elements of the matrix are all non-zero and greater than plus or 
minus one but would most likely not be possible in the context employed here 
due to the structure of the controllability matrix and the tendency for a 
majority of the dynamic multipliers to disappear to zero. Once again this 
will become apparent when various target packages are analysed below. It 
is also highly unlikely that the pursuit of a prolonged policy strategy 
over 52 periods would be economically feasible in a quarterly model and would 
certainly be impossible in an annual model although a monthly or weekly
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model would possibly be feasible. The use of a monthly model such as the 
monetary model employed by Pindyck and Roberts [1964] [1976] would
perhaps allow for the maximum degree of target path achievement until 
constrained by the limits set by the Cayley-Hamilton Theorem. The upper 
bound placed upon the length of policy lead does allow in theory for 
considerable scope in the variation of the length of the target path but 
computational realities make it somewhat prohibitive. As such, no attempt 
will be made here to achieve the maximum degree of anticipation and target 
path achievement. Indeed, an analysis over twenty periods is very close to 
being computationally prohibitive.
The next stage in the solution procedure is to compute the 
dynamic instrument and exogenous variable multipliers which are required 
in the solution procedures of both target path and target point problems.
The dynamic multipliers can be computed using any state space realisation 
provided of course that the technique is consistent with the state space 
realisation. As a variant of the Chow-Turnovsky realisation has been 
used, Equation (4.17) of Chapter Four will be used. The resulting dynamic 
instrument multipliers for each endogenous variable are listed in Tables 
20 and 21 with a summary of the cumulative multipliers given in Table 22.
As could be expected, the majority of multipliers for particular variables 
fluctuate between positive and negative values. Note that the numerical 
values of the multipliers are very small, particularly in the case of the 
rates of interest. As the target path controllability matrices will 
consist of a large number of zeros a priori, the presence of non-zero 
elements which are close to zero could result in inversion difficulties.
The multipliers also give some indication of the stability properties of 
the system referred to in the instrument instability analysis of Chapter 
Four. Bearing in mind that the multipliers represent the effect over time of
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a unit impulse in a particular instrument, if the cumulative effect of the 
impulse tends to increase over time then it will indicate a degree of 
instability in the endogenous variable of concern. If the multipliers 
clearly blow-up over time then this will certainly indicate the presence 
of severe instability. Conversely, if the cumulative effect declines and 
the multipliers tend to zero then this will indicate stability in the 
particular endogenous variable referred to. An inspection of the 
multipliers suggests that a degree of instability could exist in the open 
and monetary sectors. The cumulative multipliers support this, particularly 
in relation to FR and MB. This tendency is of course a direct result of the 
presence of FR in the model, and the fact that the identity for FR contains 
FR^ ^. If FR^_^ and FR begins to expand rapidly without any offsetting 
impact from monetary and fiscal policy then MB and M will react accordingly. 
In any case, the tendency for a unit policy impulse to have an increasing 
effect does not appear to be particularly serious. Indeed, the tendency 
for particular multipliers to increase over time will be of some assistance 
in the computation of the required instrument vector as it will eliminate 
near zero elements which could be cause for concern in a large matrix. The 
tendency for particular multipliers to increase over time is not 
characteristic of both instruments. For example, fiscal policy has a 
reasonably rapid declining influence on income and consumption. On the 
other hand monetary policy has a marginally increasing cumulative effect on 
Y and on C due to the influence of M and FR. Fortunately, the low value of 
the wealth effect in the consumption function dampens the monetary effect.
The tendency for multipliers to increase or decrease over time will of course 
affect the nature of the results. Finally, the instrument multipliers 
provide a graphic example of how at the impact level, a set of targets may 
be subject to linearly independent instrument effects but subsequent linear
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dependencies may appear in the lagged multipliers. An obvious example 
of this are the multipliers for FR and MB. The fiscal multipliers 
differ at the impact level but due to the lag and system structure of the 
model, become identical after one time period has elapsed creating 
strict linear dependence with the fiscal instrument. This effect is obvious 
here and the .cause can be readily traced back to the structural properties 
of the model, but in a larger, more complex model it may be difficult to 
detect, particularly if the multipliers are very small and rounding has 
occurred.
The purpose of the following experiments was twofold. Firstly, 
they will provide the first computational experience with target path 
anticipation problems and as such are valuable in their own right. Secondly, 
they were intended as an extension of the earlier internal and external 
balance and monetary experiments, at the same time providing a comparison 
with linear/quadratic techniques. The experiments consisted of analysing 
the achievement of firstly four sets of targets and then three sets of 
targets, beginning with an analysis of policy existence and providing the 
rank conditions were met, moving on to the actual computation of the 
policy vector. As with the earlier experiments in this chapter, they are 
identified by the pre-fix FT. The target variables for each experiment are 
listed in the following table. Identical target groupings were employed in 
the target point solutions.
The solution for FT11 requires a (40x40) controllability matrix 
and from the system dimensions given in Chapter Two, the matrix of exogenous 
variable multipliers will be of dimension (40x200) and the dimension of P 
will be (40x26). The solution to the problem is formidable in terms of the 
matrices to be manipulated. The dimensions given above were not restrictive
in terms of computation on the Australian National University's Univac 1100
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Table 23
Targets - Target Path Anticipation Problem
FTll 
FT12 
FT13 
FT14 
FT15 
FT16 
FT 17 
FT 18 
FT19
but it is highly likely that for much larger models the dimensions of 
the matrices could exceed the available core size available at a particular 
computer installation. In this case a long-winded but effective technique 
can be adopted. The matrices of exogenous variable and initial condition 
multipliers can be partitioned to form smaller matrices. The resulting 
matrices can then be multiplied with the relevant subset of exogenous 
variable forecasts or set of initial conditions and stored on tape. Each 
subset of the matrices can be handled in this way with the final result 
being obtained by incorporating the results of subsets into one final 
vector. Usually, the storage of a large vector will not be prohibitive. 
Unfortunately, little can be done about the controllability matrix R.
It is generally not possible to break it up into partitions which do not 
interact with the remainder of the matrix thus making it impossible to 
carry out separate independent inversions. This type of solution would 
only be possible when sectors of a model are completely unrelated and are
Y FR C CF M RL
/ / / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /
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subject to the actions of controls which do not appear in any other 
sector. Given this situation,a target problem could be solved as two or 
more separate problems. The high degree of simultaneity of modern macro 
models would most likely preclude this from happening. The size and the 
nature of the magnitude of the dynamic instrument multipliers poses the 
problem of satisfactorily computing the desired inverse, even when the 
matrix has full rank. To illustrate the problems associated with R and 
to illustrate how how a particular controllability matrix is set up, the 
complete controllability matrix for FT11 is presented on the following 
pages. The original computer output has been presented to avoid any typing 
errors and the elements have been rounded to five decimal places. At first 
sight it would appear that it would be a formidable task to set up the data 
for such a matrix to be fed into the computer. Once again, an extremely 
efficient simplifying procedure can be adopted. Recall that the 
construction of the matrix R if of the form
This structure is evident in the printout of R for FTll. The setting of 
the matrix can then take two distinct paths, depending on the availability 
of computer core. If the computer is very large and the dimensions of the 
problem (number of targets, number of instruments and the length of the 
planning period) are not prohibitive then R can be formed in the same 
computational process as the dynamic multipliers and it should be clear 
that only the instrument multipliers for the number of lags equal to the 
column dimension are required. Similarly, if the matrix has to be inserted 
into the computer as data, only the abovementioned multipliers need to be
299
included. (7.1) shows that it is a simple matter to construct R using 
a simple algorithmic procedure. The first k(T+s+l) columns are filled 
along with the first m rows by the insertion of the appropriate 
k(T+s+l) period point controllability matrix. Next, the computer is 
directed to insert a k(T+s+l)-k point controllability matrix in rowsiü+1 
to 2m beginning in column k+1 and ending in column k(T+s+l). The above 
process is repeated until the complete dimensions of the matrix R are 
fulfilled. The process only requires the manipulation of a much smaller 
point controllability matrix.
Turning now to R for FT11 we can observe a number of problems. 
Firstly, the first two columns only have positive entries for the first 
four rows giving 36 zero entries for remainder of the elements. Given the 
low magnitudes of the multipliers with perhaps the exception of the fiscal 
impact on Y and C, the close proximity of other variables to zero could 
have the effect of producing an inverse of doubtful accuracy. Indeed, the 
large number of zeros in the matrix could pose severe inversion problems.
It is not until the eighteenth column that the zeros disappear. The 
tendency of a fiscal impulse on Y, C and CF to tend to zero has the effect 
of producing very small values to appear in the extreme right hand columns 
of the matrix. Once again this could lead to inversion problems due to the 
close proximity of the elements to zero. The size of the matrix will 
amplify this problem during computation due to the need to carry out 
arithmetic procedures with a large number of small numerals; as a result 
rounding errors are likely to occur which could easily produce a rank 
failure. The problem became even more severe when RL was included as a 
target. It is clear even from a cursory examination of R for FT11 that
it would be almost impossible to detect a rank failure a priori and it is 
equally clear that the nature of the elements of R could prevent the
300
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computation of R 1 even when the choice of targets is consistent with strict 
policy existence. The problems of creating linear dependencies due to 
rounding would be enhanced by computing the dynamic multipliers and printing 
out the results rounded to say five decimal places and then constructing 
R based on those rounded figures. A more efficient technique would be to 
perform all computations together to ensure that the target number of 
decimal places are considered, depending on the capacity of the computer.
In any case, the results may not be completely accurate as the determinant 
will be very close to zero in most cases.
Before attempting to compute the fixed target policy vector for 
each set of targets, the question of existence was analysed and "checked".
For example, the matrix given above was inverted and then subjected to the 
traditional inverse test
I = R R = RR (7.2)
It was found that the unit matrix was obtained correct to six decimal 
places for FTll and in the cases where RL was included, correct to five 
decimal places. This indicates for FTll at least, that R has full rank 
although it must be conceded that rounding could have obscured any 
underlying linear dependencies. As a further check, the problem was then 
solved and the subsequent policy vector was substituted back in to 
generate the time paths for Y, FR, C, and CF. The computed and desired 
targets corresponded with a remarkable degree of accuracy.
The results of FTll were not encouraging. In fact, they could 
be classed as disastrous. While the solution generated the required 
time paths for the target variables, the time paths of the controls 
required to achieve the targets were completely outside the bounds of 
feasibility. Figure 30 illustrates the general behaviour of the controls.
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T  i e.FIGURE 30.
Target Path Instrument Response
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The actual levels of the controls have not been graphed due to the wide 
divergence between the maximum and minimum levels of G and DM in each case. 
The basic tendency for the monetary controls is to fluctuate between 
positive and negative with the fluctuations beginning to settle down as 
the end of the planning period approached. The initial behaviour of the 
controls had the effect of fixing the initial levels of the target variables 
at levels far removed from their respective desired values with the target 
variables eventually converging on their respective desired paths. The 
nature of the results naturally eliminates any detailed discussion of the 
results as was carried out in chapters five and six but are nonetheless 
important in their own right. A clue to the reason behind the type of 
solution obtained can be found in the results of previous optimisation and 
strongly-Tinbergen experiments. The results of these experiments clearly 
show that given the model, a high degree of instrument adjustment is 
required to achieve exact fine tuning. The previous experiments where exact 
fine tuning was achieved either had the number of instruments being greater 
than or equal to the number of targets. Here, the number of targets is 
double the number of instruments and this has resulted in the amplification 
of the behaviour of the instruments under exact fine tuning found earlier. 
The results are also consistent with the internal and external balance 
solutions where it was found that monetary policy in particular was 
required to be manipulated in a severe stop-go fashion.
FTll in its original experimental framework required a target 
path of ten periods. Given that we could expect severe instrument 
adjustments, it might be reasonable to expect that the severity of the 
adjustment could be modified by reducing the planning period and the 
period over which the system is to be held exactly on target. The 
reduction in the length of the planning period also has the effect of
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reducing the size of the controllability matrix making the inverse and 
solution more accurate. A number of alternative planning period lengths 
were tested. Specifically, (T+s+1) was set equal to 18,16,14,12 and 10 
periods. The policy lead and target path requirements for four targets 
and the above planning periods are summarised below.
Table 24
Necessary Conditions for Alternative Planning Periods
T+s+1 S T+l Dimension ofR
18 9 9 (36x36)
16 8 8 (32x32)
14 7 7 (28x28)
12 6 6 (24x24)
10 5 5 (20x20)
The above necessary conditions of course hold for any grouping of four 
targets. The four target problem of FT11 was solved over each of the 
above planning periods with the overall result that the relevant target 
path was achieved in each case but with levels of controls which once 
again displayed a considerable degree of fluctuation and lack of 
feasibility. Despite the failure of the solutions to provide results 
amenable to a meaningful economic analysis, the results do display an 
important general tendency. As the planning period was reduced, the 
degree of fluctuation in the controls became less severe. It could be 
argued that an improvement in the degree of accuracy of the computed 
inverse was responsible for such an outcome. To test this proposition 
the resulting inverses and inverse tests were examined very carefully. 
It was found that from a 14 period horizon down, the inverse became 
very accurate with the same general results. As a further test, the
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planning period was reduced further with inversions as accurate as that 
obtained in longer time paths of 14 periods or less. Once again the same 
general conclusion was obtained. Note that as the planning period is 
reduced in length we are considering smaller and smaller subsets of the 
controllability matrix presented above. The submatrices will converge 
on the top left hand corner of the matrix presented above and it can be 
seen that the number of zero elements will be reduced as will the number 
of near zero elements.
Another factor contributing to the nature of the results could 
be that too many targets were being aimed for in the four-target case.
For experiments FT12 to FT14, the target set was reduced to three. The 
experiments are of particular importance in relation to the internal and 
external balance framework as the internal and external balance separation 
is maintained and to some extent reinforced due to the complementarity 
of the third target. The achievement of C with Y and FR would strengthen 
the internal sector as C is the major component of Y and the target of Y 
is consistent with C in terms of the identity, (as we have seen this does 
not guarantee the achievement of both in the linear/quadratic framework) 
and vice versa for the open sector. The close relationship between Y and 
C on the income side and FR and CF in the open sector suggests a priori 
that the adjustment in the instruments to achieve those targets would not 
be as severe as before. A strongly-Tinbergen analysis of the above 
target configurations also supports this.
The appropriate controllability matrix for the three target 
case can be found from the four target controllability matrix by deleting 
the appropriate rows. For Y, FR and C every fourth row is deleted while 
for Y, FR and CF the third row and subsequent fourth rows are deleted 
and at the same time additional sets of dynamic multipliers are added for
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the appropriate targets to give the new matrix its appropriate row 
dimension. While the listed R will not give the full details of the 
appropriate three target R it nonetheless gives a clear indication 
as to its basic construction and properties and illustrates quite 
clearly that we could expect a more accurate inverse to result.
The choice of three targets with two instruments over twenty 
periods requires adjustment in the necessary conditions. The dynamic 
counting rule gives the target path a dimension of thirteen periods with a 
lead of seven periods. The dimension of R becomes (39x40). Clearly we 
have more time indexed instruments than is required and unless one 
"instrument" is deleted, R will not have a regular inverse. The choice 
of "instrument" to drop could be quite crucial as it becomes a known 
exogenous variable and the value selected will influence the final result. 
For the initial experiments, the monetary "instrument" corresponding to 
the last column of the matrix listed above (column 40) was dropped and 
assigned a value equal to its historical level. This had the effect of 
allowing any level of DM to be set at the beginning of the planning period. 
The solution to FT12 once again resulted in a vector of controls which 
could not be regarded as feasible. Similar results were obtained for 
FT13 and FT14. Experimentation with different deleted "instruments" did 
not change this basic result although the choice of instrument and the 
time period in which it was deleted did change the time paths of the 
overall control vector. The only encouraging factor to emerge was the 
fact that the resulting time paths for the instruments were considerably 
less severe than those required in the four target case. Surprisingly, 
the most feasible result was obtained for the target grouping, Y, C and 
CF. A reduction in the length of the planning period produced results 
similar to the four target case in that the fluctuations in the
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instruments over the entire planning period and the endogenous variables 
in the anticipation period were considerably less than the four target case.
Experiments FT15 to FT19 incorporate monetary variables with income 
and external balance targets. For all experiments that follow, the 
counting rule conditions applicable to FT11 to FT14 also apply. The 
conclusions and results obtained from the previous fixed target experiments 
suggest that a similar set of results would be forthcoming for FT15 to FT19. 
This indeed is the case with the added qualification that the results are 
more severe in relation to the required time paths for the instruments.
The coupling of M and RL could be expected to produce some degree of 
fluctuation in the controls as is suggested by the strongly-Tinbergen 
experiments. However, the dropping of either M or RL in a three target 
framework does not eliminate the severity of the control or initial 
endogenous variable behaviour. The results of the monetary experiments of 
Chapter Six suggested that if a monetary target was aimed for then the 
external balance position would need to be sacrificed. The strong trade-off 
between M and FR is sufficient (in FT16 for example) to upset the behaviour 
of the remainder of the system, particularly in the anticipation period.
The time path for FR fluctuates severely in the anticipation period 
reaching excessively high and low values thus raising the possibility of 
speculative capital movements. (Similar but less severe behaviour also 
occurred in FTll to FT14). As with FT11 to FT14, the monetary fixed target 
experiments were carried out with a shorter planning period. The results 
reinforce those which have already been discussed. The overall results 
of the target path experiments indicate that the need to exactly hold 
targets to a desired set of paths requires excessive instrument adjustment 
[not unstable in the context of instrument instability]. This suggests that 
the achievement of a point objective may be more feasible, although it would
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be harder to justify a point objective on political and economic grounds.
The achievement of point objectives was carried out using 
identical target groupings to those employed in experiments FT11 to FT19 
and are identified as experiments FT20 to FT28. Point controllability 
matrices for Y, FR, C, CF and Y, FR, M, RL are given below. Matrices for 
groupings of three targets can be obtained by deleting the appropriate row. 
Recall that the order of the matrix to be inverted in this case is equal to 
m, the number of natural targets. Thus, for four targets a 4 x 4 inversion 
is required and it can be seen from the matrix relevant to Y, FR, C, CF 
that it is a simple matter to establish full rank before computation. Even 
after fourteen periods it is a simple matter to obtain a matrix of full 
rank. (See appropriate matrix). The point controllability problem offers 
considerable scope for manipulating instruments over a variety of different 
time periods. For example, in the fourteen period case the necessary 
instrument adjustment could fluctuate between the extreme cases of taking 
all necessary action at the beginning of the policy lead or leaving it 
until the final periods. What is gained in flexibility may be lost to some 
degree in the need to assign values to the large number of slack time indexed 
instruments as the values chosen for those instruments will significantly 
affect the ultimate values of the instruments which are solved for. Perhaps 
the ideal situation would be to only consider the minimum lead necessary 
(see Chapter Two) . In the case of four targets we would require one period 
lead and all the time indexed instruments would be required thus avoiding 
the need to assign values to slack instruments. The minimum lead approach 
was adopted for the two initial target point experiments in which both 
sets of targets were specifically aimed for. Unfortunately, the results 
once again must be regarded as infeasible, particularly monetary policy.
The only encouraging aspect is that the required monetary and fiscal
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policies are positive during the policy lead and target point time 
periods - a significant improvement over the target path results.
To gain some insight into the sensitivity of the results, the policy period 
in both cases was extended until the fourteenth period was reached. Various 
combinations of slack instruments were examined firstly being assigned 
their target levels set out in Chapter Four, and secondly,being set at their 
historical levels. The overall feasibility of the results did not change 
but the experiments did indicate that the choice of values for the slack 
instruments can have a significant effect on the values of the computed 
control levels.
The experiments were repeated in a three target framework which 
eliminates the need to hit both M and RL which is a significant constraint 
on the solution. The dropping of M or RL leaving only Y, FR, M or Y,
FR, RL as the targets produced a substantially better result than the four 
target case but once again the policy values were not feasible and the 
system exhibited a tendency to fluctuate severely during the anticipation 
period. Note that with three targets and the minimal lead, policy planners 
will always require one slack instrument which makes the solution somewhat 
more sensitive than the four target case with minimal lead. The solutions 
to Y, FR, C and Y, FR, CF provided the best results in terms of feasibility 
of all the target path and target point experiments (excluding the 
strongly-Tinbergen approaches). The time path for G with a wide variety 
of anticipation periods displayed a high degree of feasibility for all 
time periods while unfortunately the monetary instrument fluctuated 
between extreme and feasible positive solutions. For example, the solution 
to Y, FR, C with a one period lead resulted in the target point being 
achieved with control results for the first two periods of —
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G DM
Period 1 747 1836
Period 2 1168 1791
The high values of DM relative to the historical initial conditions would 
most likely eliminate this solution at a practical level as it would 
require a huge increase in domestic liquidity and corresponding shift in 
the private sector's portfolios. In fact the time path for DM became 
more excessive in terms of high and low values as the planning period 
progressed. That is, the target point was achieved every second period but 
the anticipation period was characterised by a strong movement in monetary 
policy, giving excessively fluctuating values for DM. This of course has 
a disruptive influence on the remainder of the system, particularly on FR, 
giving one period exactly on target and the one period significantly 
off target. The behaviour of FR suggests that exchange rate speculation 
could also be a problem. The results nonetheless confirm earlier experiments 
in that the exact achievement of internal and external balance requires 
a severe stop-go monetary policy - a point which is adequately emphasized 
by all the target path and target point experiments. The majority of the 
target point results confirm the target path results in that exact fine 
tuning results in infeasible policy requirements (remember that target 
path achievement implies target point achievement at the beginning of 
the target path) and suggest that the target path results for large 
controllability matrices were not a result of the possible unstable and 
inaccurate nature of the computed inverse. The highly accurate inverses 
consistent with the target point problem (see the relevant controllability 
matrices) which produce similar behaviour, support this contention.
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LINEAR/QUADRATIC COMPARISON
Experiments FT11 to FT19 were repeated in a linear/quadratic 
framework which implies infinite impatience by the policy planner in 
trying to achieve all objectives. The results would serve to indicate 
if the choice of targets would yield infeasible results in both 
stabilisation frameworks. The target groupings selected for detailed 
analysis are given in the following table. The weights for each variable 
are also listed.
Table 25
Targets - Linear/quadratic Comparison
Y FR C M RL CF G DM
FT20 1000 1000 1000 0 ' 0 1000 1 1
FT 21 1000 1000 1000 0 0 0 1 1
FT 2 2 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 0 1 1
FT2 3 1000 1000 0 1000 1000 0 1 1
The controls were assigned a weight of one to avoid any inversion problems 
created by approximations, rounding and so on. All targets are in fact 
linearly independent and the allocation of a weight of one to the controls 
has the same effect as a zero weight. As before, a twenty period planning 
horizon was used along with multiple cost matrices to eliminate cost 
function bias.
The first experiment, FT20, emphasized the internal and external 
balance targets with M and RL taking on the function of intermediate 
variables in the sense of the definition of Chapter Four. Major results 
are graphed in figures 31 to 34. The time path for Y is almost perfectly 
stabilised in relation to its target. Any target deviations are minimal
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and would be of little or no concern to a policy planner in a real 
world situation. The optimal path for FR is not as acceptable as that 
for Y although for the majority of the planning period it tracks 
reasonably closely to its desired path. Similarly for CF. The target 
which exhibits the greatest degree of fluction or divergence from its 
target is C. The optimal path begins on target and then begins to 
systematically diverge below the desired level. It is clear that if C 
was exactly on target then the time path for Y would exceed its target. 
Recall that the target for Y was specified consistently in terms of C 
and other components. Similarly, the target for FR was specified 
consistently in terms of the components of the FR identity, CB and CF.
The results clearly show that targets which appear to be consistent at 
the identity level may not be consistent when a component of the identity 
is explained by a behavioural relationship.
The divergence of C from its target can be partially explained 
by the behaviour of the money supply which was allowed to adjust freely. 
It can be seen from the relevant graph that the money supply was 
particularly restrictive in relation to its desired time path with a 
severe contraction occurring in period ten. The sharp downturn in the 
supply of money filters through the income sector via wealth effects on 
consumption. Like the supply of money, the rates of interest fluctuate 
considerably with the long rate reflecting a "wave like" time path 
similar to those obtained in the internal and external balance 
experiments of Chapter Five with the long rate reaching a level of 7.4 
at its peak. The level itself may not be too excessive but the graph of 
RL reveals that the optimal time path accelerated towards the peak in a 
comparatively short period which poses the problem of asset market 
instability and once again raises the question of whether or not some
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attempt should be made to stabilise interest rates which do respond 
adversely to the achievement of internal and external balance.
The results so far do not diverge that significantly from the fixed 
target results in that the targets are reasonably well stabilised and the 
intermediate variables exhibit behaviour similar to that obtained in the 
fixed target experiments when the target path was exactly achieved.
However, the exact achievement of all targets in the fixed target framework 
allowed for even greater adjustment in the rates of interest and the supply 
of money and leaving aside questions of control feasibility, the linear/ 
quadratic results are preferable on these grounds. Turning now to the 
question of the required optimal mix of policy we can see immediately from 
the graphs that fiscal and monetary policy are more acceptable in this case 
than the fixed target framework although the results do tend to support the 
fixed target results. The optimal fiscal policy is exceptionally strong and 
expansionary in relation to its target and indicates that government 
spending has been almost exclusively assigned to the achievement of Y and 
C. The strong movement in G over the latter half of the planning period 
reflects an attempt to offset the restrictive monetary policy operating on 
C and to a lesser extent on Y. While the strong use of G has effectively 
stabilised Y, it is not sufficient to close the gap between optimal and 
desired C and in fact the results suggest an exceptionally severe fiscal 
policy would be required to do so - a result which supports the fixed 
target solutions. A more severe optimal fiscal policy would have 
repercussions on the external and monetary sectors (see reduced form) thus 
requiring even greater adjustment in G and a significant adjustment in DM. 
Indeed, even without any further adjustment in G, the optimal monetary 
policy is particularly severe and once again is of a stop-go nature. The 
general nature of the optimal monetary policy is contractionary which
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accounts for the restricted money supply and shifts rapidly between 
what can be loosely termed "high" and "low" values which could place 
extreme pressure on asset markets and in fact it may be difficult, as in 
the monetary experiments, to persuade the private sector to shift its 
portfolios in such an extreme fashion in such a short time thus throwing 
doubt on the feasibility of such a policy mix.
Experiment FT21 involved the dropping of the CF target. As a 
consequence, the overall target performance was considerably improved.
The time paths for Y and FR were almost exactly on target for the entire 
planning period (a much superior solution to the fixed target case) and 
as such have not been graphed. As an indication of the increase in 
performance the RMSD for real Y fell from 138 for FT20 to 60 for FT21 while 
the RMSD for nominal FR for FT21 equalled 6 - a figure not significantly 
different to zero. While Y and FR improved considerably, only a marginal 
improvement occurred in C - once again illustrating the problem of 
consistently specifying targets. The slight improvement in C results 
directly from the more expansionary monetary policy with the significant 
improvement in M being offset in the consumption function due to the low 
impact of financial wealth on C. The other intermediate variable of 
importance, RL, behaves in a more severe manner than in the previous 
experiment reaching a maximum value of 8.2%.
The earlier IEB experiments indicated that the closer the system 
moves towards exact achievement of internal and external balance, the more 
severe becomes the optimal policy mix. This is graphically supported and 
illustrated in this experiment with monetary policy becoming particularly 
severe moving between extremes of a significantly easy monetary policy 
in the middle portion of the planning period to a very restrictive policy
at the end. On the other hand fiscal policy is used in a strong fashion
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as in the previous experiment but is marginally more expansionary. The 
dropping of one target has allowed for a greater overall controllability 
of the remaining targets but at the expense of a more severe mix of policy.
It is interesting to compare this result with the target path and target point 
results. Given the same target combinations it was found that the dropping 
of one target (either C or CF) had the effect of producing a less severe 
and more feasible policy mix -  the reverse result to the linear/quadratic 
optimisation approach. The optimisation experiments also illustrate the 
advantages of reducing the gap between the number of targets and instruments. 
The target path approach as we have seen provides its most powerful 
application to situations of more targets than instruments with consequent 
severe repercussions for the use of the instruments. The results presented 
so far suggest that solely within the framework of internal and external 
balance, infinite impatience by the policy planner in trying to achieve his 
objectives and the resulting target compromise is considerably superior to 
anticipating a target path and achieving exact fine tuning.
The remaining two experiments to be discussed in detail feature the 
incorporation of monetary targets along with internal and external balance 
objectives. Firstly consider FT22. The exact achievement of both M and 
RL in a strongly-Tinbergen framework is of course not feasible due to the 
required policy mix and the inclusion of both targets with other targets 
does not enhance feasibility when anticipation is allowed. (Note that 
feasibility in this context does not refer to existence). The monetary 
target experiments of Chapter 6 illustrated the degree of trade-off beteen 
M and RL suggesting that the trading off of targets in an optimising 
framework would produce a situation whereby both targets would be 
significantly compromised. The results presented in figures 35 to 38 show 
the outcome to be contrary to the above and c ontrary to earlier evidence.
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The money supply in FT22 is more effectively stabilised than in the two 
previous experiments where M was an intermediate variable but at the same 
time RL has been very effectively stabilised. Indeed, allowing for some 
settling down of the solution in response to the divergence between the 
target for RL and the initial conditions for RL, the optimal path presents 
a situation where RL has been effectively pegged. It would appear that the 
trade-off predicted by both the model, the earlier optimisation experiments 
and the fixed target experiments had been neutralised. Recall that in 
Chapter Six the achievement of a money supply or interest rate target 
produced a vigorous reaction in the balance of payments position. This 
result has occurred again indicating that the trade-off between M and RL 
has been partially absorbed by FR and is a direct result of the cost 
minimisation nature of the linear/quadratic approach. As all weights have 
been scaled to give identical costs for given percentage deviations, costs 
are minimised by restricting M and RL and letting FR adjust in a more free 
manner. If the full effects of the trade-off between M and RL had been 
allowed to fully manifest itself, considerably higher costs would have been 
obtained. This is not to say that the trade-off has been eliminated as 
large percentage deviations in M still occur. In fact, the trade-off has 
been reflected more in M than RL - possibly because of the presence of 
RL^  ^in the function for RL which helps to keep RL on or near target 
once the solution settles down to a reasonably well stabilised time path. 
The results illustrate how an optimising solution minimises costs by 
restricting the movement of variables which are likely to produce high 
costs, thus siphoning off any trade-off into another closely related 
variable - a result of particular importance when monetary targets are
of concern.
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The behaviour of the income sector also deserves some comment.
It can be seen from the graphs that once again income has been effectively 
stabilised and this result follows naturally from the monetary experiments 
of chapter 6 whereby it was demonstrated that a well stabilised income target 
was consistent with the achievement of a monetary target. The incorporation 
of Y as an explicit target along with monetary targets merely reinforces 
and confirms the earlier results. Once again the optimal path for C 
exhibits large percentage deviations and as before the reason can be traced 
back to the optimal mix of policy. The optimal fiscal policy is significantly 
contractionary compared with the policies generated in FT20 and FT21 with 
the optimal path lying below the desired level for the entire planning 
period. On the other hand, monetary policy is exceptionally expansionary 
and severe with a massive increase in domestically created liquidity 
occurring towards the end of the planning period. The nature of the optimal 
policy is sufficient to squeeze out capital inflow in many periods. The 
severe expansionary monetary policy is not sufficient to produce a similar 
movement in the supply of money as the reaction of foreign reserves is 
partially offsetting and because fiscal policy is contractionary. Fiscal 
policy has a significant influence on the monetary sector and a restricted 
level of nominal income reduces the demand for money keeping interests 
effectively pegged at a low level. The low levels of the rates of interest 
contribute to the offsetting of the expansionary monetary policy. The net 
result is as we have seen a time path for C which is significantly more 
depressed than Y. (Y lies just below its target). The deletion of the targets 
C and CF and the inclusion of M and RL has resulted in a switch in the 
emphasis on the use of the instruments from a situation of strong fiscal 
and monetary policy to a situation of less severe fiscal policy and a more 
severe monetary policy. While C has been deleted from the cost function,
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the overall performance of C is as good as in FT20 when C was weighted 
heavily. Thus, in FT21 five targets are effectively stabilised in 
comparison with the earlier results with the added advantage that while 
the relatively poor performance of C in FT20 and FT21 contributed 
substantially to total welfare costs, the same performance was maintained 
in FT22 with zero welfare costs (contributed by C). However FR performs 
less satisfactorily in FT22 than FT20 and CF in FT20 tracked very close to 
its target and while an added bonus in relation to C is gained in FT22, the 
overall performance is significantly worse than FT20 with total welfare 
costs being given by
welfare cost FT20 = 3.84
welfare cost FT22 = 14.24
which merely confirms the degree of trade-off inherent in attempting to 
achieve a combination of monetary and open sector targets and clearly 
suggests that an income and balance of payments target configuration or a 
configuration including other income variables and one other monetary target 
are preferable as regards the welfare loss generated by the quadratic cost 
function.
The final experiment to be discussed in detail consisted of 
dropping the interest rate target and attempting to simultaneously achieve 
Y, FR and M without any policy anticipation. The major results are also 
graphed in figures 35 to 38. Once again the conclusions of the monetary 
experiments of Chapter Six are verified (in relation to the model) in that a 
high degree of stabilisation has been obtained for real Y. The proximity 
of the optimal path for Y to that of FT22 makes it difficult to graph and 
has not been included in figure 35. However, the dropping of RL has 
resulted in an improvement in the performance of Y illustrated by comparing
the relevant RMSDs for real Y in both experiments .
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RMSD,
FT22 197
FT 2 3 148
The improvement in Y has been matched by an even more significant 
improvement in the balance of payments position with optimal FR becoming 
exceptionally well stabilised, particularly towards the end of the planning 
period. The stabilisation of FR and an improvement in the performance of 
the money supply has resulted in a marked deterioration in the behaviour 
of RL (see figure 36). This is a direct result of the trade-off between 
monetary variables and by letting RL take on the function of an intermediate 
variable, FR and M are able to be more effectively stabilised.
The dropping of RL from the cost function has the result of 
completely reversing the emphasis in the use of the instruments. Fiscal 
policy is more expansionary but the significant switch has occurred in the 
use of monetary policy with the direction of policy being substantially 
reversed towards the end of the planning period. Monetary policy is still 
severe and of a stop-go nature but the overall use of DM has been less 
severe than in FT22 as is indicated by the appropriate RMSDs and figure 38.
RMSDj
FT22 585
FT23 280
This result concurs with the fixed target solutions where it was found 
that the deletion of either M or RL as a target resulted in a relaxed use 
of monetary policy and once again is a direct result of the trade-off
between M and the rates of interest.
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STOCHASTIC EXTENSIONS
All fixed target and linear/quadratic experiments presented in this 
chapter were repeated within a stochastic framework. Firstly, within a 
monte carlo framework to obtain some sampling statistics and secondly 
specific illustrative sets of stocks were used and the subsequent system 
performance analysed in relation to instrument and target sensitivity. It 
was found that the same general results held for both monte carlo and 
illustrative single shock experiments. The failure of the target path 
and target point solutions to provide feasible results in a deterministic 
framework means that a detailed stochastic analysis of the resulting time 
paths is equally fruitless from an economic point of view. Suffice to say 
that the presence of additive uncertainty to which the instruments are 
unable to adjust (except in strongly-Tinbergen situations) results in the 
target path or target point being severely compromised and throws some 
doubt on the use of fixed target techniques, particularly when there is a 
high degree of uncertainty. On the other hand, strongly-Tinbergen 
solutions respond exceptionally well to additive shocks. This is of course 
a result of the instruments and outputs being computed for each unit 
time period and as the solution explicitly incorporates the past state 
vector at each stage of the solution, the instruments are able to adjust 
for past shocks. A similar result was obtained for the linear/quadratic 
solutions under similar circumstances and when the number of instruments 
exceeded the number of targets. The results of experiments from earlier 
chapters confirms this and as such a graphical exposition of the results 
has not been presented. The strongly-Tinbergen approach to stabilisation 
can be superior to a flexible target approach to the same problem as in 
some cases an optimisation approach will require a solution to settle 
down towards the targets. This need not always be the case as was
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illustrated by IEB2 in Chapter live.The degree of settling down will depend 
on the lag structure of the system and upon the relationship between 
the initial conditions and the desired target paths of the outputs.
A safety-first rule would be to apply a strongly-Tinbergen solution in 
place of an optimisation solution whenever the number of targets equals the 
number of instruments and of course provided policy exists. Uniqueness 
and existence for strongly-Tinbergen solutions and optimisation solutions 
are readily established from the reduced form when m = k and in the case of 
a simple model, the conditions can be established from an inspection of the 
structural equations.
The stochastic results of the optimisation experiments are 
predictable based on the earlier work. The results clearly show that 
income and external targets are preferable in terms of welfare loss to 
income, external and monetary targets under uncertainty. The requirement 
that there be more targets than instruments results in the system being 
unable to adjust in a manner which allows the optimal stochastic paths 
to fluctuate about their desired levels (see IEB2 and strongly-Tinbergen 
results). The "best" result in terms of welfare loss from certainty to 
uncertainty increased in excess of 400%. The welfare loss corresponding 
to FT22 and FT23 was considerably higher with the optimal path for FR 
being liable to decerase or increase rapidly due to the presence of i-n
the identity for FR. Similarly, the supply of money exhibited large 
percentage deviations. In all cases, Y performed exceptionally well under 
uncertainty, largely because the income sector is insulated to some 
extent from the open and monetary sectors due to the low coefficient of 
financial wealth in the consumption function. This result is reinforced 
by the fact that shocks to the income sector through C, I, TPY and so on
are typically smaller than external shocks for example. The variation in
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the magnitude of the shocks reflects the real world situation where 
unanticipated uncertainty can arise in the open and hence monetary sector 
as a result of external facts being beyond the control of the domestic 
authorities. A comparison of the results obtained in this chapter and 
those of chapters 5 and 6 suggests that in the presence of an important 
open sector and given close linkages between this sector and the remaining 
sectors of the economy, the authorities should keep the relationship 
between instruments and targets as near as possible to equality to avoid 
excessive welfare loss due to uncertainty. The behaviour of the controls 
under uncertainty is also largely predictable based on the earlier 
experiments (the same set of random shocks was employed in each experiment 
to enable feasible comparisons to be carried out). As could be expected, 
the introduction of uncertainty resulted in a switch in the emphasis on 
particular instruments, particularly on the fiscal instrument which was 
employed in a relatively sedate manner under certainty but which became 
considerably more vigorous after the introduction of stochastic shocks.
The divergence between the optimal instrument paths for deterministic and 
stochastic frameworks once again raises the problem of implementing a 
stabilisation strategy based on certainty when policy planners are 
forced to plan in advance of the planning period and are unable to allow 
the instruments to adjust in accordance with unanticipated shocks. 
Sufficient evidence on this is given in earlier chapters and hence will 
not be discussed in detail here. The RMSDs for G and DM under certainty 
and uncertainty are given below (illustrative shocks) to illustrate the 
divergence in the optimal time paths and the switch in emphasis on 
instruments that can occur indicating the problems that could arise in 
implementing a successful stabilisation policy under uncertainty.
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Table 26
Instrument Performance under Certainty and Uncertainty
RMSD - G (Real) RMSD - DM (Nominal)
D S D S
FT20 190 225 410 396
FT21 204 156 593 885
FT22 84 200 585 680
FT 2 3 40 60 280 580
The conclusions to be drawn from this chapter are essentially 
clear cut. Given the model, target configurations and the numerical levels 
of target paths, a fixed target approach to stabilisation is inferior 
to a flexible target optimisation approach where targets are traded off 
rather than exactly achieved. The exact achievement of a target path or 
target point where the number of natural targets exceeds the number of 
natural instruments, places undesirable pressure on the available 
instruments. Even in strongly-Tinbergen situations infeasible solutions 
can arise when we attempt to achieve targets from different sectors of 
the system. The choice of targets employed in this study may well have 
been a major factor in producing extreme paths for the controls. A 
selection of all income targets for example may produce a set of feasible 
instrument time paths. Unfortunately,linear dependencies between income 
variables prevented a detailed examination of this aspect although the 
achievement of Y and C in a strongly-Tinbergen framework was consistent 
with a feasible set of instrument values. Additional computational 
experience needs to be obtained with larger models to ascertain whether 
or not alternative target configurations are feasible. However, the 
results do suggest that exact fine tuning will be inferior to attempted
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fine tuning.
The linear/quadratic flexible target solutions to the specified 
target configurations indicate that it is feasible to include internal 
and external balance targets along with monetary and other income targets 
The results are very encouraging as the experiments reveal that Y and 
FR can be closely stabilised in many cases with the greatest degree of 
divergence occurring in other targets, for example in C. Although the 
trading off of targets allows for a generally acceptable overall 
stabilisation result, severe policy actions are required although not as 
severe as the fixed target solutions. It is the closing of the gap (in 
many cases a small gap) between optimal and desired paths in the fixed 
target framework which turns a severe but feasible optimal policy into 
a more severe and infeasible non-optimal fixed target policy.
CHAPTER VIII
STABILISATION AND SPECULATIVE CAPITAL FLOWS
This chapter develops a special case of forecasting error in 
relation to uncontrollable exogenous variables. In particular, problems 
of unanticipated foreign exchange speculation are examined with specific 
reference to the applicability of dynamic stabilisation techniques. The 
results of the previous chapter suggest that a detailed analysis within 
the context of the fixed target framework would be largely fruitless due 
to the lack of feasibility of the results. As such, the emphasis will be 
placed on the linear/quadratic technique although it is possible to draw 
some very general conclusions about the fixed target approach.
The process of foreign exchange speculation essentially arises 
out of the utilisation of a fixed exchange rate approach to the balance of 
payments. If an adjustment in the exchange rate is predicted, either 
rightly or wrongly, then speculators will begin to move capital either into 
or out of the country of concern, depending on which way the exchange rate 
is expected to adjust. Assessments of exchange rate adjustments are 
usually based on the direction in which foreign exchange reserves have been 
moving over a particular time period. The fact that an exchange rate 
adjustment is expected is quite sufficient in most cases to ensure that such 
an adjustment docs in fact occur, even if the authorities had not been 
contemplating such a policy decision. That is, the actions of speculators 
can force the expected adjustment. The problem faced by the authorities is 
to try to identify when speculation is occurring which may involve the 
difficult task of disentangling speculative capital movements from short 
run perturbations. A failure to correctly identify capital movements as 
speculative could lead to disastrous balance of payments problems with a
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corresponding effect on the money supply. Alternatively, a hasty exchange 
rate adjustment to eliminate what has been incorrectly identified as 
speculative movements could also result in unfavourable repercussions 
throughout the internal and external sectors of the economy.
The model as we have developed it captures the essence of this 
speculative interaction as can be seen from the dynamic simulation results 
presented in Chapter 2 (Figure 3). The massive increase in foreign 
reserves which occurred towards the end of the estimation period was a 
direct result of speculative movements. The previous experiments conducted 
with the model yield some very interesting results in relation to 
potential speculative situations. Firstly, when FR is incorporated in the 
cost function (mainly with Y) and controls are allowed to adjust in a free 
manner, FR is so effectively stabilised that no speculation would be 
likely to occur. In some instances this result holds even when the use of 
one instrument is restricted. Of more importance however is the result 
that the incorporation of FR in the cost function with freely adjusting 
instruments is not conducive to inducing speculative movements even when 
additive uncertainty is introduced. The introduction of uncertainty 
results in a greater degree of fluctuation in foreign reserves about the 
desired time path but the short run shocks are not sufficient to "trigger" 
speculative capital flows due to the adaptive nature of the linear/ 
quadratic approach. The implications of this are quite straightforward 
and very important - if speculation is to be avoided under a fixed 
exchange rate regime then the authorities should exercise a considerable 
degree of control over the balance of payments. In the case of a country 
like Australia, control over the balance of trade is quite difficult due 
to the volatile and largely unpredictable nature of exports so attention 
must be focussed on capital flows. The comparative optimisation
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experiments of Chapter 7 also yield similar results. The inclusion of 
FR in the cost function with more than one other target also resulted 
in FR being stabilised at levels which would preclude any speculative 
reaction in relation to an anticipated revaluation. (The model assumes that 
speculation was triggered in 1971 at a level of $1779 million).
The monetary experiments reveal a different reaction in the level 
of foreign reserves with at least one optimal path being characterised by 
exceptionally severe upswings and downswings (other paths exhibited 
behaviour of a less severe nature). Indeed, the majority of monetary 
experiments create conditions conducive to speculative capital movements.
The situation of severe upswings (or downswings) which stabilise out at 
some higher or lower level presents a particular problem for the authorities. 
If an optimal plan is being followed then it would be necessary to publish 
full details of the expected movement in foreign reserves. By doing so the 
government may be able to prevent speculative movements from occurring by 
pointing out that after some initial adjustment in reserves, reserves would 
become stabilised. A failure to do this could of course result in the 
optimal strategy being destroyed although it could not be guaranteed that 
the publication of the desired strategy would have the desired results.
The ability of the government to convince the private sector that no 
exchange rate adjustment will occur is extremely limited as is illustrated 
by recent events towards the end of 1976 when constant appeals by the 
government failed to prevent speculation. Although the monetary experiments 
of Chapter 6 are only to be viewed as polar cases, they do suggest that the 
pursuit of a monetary target could lead to an unstable time path for foreign 
reserves. It is interesting to note that since the 1976 Liberal budget 
there has been an attempt to steer the money supply as close as possible to 
a rigid target and let interest rates adjust. Towards the end of 1976
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balance of payments problems began to emerge which were primarily a result 
of capital flows - a result anticipated by the model although it must 
be stressed that the model only allows for an upward surge in reserves with 
a resulting revaluation. Nonetheless, looking at the predictions of the 
model in reverse gives an accurate forecast.
The general conclusion to be gleaned from the preceding
optimisation experiments is that so long as the balance of payments position
is incorporated in the policy planner's cost function as a major target
(high weight), speculative capital movements can be avoided along with a
corresponding explosion in foreign reserves and resulting in a massive
expansion in liguidity. This indicates that under appropriate conditions
the linear/quadratic technique can be an effective stabilisation tool in
an open economy operating under a fixed exchange rate. What of the fixed
target approach? The experiments conducted with FR as a target of course
resulted in the FR target being exactly achieved over the specified target
path. However, the need to anticipate the target path resulted in extreme
values of FR being required during the policy anticipation period. This
would most likely lead to speculative capital movements and a subsequent
revaluation or devaluation with the net result that the exact fine tuning
goal of the stabilisation plan would be compromised. Not only would the
foreign reserves target be compromised but so would an income target for
example, due to the wealth effects in consumption with wealth being
affected by the behaviour of foreign reserves influencing the supply of
money. While the nature of the computed controls associated with the
fixed target approach would exclude the use of this technique given the
<»
model and targets selected for this study, the results nevertheless do 
indicate that the use of optimal stabilisation techniques would be superior 
to a dynamic Tinbergen approach when a fixed exchange rate is built into the
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system. Unlike the optimisation approach, the possibility of 
unanticipated speculation arises in the fixed target framework even when 
the balance of payments position is an explicit target. The only case 
where a fixed target approach would be acceptable would be in a strongly- 
Tinbergen framework with as many instruments as targets. As we have seen, 
this situation does not require any anticipation and foreign reserves 
could be exactly stabilised in each time period of the policy horizon.
(See IEB2, Chapter 5.)
The existence of a potential foreign exchange speculation 
situation poses considerable problems for policy planners wishing to plan 
policy consistently within some formal framework. The major problem 
being that it is very difficult to anticipate when speculative movements 
will be triggered and to recognise such an occurrence before it becomes 
a serious destabilising factor. A large upswing in reserves may occur 
over a short period of time which is a result of large capital movements. 
The capital movements may not be the result of speculation and the policy 
planner may invoke unnecessary counteractive measures. Similarly, the 
reverse may occur with equally disastrous results. A failure to correctly 
identify the appropriate trigger level of reserves also has implications 
for the linear/quadratic and fixed target approaches. Both techniques 
require forecasts of the uncontrollable exogenous variables over the 
length of the planning period. Given this constraint it would seem to be 
desirable to be able to incorporate speculative movements within the 
overall plan. One method of doing this would be to select the components 
of the welfare function or target package and perform a computer 
simulation. If the simulation indicates the likely presence of 
speculation then the plan can be revised to incorporate speculative 
movements. The revised plan could then be implemented. One would need
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an extremely accurate model and a profound faith in its forecasting 
abilities to be able to pursue such a course of action. The procedure 
also suffers from the requirement that the trigger level of reserves 
must be known beforehand and as we have argued this would be extremely 
difficult as the trigger level will be a function of political and other 
non-economic variables. Despite its limitations the above procedure 
still remains an option available to a planner with exceptionally good 
information about the evolution of the system and a high degree of control 
over the system.
The optimisation and fixed target experiments of previous 
chapters have shown that severe policy movements are required for exact 
fine tuning in a situation of no unanticipated speculation. The complete 
offsetting of speculative capital movements may require such extreme 
policy movements that it is not feasible both economically and 
politically to restore stability to the balance of payments and money 
supply without undertaking some degree of exchange rate adjustment. This 
possible outcome is supported by the historical adjustment of monetary 
policy whereby massive open market operations were carried out towards 
the end of 1972 to try and sterilise the incoming capital flows. The 
level of the domestic monetary base fell from $1984 million in the first 
quarter of 1970 to $689 million in the last quarter of 1972. The actions 
of the reserve bank were not sufficient to perfectly sterilise the 
incoming capital and it is reasonable to assume that perfect 
sterilisation would have required a considerably more severe monetary 
policy than that which was carried out. This type of policy behaviour 
would place limitations on the incorporation of speculation in the overall 
plan as suggested in the previous paragraph.
The activities of the monetary and political authorities over
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the period leading up to the 1972 revaluation also reveal another 
important problem. It is clear from the data that the Reserve Bank was 
aware of the speculation problem for some time yet no supporting action 
was forthcoming from the government. A not unreasonable conclusion would 
be that political expediency was the reason for the inaction. This is 
supported by the fact that a general election was scheduled for December 
1972 which the Liberals subsequently lost with the necessary revaluation 
occurring almost immediately after the change of government. Such purely 
political actions are almost impossible to adequately capture in a model 
or comprehensive plan. Alternative scenarios could be constructed for 
differing political reactions but it would be difficult to ascertain 
which plan to implement and it would not be possible to jump from one 
plan to another given the need to recompute the desired plan over perhaps 
a shorter time period. The implementation problem discussed in Chapter 2 
would also place constraints on this type of action. It should be 
pointed out that the incorporation of political decisions is extremely 
difficult in many cases and is not solely confined to the problem of 
adjusting exchange rates to inhibit speculation. The importance of 
exchange rate adjustments to primary industry in Australia makes the 
issue perhaps more contentious than in other countries and is one factor 
which is likely to severely complicate any attempt to systematically plan 
economic policy without resorting to a freely adjusting exchange rate.
The preceding discussion paints a fairly gloomy picture for the 
use of formal quantitative stabilisation.techniques in an open economy 
operating under a fixed exchange rate. However, the nature of the 
linear/quadratic solution appears to offer a potential solution to the 
problem. The feedback nature of the optimal control laws allows the current 
controls to adjust to past disturbances. Given this situation, policy
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could be expected to adjust to speculative forces which appear in x^_  ^
but will not be able to adjust to current speculative movements. The exact 
offsetting of speculation arising in the previous time period could be 
compromised by the current period situation and if the unstable feedback 
from capital flows into foreign reserves is particularly severe, explosive 
behaviour in foreign reserves could still occur. The previous optimisation 
experiments have illustrated that the composition of the feedback matrices 
can change substantially between target selections and cost function 
weightings with the same set of targets. Thus, the degree of dependence 
of the controls on the lagged value of FR (the crucial component of F^_ in 
relation to speculation) can vary to a considerable degree with the result 
that in some cases _he degree of feedback may not be particularly 
significant which would preclude any effective response in the controls 
to speculative capital movements. Ideally, one would like FR ^, CF , 
and to appear in the feedback matrices as the unstable behaviour
resulting from unanticipated speculation is predominantly reflected in 
these variables. The model only incorporates FR^ _ and the inclusion of 
CF^  ^and M  ^without reason could be regarded as "fixing the results". 
Indeed, the practice of incorporating lagged values of all endogenous 
variables explained by behavioural relationships is a common feature of 
applied optimal stabilisation studies (Pindyck (1973a), Garbade (1975a)) 
and serves the purpose of spreading the response of the controls to 
past disturbances over the entire system (as well as ensuring a good fit 
to the data) and lets the controls respond directly to past shocks in the 
target of concern. In many cases such a model specification is not 
justified on any theoretical grounds and if it is not adopted then we 
have the situation whereby controls adjust to past shocks in variables 
which have little effect on the target of concern. The reader is
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referred to the discussion in Chapter 6 where monetary targets are achieved 
through control response to other variables. Given that policy planners 
would be unable to exactly piedict when speculative capital movements 
are triggered or separate speculative movements from non-speculative 
movements in the initial stages of an upswing or downswing in reserves, 
or adequately plan for political inertia, it remains to be seen whether 
or not the controls can adequately adjust to speculative movements in much 
the same manner in which they adjust for additive disturbances. If 
controls are able to effectively adjust then the need to incorporate 
speculative movements and political decisions within the overall optimal 
plan will be redundant. The remainder of this chapter will focus on this 
issue.
APPLIED RESULTS
Before proceeding to the applied results it should be stressed once 
again that the results from Chapter 7 indicate that unanticipated 
speculative capital movements could have serious destabilising effects, 
even if the results obtained hud been feasible. The results suggest that 
the use of fixed target techniques should not be pursued when the 
possibility of unanticipated speculative capital flows exists. For this 
reason it is permissible to ignore the policy lead fixed target framework 
in the applied experiments that follow, with the linear/quadratic 
technique being of prime concern.
The overall format of the experiments is to specify a particular 
"trigger" level o- reserves and then re-run all previous experiments in 
which the trigger level was achieved. The re-run experiments allow for 
the speculative trigger to be activated which then sets off the unstable 
feedback from capital flows into foreign reserves requiring the controls
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to adjust accordingly, depending on the extent of feedback from FR  ^
in the feedback matrices. The resulting performance of the system can 
then be compared with the non-speculative results along with the ability 
of the controls to adequately adjust to offset the speculative capital 
flows. Note that the model only allows for speculative capital inflow 
which induces pressure for a revaluation. This is because the model was 
only estimated over a time period up to the 1972 revaluation and hence 
does not contain a proxy for speculative capital outflow and the 
corresponding pressure for a devaluation. Some of the earlier experiments 
contained results in which the time path of foreign reserves exhibited 
a significant downswing, the results of which cannot be directly analysed 
in a speculative framework due to the limitations of the model as we have 
seen. However, it is reasonable to assume that the unstable feedback 
from capital flows will approximate a mirror image effect in relation to 
upswing results and any broad conclusions obtained from the experiments 
wixl be applicable in general terms to a situation of anticipated 
devaluation.
The specification of an appropriate trigger level is. essentially 
arbitrary as speculation could occur given a multitude of different levels 
of past reserves. Speculation could occur after a prolonged increase in 
reserves over time or after a short-run perturbation combined with media 
or other non-economic pressure which is able to persuade speculators that 
a revaluation is imminent. Regardless of how it occurs or at what level, 
it could be expected that the general reaction of the controls will be 
the same from case to case. To this end we will specify a trigger level 
of reserves which will invoke speculative capital movements regardless 
of whether or not reserves have been climbing steadily towards the 
trigger level or hit the trigger level in a short period of time. Two
352
trigger levels were selected for the experiments. Firstly, a level of 
$1800 million was selected and secondly, a level of $1900 million was 
tested within the structure of the model. $1800 million was selected as 
it is a convenieno bench mark to start from given its close proximity to 
the historical (assumed by the model) level of $1779 million. Only those 
previous experiments in which the trigger level was reached and which 
exhibited feasible control paths were selected. Thus, M3 (rate of interest 
target) was not included although the trigger level of $1900 million was 
exceeded. The purpose of testing two separate triggers was to ascertain 
whether or not a higher initial trigger level would be consistent with 
greater instability than the $1800 million case and perhaps result in an 
infeasible control path as opposed to a feasible control response at a 
lower initial level of reserves. The experiments are identified by the 
prefix SPEC and followed by a numeral indicating the number of the particular 
speculative experiment. The specific cost function weightings are set out 
in Table 27 wnere the letters D and S once again refer to deterministic 
and stochastic.33 Where a stochastic experiment is designated it refers to 
the illustrative shocks discussed in Chapter 5, unless otherwise indicated.
In mos,, cases both deterministic and stochastic solutions are relevant for 
a particular speculative experiment. However, in a minority of cases only 
the stochastic solutions are examined as the deterministic solution failed 
to achieve the required trigger level of foreign reserves. In all such 
cases the deterministic solutions failed to achieve the required level by 
a very small amount and in any real world situation it would be reasonable 
to assume that speculative capital movements would be triggered under 
conditions of both certainty and uncertainty. Note that Table 27 contains 
three different sets of experiments for each cost function specification.
The three sets of experiments consist of examining the effects of
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Table 27
Speculation Experiments - Cost function Specification
Trigger
Y MB M G DM D s level
Spec 1,13,25 1000 .1 .1 / 1800
Spec 2,14,26 1000 .1 1000 / / 1800
Spec 3,15,27 1000 .1 .1 / 1800
SPEC 4,16,23 1000 500 .1 * * 1800
SPEC 5,17,29 1000 .1 .1 / / 1800
SPEC 6,18,30 1000 1000 .1 / / 1800
SPEC 7,19,31 1000 1000 .1 V / 1800
SPEC 8,20,32 1000 1000 .1 .1 / / 1800
SPEC 9,21,33 1000 1000 .1 .1 / / 1900
SPECll,23,35 1000 1000 .1 / / 1900
SPEC12,24,36 1000 1000 .1 .1 / 1900
* Experiment conducted with deterministic controls 
in a stochastic system..
speculation over varying time periods. By varying the time period over 
which speculative capital flows into the system we will be able to 
ascertain whether or not a cessation of such flows will enable the controls 
to adjust in such a manner as to allow the system to return to a position 
similar to the non-speculative case. That is, can the original optimal 
paths for the target variables be regained without the need for re­
planning and if re-planning is required, will it be significant in terms
of the optimal plan?
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The firsL set of experiments (SPEC 1 to SPEC 12) consisted of 
allowing speculation to continue unabated to the end of the planning period, 
beginning in the appropriate period when the trigger level is reached 
(approximately period 10 in all cases) . The purpose of the experiments 
is to determine whether or not speculative flows can be sterilised in a 
linear/quadratic framework with the controls adjusting solely in response 
to the size of ehe feedback coefficients in the matrices F^ _ relating 
u* to FR^  ^ . The general feasibility results are set out in Table 28.
Table 28
General Feasibility Results - Unchecked Speculation 
Exp._________ Type_______ Trigger________ Feasible_______ Infeasible
SPEC 1 S 1800 /
SPEC 2 D + 3 1800 /
SPEC 3 S 1800 7 •?
SPEC 4 * 1800 /
SPEC 5 D + S 1800 /
SPEC 6 D 1800 /
SPEC 7 D + S 1800 /
SPEC 8 D + S 1800 /
SPEC 9 D + S 1800 /
SPEC 10 D + S 1900 /
SPEC 11 S 1900 /
SPEC 12 S 1900 7 •p
* Experiment conducted with 
in a stochastic system.
deterministic controls
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The major result to emerge is that eight of the twelve policy 
selections are clearly infeasible. This is due to the fact that the 
controls did adjust to past disturbances but as the planning period 
progressed, the feedback from FR^ _  ^ became so severe that the required 
monetary policy was forced to become negative. Even though extreme 
policy adjustment has occurred in SPEC 4 to SPEC 11 for both D and S, 
foreign reserves still tend to blow up towards the end of the planning 
period. (See figures 39 to 41). This illustrates quite graphically that 
the Reserve Bank would find it almost impossible to sterilise speculative 
capital movements which are allowed to continue to enter the system 
unabated. This is supported by the structure of the model. Of particular 
interest is the result that the presence of speculative capital flows 
overwhelms the effect of random additive disturbances in relation to the 
time path of foreign reserves. This is evident in the stochastic time 
paths presented in figures 40 and 41. In the absence of unanticipated 
speculative capital flows the optimal paths for FR tend towards a 
significant downturn towards the end of the planning period. This is 
especially so in Figure 41. The shocks are unable to generate a similar 
downturn in the presence of speculation which indicates that while other 
forms of uncertainty may create a tendency to steer the balance of 
payments towards a substantial downturn, speculation will dominate and 
reverse the direction of the system.
The results of SPEC 1 and SPEC 2 are feasible in terms of the 
mix of policy and the presence of speculation results in an improvement 
in the performance of the target (Y in both cases). The RMSD for Y 
in SPEC 1 with no speculation is 125 while the presence of speculation 
yields an RMSD of 97. The improvement is slight but it illustrates the
interesting situation that speculation and additive disturbances can be
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complementary to the target of concern, perhaps even cancelling each other 
out to some extent. The time paths for speculation and no speculation do 
not exhibit a tendency to replicate each other but deviate from the target 
in different periods and with different magnitudes. Nevertheless, the 
general overall performance is almost identical. SPEC 2 was also feasible 
with the use of DM being restricted thus implying the need for G to adjust 
to offset speculative forces on income. The RMSD for deterministic and 
stochastic real G is given below.
RMSD (no spec) G RMSD (spec) G
D 160 103
S 170 230
Once again the results are surprising as the deterministic solutions 
reveal that less fiscal policy is required in the speculative case with 
the result that the performance of Y virtually remains identical to the 
non-speculative case. In this case speculation has been complementary to the 
achievement of the target. Note that all experiments which were classified 
as infeasible consisted of cost function specifications which incorporated 
either M or MB as a major target and as FR has considerable influence 
on those variables, the feedback response was greater as was the degree of 
compromise with the non-speculative results. Finally, SPEC 3 and SPEC 12 
have been classed as questionable outcomes. In both cases fiscal policy 
was allowed to adjust freely and in both cases the adjustment was 
relatively severe with highly depressed levels of government spending. 
However, the income sector was not depressed due to the upsurge in reserves 
and the supply of money which has a positive effect on income through the 
financial wealth effect on consumption. The feasibility of the results 
rests on a value judgement concerning the level of government spending.
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Ilf a high level of social welfare and other government services are 
desirable then the results will not be feasible, but if the opposite is 
tiruä with a high degree of emphasis on the private sector then the reverse 
wilL be true in relation to the nature of the optimal policy. A further 
result of some interest is that the questionable result of SPEC 12 is 
derived from the same cost function specification as SPEC 9 yet SPEC 9 
i:s slearly infeasible. SPEC 12 employs a higher trigger level which is set 
off in a later period than the 1800 trigger. The higher trigger level 
results in a slightly less cumulative feedback effect as it operates over a 
shorter period. This accounts for the improvement in the results. The 
use of a higher trigger level in other experiments did not appear to have 
had any substantial effect on the general overall results.
The two final sets of experiments examine the effect of a cessation 
of speculative flows after a short period of operation. The implementation 
of this type of experiment does involve some problems however.
Historically, the cessation of unanticipated speculative capital flows, 
whether inflow or outflow, has occurred through an adjustment in the exchange 
rate which naturally has had an effect on the Australian dollar value of 
foreign reserve holdings. The model presented in Chapter 3 does not contain 
any provision for exchange rate adjustments largely because the exchange 
rate was fixed over the estimation period and did not contribute 
significantly to the performance of the model. The fact that Australia 
did operate a fixed exchange rate explains why the estimation period ended 
with the 1972 revaluation. Adjustments in the exchange rate have typically 
been associated with a plethora of other controls designed to remove, hinder, 
or offset further speculative capital flows. For example, in 1972 the 
revaluation was accompanied by restricting the deferment of payments 
abroad for imports, services, dividends and interest and limiting
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prc-paymcnts for exports. In addition, surveillance over inter-company 
accounts was increased and restrictions on borrowing from certain types 
of desposits held in Australia by overseas residents were applied along 
with restrictions on non-resident investment in fixed interest securities. 
Such controls have not been incorporated in the model and indeed their 
incorporation would have been difficult at the level of aggregation 
employed. How then do we interpret a cessation of speculation within the 
context of the model and the following experiments? A close inspection 
of the data reveals that the large 1972 revaluation had the result of 
firstly stopping speculation and secondly producing a revaluation of 
$232 million in the Australian dollar value of reserve holdings. Given 
that foreign reserves stood at $5000 million prior to the revaluation, the 
shift in the Australian value only constituted a small percentage change. 
The size of the percentage change would largely eliminate any significant 
adjustment in the general indicative behaviour of the economy due solely 
to the revaluation of foreign reserve holdings in Australian dollars.
(There would be a significant change due to the cessation of speculation 
however). In the context of the experiments carried out in this study, 
the cessation of speculation after a short period with reserves at a level 
considerably less than $5000 million would only require a small adjustment 
in the exchange rate with a corresponding slight adjustment in the 
Australian dollar value of foreign reserves. The net result (leaving aside 
a cessation in speculation) of a small exchange rate adjustment in terms 
of the general indicative behaviour of the model would be small and as 
such can be abstracted from for the purpose of a general exposition.^
The above argument does have some empirical basis in light of the 
historical behaviour of the economy but if the reader is unhappy with the 
approach the cessation in speculation can be viewed as occurring as a
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result of strong government action in convincing speculators that the 
exchange rate will be defended. As before, if such an event can be carried 
ou: before speculation has been allowed to generate an apparently destabilising 
increase in FR, the approach remains quite valid.
To reiterate, the purpose of the experiments is to examine the 
feasibility of allowing the system to adjust to a short burst of unanticipated 
capital inflow due to exchange rate speculation and the ability of the system 
to get back on target or back to or close to the original optimal path 
without resorting to re-planning. The experiments consist of examining the 
sane trigger levels as before but incorporate two cut off points. Firstly, 
the effects of a cessation of speculation after four periods is examined 
(SPEC 13 - SPEC 24) followed by a two period analysis (SPEC 25 - SPEC 36).
As before, speculation was triggered around the middle of the planning period 
due largely to the impact of the exogenous variables on the system at that 
tine. The general feasibility results for both cut off points were identical 
and are presented in Table 29.
Table 29
Speculation - 4 and 2 period Cut-off
Exp.
SPEC 13,25
Type
S
Trigger
1800
Feasible
/
Infeasible
SPEC 14,26 D+S 1800 /
SPEC 15,27 S 1800 /
SPEC 16,28 * 1800 /
SPEC 17,29 D+S 1800 /
SPEC 18,30 D 1800 /
SPEC 19,31 D+S 1800 /
SPEC 20,32 D+S 1800 /
SPEC 21,33 D+S 1800 /
SPEC 22,34 D+S 1900 / (S) / (D)
SPEC 23,35 D+S 1900 / (S) / (D)
SPEC 24,36 S 1900 /
* Experiment
stochastic
conducted with 
system.
deterministic controls in a
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The introduction of a sudden halt to speculative capital movements 
after a short period of time has resulted in a greater number of 
solutions being feasible compared with the situation in which speculation 
was allowed to continue unabated. Of particular interest are the solutions 
to SPEC 22, SPEC 24, SPEC 34 and SPEC 35 in which the deterministic 
solutions are clearly infeasible due to the nature of the required time 
paths of the controls, whereas the stochastic solutions are feasible. Once 
again we have a situation in which general additive uncertainty has been 
complementary to uncertainty resulting from unanticipated speculation in 
relation to requiring a less severe monetary policy than the policy which 
prevailed in the absence of additive shocks. This type of counter­
intuitive result has been a feature of many experiments carried out in this 
study and supports the more generalised theoretical work already cited. It 
is clear that uncertainty need not necessarily be a hindrance to policy­
makers or be destabilising.
The ability of the system to get back on target is reflected in 
Figures 42 and 43 where selected experiments have been graphed. The graphs 
of SPEC 17, SPEC 29, SPEC 15 and SPEC 27 reveal a rapid shift back to the 
original optimal path without speculation and this behaviour of the target 
variables was reflected in all of the cut-off experiments and yields a 
minimal welfare loss from the non-speculative case. Thus, a brief 
unanticipated speculative capital movement in capital flows takes on the 
characteristics of a brief perturbation to the system after which the 
system is able to quickly recover and return exactly to its desired path. 
This response was not forthcoming when speculation was allowed to continue 
unhindered. While the target variables return to the original optimal 
path, the controls do not. In fact, the presence of a short burst of 
speculation when monetary targets are incorporated in the cost function
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forces both fiscal and monetary policy to vary from the original optimal 
path after the target variables have recovered- Similar behaviour can be 
found in the non-target endogenous variables, particularly in the various 
time paths for foreign reserves which depart drastically from the non­
speculation case. However, the general behaviour of FR remains identical 
to the non-spcculative case but at a significantly different level. See 
Figure 43. The failure of FR to get back to the original optimal path was 
reflected in all experiments as was the tendency for FR to reflect the 
exact cycles and downturns of the non-speculative case after the initial 
perturbation. The behaviour of FR has a significant effect on the adjustment 
of both controls when monetary targets are aimed for (with or without 
income targets) due to the significance of FR^ _  ^ in the relevant feedback 
matrices. See Figures 44 and 45. The importance of the feedback effects 
from FR reflects the underlying structural relationship between FR and the 
monetary sector. In contrast, the inclusion of Y as the sole target in 
the cost function produces a situation in which the time paths for both 
controls track very close to the non-speculative optimal paths with both 
controls returning exactly to the non-speculative time paths by the end 
of the planning period. This of course reflects the fact that monetary 
effects arising through balance of payments disturbances are minimised 
on the income sector due to the size of the financial wealth effect in 
the consumption function.
The analysis of this chapter yields some important results 
relating to the use of quantitative stabilisation techniques. Firstly, as 
we have already mentioned, the fixed target case would appear to be 
inappropriate when a fixed exchange rate regime is operating. The exception 
to this being strongly-Tinbergen situations such as IEB2 where reserves 
can be exactly controlled for all time periods of a planning period.
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Secondly, the treatment of unanticipated speculative capital flows as an 
additive type shock which cannot be adequately foreseen, will render 
linear/quadratic techniques ineffective if the speculation is allowed 
to continue unhindered unless pure income targets are aimed for. At the 
simulation level, lincar/quadratic techniques become feasible and 
exceptionally powerful when the speculation ceases after a brief period. 
Indeed, if Y is the only target then replanning may not be necessary.
At the practical level problems could arise out of the need to plan 
optimally in advance of the planning period or time period in which 
policy is to be implemented. (See Chapter 2). This would be especially 
so in the case of fiscal policy. A condition for the successful 
implementation of linear/quadratic techniques in a situation of unanticipated 
speculative capital flows and monetary targets is that a major 
restructuring of policy implementation takes place which would allow all 
instruments to be adjusted rapidly without being subject to the bureau­
cratic and political inertia to which they are subject at the present 
time. Monetary instruments are generally more flexible in practice than 
government spending with respect to rapid adjustment to immediate past 
states of the system and as monetary policy is the major weapon against 
balance of payments perturbations (in the absence of a freely adjusting 
exchange rate), the inability of fiscal policy to instantaneously adjust 
(instantaneously implemented) may not be a hindrance in all cases. The 
previous experiments suggest that in some cases a rapid adjustment by 
G^_ (within the unit time period) in response to immediate past 
speculative influences will be required but only in a minority of 
situations depending largely on the relative weights in the cost function.
The analysis does suggest that in general a more appropriate model in 
relation to the use of monetary instruments and the monetary and open
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sectors of an economy would perhaps be monthly rather than quarterly.
This conclusion has arisen elsewhere in this study and illustrates an 
important constraint on the use of quantitative techniques for economic 
stabilisation. As the correct income model, given the present level of 
sophistication in relation to data collection, is likely to be quarterly, 
the use of a monethly monetary model would require some decentralisation and 
deterioration in the coordination and implementation of policy. The 
results presented in earlier chapters of this study clearly show that policy 
needs to be coordinated thus some very short run monetary control may 
have to be sacrificed through the use of a fully integrated model to 
achieve a reasonable degree of policy coordination. This apparently 
paradoxical situation requires further attention, particularly if formal 
stabilisation techniques are to become an integral part of policy 
formulation and decision making.
The results also suggest that the cessation of speculative movements 
need not be permanent. Indeed, Figure 43 reveals that speculative 
movements are likely to be triggered again (perhaps in the opposite 
direction) thus further complicating the implementation of policy and 
adding an additional constraint to the practical use of linear/quadratic 
techniques. In general terms the results indicate the difficulties in 
implementing formal stabilisation techniques in an open economy with a 
fixed exchange rate. To avoid such complications a flexible exchange 
rate could be employed, or, in a lincar/quadratic framework, the balance 
of payments would need to be incorporated in the cost function as a major 
target subject to allowing instruments to adjust freely. Alternatively, 
the treatment of FR as a target in a strongly-Tinbergen framework will 
also preclude the occurrence of speculation arising from an upswing or 
downswing in reserves. The results of the previous experiments suggest
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that given the two above situations, even the presence of additive 
uncertainty in all sectors of the economy will be unlikely to result in 
unanticipated speculative capital movements. The analysis has assumed 
perfect forecasting ability in relation to the other uncontrollable 
exogenous variables of the system. For practical purposes it is 
doubtful if exact forecasting could be achieved, particularly in relation 
to exports which form a major component of the open sector. It would 
appear that a relaxation of the perfect forecasting assumption would 
necessarily inhibit any extensive planning and in particular would limit 
the degree of control over the open sector. This in turn could result 
in a failure to adequately plan and adjust for speculative capital movements. 
This need not be the case however. For example, in a strongly-Tinbergen 
framework there is only a need to forecast one period in advance.
Assuming that policy can be implemented fairly quickly then one period 
forecasts would not be an undue hindrance and it could be expected that 
forecast errors would be relatively small in most cases thus allowing for 
close control of the targets. The linear/quadratic approach can be 
modified by using learning techniques or by adjusting the length of the 
planning period until it is felt that a reasonably accurate forecast can 
be made. Unfortunately the need to plan in advance will tend to make 
forecasts more inaccurate but at least a reduction in the length of the 
planning period will reduce the degree of forecast error in the absence
of any severe abnormal external shocks.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
The major conclusions of this study have been discussed in detail 
at the end of each relevant chapter but it is nonetheless useful to 
reiterate the major points. Firstly, it is quite clear that given the 
model and the target levels for specific endogenous variables, the dynamic 
Tinbergen or fixed target approach to stabilisation is vastly inferior to 
an optimisation or flexible target approach. This result does appear at 
first sight to be counter-intuitive as many policy-makers would agree 
that the underlying philosophy of the fixed target approach is more 
appropriate to stabilising the economy than an optimising approach. It is 
not uncommon to hear both politicians and policy-makers arguing that any 
specified targets can only be reached after a degree of time has passed 
(the policy lead or anticipation period in the fixed target framework). The 
results appear to concur with this view as it has been clearly shown that 
if the equality between instruments and targets is broken and if the number 
of targets exceeds the number of available instruments, optimisation will 
result in the non-achievement of all targets. However, it has also been 
clearly shown that to exactly achieve all targets by an appropriate 
anticipation of the target path, requires infeasible policy prescriptions, 
even if only a relatively small gap is to be closed between the target and 
a corresponding optimal solution. In fact, in an open economy, the 
achievement of targets selected from different sectors of the economy will 
result in severe policy adjustments even in a strongly-Tinbergen framework. 
This of course is due to the way in which the sectors interrelate and the 
experiments of the previous chapters indicate how action to stabilise one 
sector of the economy can create adverse movements in another sector.
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The results do not necessarily indicate that it is wrong to try 
and anticipate a target path objective as it must be remembered that it has 
been implicitly assumed that the model is the correct model. This has 
allowed exact fine tuning at the simulation level. At the practical level 
policy-makers may not have such a profound faith in the properties of any 
econometric model and would most likely use a combination of judgemental 
and quantitative analysis to arrive at a suitable policy sequence. This 
factor combined with a tendency for the structure of the economy to evolve 
over time would most likely mean that it would be deemed satisfactory to 
steer the economy to within reasonable bounds of the targets after a 
suitable anticipation period. It should be stressed that the results 
obtained in this study are only meant to be indicative of what could 
happen if either of the two stabilisation techniques were implemented. 
Unfortunately, our knowledge of control techniques has tended to exceed our 
knowledge of how the economy works. If, in the future, policy-makers are 
prepared to accept econometric models for actual planning purposes and are 
willing to implement the policies generated by applying stabilisation 
techniques to those models, then the conclusions of this study will become 
particularly relevant. What is required now is considerable additional 
research on fixed target techniques using alternative models and target 
sets, as the use of such techniques as a guide for policy-making may not 
be too far away in the future - policy-makers are already beginning to 
use optimisation techniques.
The complications of an open economy have been stressed throughout 
this study. In particular, it is clear that the phasing and implementation 
of both monetary and fiscal policy needs to be co-ordinated to a high degree. 
The internal and external balance and monetary experiments illustrate how
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policy manipulations by the fiscal and monetary authorities can impinge on 
other sectors of the economy producing the need to offset such influences 
while trying to steer a particular sector towards a designated goal- The 
successful implementation of a stabilisation strategy requires a high degree 
of centralised policy-making which in turn requires the use of at least 
a quarterly model. In fact, it has been argued that as monetarv policy is 
generally easier to quickly implement than fiscal policy, a Quarterly 
model may even be inappropriate for monetary and open sector stabilisation 
and a degree of control over the money and open sectors may need to be 
sacrificed in order to achieve policy co-ordination within a quarterly 
framework. The loss of control over the open and monetary sectors will be 
more pronounced under significant uncertainty as the monetary instrument 
will be prevented from adjusting to offset very short-run perturbations. 
Perhaps what is required to overcome this problem is a quarterly income 
sector coupled with monthly open and monetary sectors. The only problem 
here would be trying to model the linkages, particularly if quarterly 
income data was required.
Uncertainty has been a key issue throughout this study. The 
presence of uncertainty is of particular importance in relation to the open 
sector and to a lesser extent in relation to the monetary sector. The 
internal and external balance experiments of Chapter Five illustrate how 
additive uncertainty can shift the open sector off target due to the nature 
of the identity for foreign reserves. This poses a particular problem for 
external stabilisation and it is clear that if uncertainty is present in 
the open sector to a considerable extent, then the open sector will need to 
be heavily weighted in the cost function in an optimisation framework to
ensure the exclusive assignment of the monetary instrument. We have seen
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that an exclusive assignment of the monetary instrument to the open 
sector can keep the time path for foreign reserves very close to its 
target when uncertainty is present. On another level, we have seen that 
the presence of uncertainty can produce significant switches in the use of 
fiscal and monetary policy from the deterministic case. In particular, it 
has been shown that in some instances the use of policy can be more passive 
under uncertainty than certainty - a result which many policy-makers may 
find surprising. The change in the mix of policy from a certainty situation 
to one of uncertainty suggests that if policy is formulated on the basis of 
perfect information (which it may be necessary to do) and then implemented 
in an uncertain world, significant destabilisation may occur. The results 
of the preceding experiments confirm this to a large extent, although it 
may be possible in the case of a total monetary base target to successfully 
implement a deterministic policy in a stochastic world. The results of 
the internal and external balance experiments also illustrate that it is 
possible to obtain a greater degree of control with less instruments under 
uncertainty than can be obtained with additional instruments. This result 
is very important as it indicates that uncertainty need not be a hindrance 
to stabilisation as is commonly assumed. The stabilising properties of 
uncertainty appear throughout this study, particularly in relation to 
unanticipated speculative capital flows. The possibility of speculative 
capital flows under a fixed exchange rate regime is a special form of 
uncertainty which can seriously disrupt any fixed or flexible target 
strategy. However, by treating speculation as a type of additive 
uncertainty, minimal disruption to a stabilisation strategy obtained from 
optimisation can result.
One aim of this study was to compare the stochastic performance 
of both the fixed and flexible target approaches to stabilisation and to
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examine the loss of fine tuning in the fixed target framework. Optimisation 
is clearly superior to fixed target stabilisation under uncertainty when 
the number of natural targets exceeds the number of natural instruments.
This of course follows from the feedback nature of the optimal control 
laws. In a strongly-Tinbergen framework, a fixed target solution is 
probably marginally superior to optimisation under uncertainty in that the 
fixed target solution explicitlv includes the initial conditions or 
immediate past state of the system in the solution procedure. On the other 
hand, an optimisation solution may require the system to settle down if 
there is a significant divergence between the initial state and the targets. 
It should not be forgotten that in a strongly-Tinbergen situation, 
optimisation can be regarded as redundant. Unfortunately, the nature of the 
fixed target, policy lead solutions, mean that a detailed discussion of 
the stochastic results will be of little additional value. This is an 
area in which there is ample scope for additional research with alternative 
models.
The presentation of particular feedback matrices in Chapters 
Five and Six not only indicates the difficulties in trying to estimate 
historical preference functions, but also casts some doubt on a comment put 
forward by Benjamin Friedman (1975a) in the conclusion of his volume on 
applied stabilisation. Friedman observed that the feedback matrices 
obtained from optimal experiments could be used to derive rules for 
alternative scenarios, for example, inflation, recession and so on. 
Friedman's comment overlooks the fact that if we have a model from which 
we can obtain rules that we can believe in then of course there is no need 
to use simple rules - we would do better by using the results of the optimal 
stabilisation experiments. Leaving this aspect aside, it is clear from 
the feedback matrices presented in this study that in the short-run, the
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coefficients of the feedback matrices chanqe so often over a planninq 
horizon that no single rule could be isolated. Further complications are 
introduced by the behaviour of the additive vector which is liable to shift 
dramatically from period to period and be an important factor in the 
formulation of optimal controls. Simple rules of the type considered in the 
rules versus discretion controversy which originated with Simons (1936) do 
not usually contain a constant term and if it is desired to include a 
constant term, it is clear from the results that there is no way of 
specifying a single, appropriate number based on the optimal solutions.
A number of issues relevant to the applied control theorist have 
also been raised, the most important being the notion of cost function bias. 
It is only be eliminating cost function bias that exact trade-offs can be 
maintained and legitimate and meaningful welfare comparisons can be made 
between alternative cost function specifications. A technique for deriving 
target paths for seasonally unadjusted variables was introduced and 
implemented and it was recognised that in the formulation of appropriate 
target paths, the consistent specification of identities does not guarantee 
the consistent achievement of the components of the identity or the 
variable described by the identity. The above issues have been overlooked 
by applied control theorists in the past but should be considered when 
stabilisation scenarios are being formulated and executed.
While optimisation techniques have received a good deal of 
attention in relation to economic stabilisation, there still remains a 
considerable area for research into alternative stabilisation techniques 
such as the dvnamic Tinbergen fixed target approach. The present study 
only touches the surface. Additional work needs to be carried out in the 
stochastic area and it would be beneficial to compare the sensitivity of 
flexible and fixed target techniques to coefficient and more general
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structural adjustments, sensitivity to forecast errors in the uncontrollable 
exogenous variables and the initial conditions. In fact, little or no 
attention has been paid to forecasting errors in relation to exogenous 
variables and initial conditions with respect to optimal control,so this 
gap needs to be filled before the fixed target approach is analysed in 
detail. The results of this study present a fairly gloomy picture of the 
fixed target approach to stabilisation but as this constitutes the first 
attempt at an applied analysis of such problems, the results should not 
be taken as the final conclusive evidence on the subject. Alternative 
models and target sets, particularly target sets which only include 
variables from one sector of the economy, may yield feasible results 
which may allow the fixed target approach to be regarded as a feasible and 
perhaps more acceptable alternative to optimal macroeconomic control.
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FOOTNOTES
1 An example of a non-linear technique which provides a solution in which 
it is not clear if it would be any better in terms of computational 
costs or accuracy of the algorithm in relation to obtaining an optimal 
solution than a linear treatment of the same problem can be found in the 
work of Gupta et al (1975). There is some uncertainty about the accuracy 
of the technique (page 266) "While it cannot be proven that the algorithm 
converges to the global optimum, the probability of such convergence can 
be shown to increase with the number of initial points randomly chosen
in the solution soace...Thus it is likely that the policy solutions we 
present are globally optimal". There is however, no guarantee that 
this is the case and would depend on the number of initial points chosen.
2 The Theil-Tinbergen procedure (Theil (1964), Tinbergen (1952)) can also 
be employed which obviates the need for a large state space realisation, 
see Friedman (1975a) . The choice of technique is usually made on the 
grounds of convenience or solution tractability and the preferences of 
the researcher. In any case, Norman (1976) has recently shown that the 
dynamic programming technique and the Theil-Tinbergen approach are in 
fact logically equivalent.
 ^ This is a standard mathematical result. See Chow (1970) for a further 
analysis in relation to optimal control analysis.
A more detailed discussion, although within slightly modified frameworks, 
can be found in the works of Garbade and Preston cited above. Garbade 
employs a Chow type framework while Preston utilises the conventional 
control theory formulation which as yet has not gained a wide acceptance 
in the economic control theory literature. In addition, Preston relies 
on the control concepts of observability and detectability, concepts 
which have been part of the control literature for some time but have 
been ignored in economic applications. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
summarise the major results in a succinct manner and at the same time 
seeing intuitively why certain conditions are applicable, without 
resorting to a prolonged rigorous analysis.
5 While the specification of R > 0 is not necessary for policy uniqueness 
in the dynamic programming framework presented here, Rt > 0 is necessary 
in the minimum Principle solution used by Pindyck (1973) where R^_  ^
appears as an individual component of the solution. The dynamic 
programming procedure is generally more flexible then, although 
R = 0  can be approximated in the minimum Principle framework by setting 
R^ > 0 with the weights extremely small in relation to the output weights.
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r I am indebted to a number of public servants for contributing some 
revealing insights into some of these aspects. They, of course, 
must remain anonymous.
7 A, C and D denote structural coefficients as distinct from reduced 
form coefficients.
 ^ The relationship between the final form and the state space form was 
initially established by Preston and Wall (1973).
01 B must be mxm. If B is greater than mxm then appropriate adjustments 
can be made by deleting time-indexed instruments. This is discussed 
elsewhere in Chapter Two.
I® (2.64a) illustrates that s is not completely arbitrary but that there 
exists a minimal policy horizon, the length depending on the number of 
targets and instruments.
11 Turnovsky (1968) has successfully employed this hypothesis in an 
applied analysis of New Zealand imports.
After this study was completed the author became aware of a later study 
by Porter, Porter (1976), in which the domestic assets of the Reserve 
Bank (DM) were broken up into constituent parts giving an overall 
better fit to the data. It would appear that the improvement in fit 
would not substantially alter the general nature of the results.
12 We have already noted that this is extremely difficult in Australia 
due to the institutional nature of wage and price determination.
1 See Kareken, Muench and Wallace (1973) for a detailed discussion of 
some important problems associated with this issue.
^  The analysis of the problem is carried out in Turnovsky's paper with an 
infinite time horizon although it is indicated that a similar set of 
results can be obtained with a finite time horizon. Turnovsky's 
analysis also allows for the case where the number of targets is 
greater than the number of instruments which is more general than 
Holbrook's original framework.
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while no formal dynamic stability analysis has been carried out, an 
examination of the reduced form indicates that we could reasonably 
expect Y to be a stable function based on the rule of thumb 
technique of examining the size of the coefficients of the lagged 
endogenous variables, particularly lagged Y. Simulation studies 
with both instrument constant lend support to this assertion and 
similarly help confirm that no oscillatory behaviour in Y occurs 
over the twenty period policy interval.
17 At the present time an exhaustive investigation into instrument 
instability in the fixed target framework is being conducted 
by Preston and Sieper at the Australian National University.
I O The disturbances were generated in a manner which produced zero 
auto-correlation. This procedure eliminated the computational 
complication of using control laws which would take account of 
the auto-correlation. For practical planning purposes any auto­
correlation present in the model could be accounted for by 
implementing an appropriate control technique, for example, the 
technique outlined by Pagan (1975).
^  The terms "strong", "expansionary" and "contractionary" are used in 
relation to the position of the optimal policy path relative to its 
target. Where stochastic and deterministic results are being 
compared, the terms refer to the relative position between those 
two paths.
p n The comparison is made in terms of the deterministic results as 
the historical data used to estimate the model will contain any 
historical shocks and the historical fiscal and monetary policies 
will contain adjustments for those shocks, that is, only if the 
shocks were detected sufficiently quickly enough to enable 
counteractive policy action.
p I Several other exploratory experiments were carried out with different 
targets which indicated that a severe divergence between initial 
conditions and targets required that the solution settle down before 
the targets were achieved exactly.
■ The feedback matrices for IEB2 are identical for all time periods 
and are largely redundant given that the problem can be solved 
within a strongly-Tinbergen framework and as such, have not been 
included.
23 The same result could occur when zero costs are allocated to the 
instruments.
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Policy planners could perhaps adjust relatively easily to monetary 
disturbances where the data is often of a monthly or even weekly 
nature but could not adjust easily to lagged income say, where there 
are very real delays in obtaining the correct information about the 
previous level or current level of Y.
25 The length of lags in the system is also important as lags greater 
than say three periods,would probably allow all instruments to 
adjust in response to past shocks in the state vector. Not so 
however for one period lags.
36 For a discussion of related issues concerning this problem see 
Friedman (1975b).
It could be argued that the model used here is too simple for any 
such conclusions to be drawn. However, in terms of complexity it 
is certainly no worse than a considerable number of monetarist 
models which have been used for theoretical analysis and applied 
work, for example, the model of Andersen and Jordan (1970).
33 Evidence of this appeared in Australia in recent years, particularly 
up to 1972, with attempts to keep interest rates stabilised being 
consistent with a rapidly expanding total monetary base and money 
supply with annual increases of 25% in nominal M not being uncommon.
33 A similar conclusion holds for the case where the supply of money 
and the rate of interest are exactly controlled.
30 It should not be forgotten that the structural properties of the
system will not change and the instrument will still be structurally 
unstable, which should be distinguished from stability at the 
implementation level.
33 This effect was also apparent in the IEB experiments. The scaling of 
weights is not so important in the monetary experiments as only one 
target is aimed for. Note also that the auxiliary state variables 
are also important components of the feedback matrices which places 
some doubt on the historical estimation of feedback matrices unless 
the exact, true model is used.
33 Further monte carlo experiments were carried out which confirmed 
the robust nature of the linear/quadratic solution. In each 
case the target of concern was stabilised around its desired time 
path.
383
Strongly-Tinbergen experiments were carried out where there were 
two targets and both instruments were allowed to adjust freely 
(a weight of -1 in an optimising framework). The results are 
interchangeable.
31' A small exchange rate adjustment would only have a minimal effect 
on other areas of the economy, for example the price level, and 
would not change the general results.
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